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I Introduction 
 
In the past years corporate governance has become a topic of considerable interest both, 
in theory and practice. Despite the existence of various approaches to what corporate 
governance means2, corporate governance can yet be generally understood as “the 
system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate 
governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation such as the board, managers, shareholders, and 
other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on 
corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the 
company objectives are set and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance.”3  
 
The discussion on corporate governance goes back to the beginning of the 1980s during 
which US managers had been neglecting shareholders’ interests resulting in an ongoing 
decrease of share prices. These managers focused on firm growth rather than on 
increasing shareholder value. Incentive-based compensation tied to stock market 
performance did not exist and managers were only weakly monitored. In response to the 
dissatisfaction of shareholders, a wave of hostile take-overs emerged against which US 
managers protected themselves with severance payments. Over time, hostile take-overs 
turned out to be an ineffective means of improving fundamental corporate governance 
structures.4 As a result, deficits concerning the long-term alignment of shareholders’ 
and managers’ interests and the distribution of roles within the internal control bodies 
were criticized.5 In Europe the topic of corporate governance was already being 
discussed from a theoretical perspective during the 1960s and 1970s describing 
corporate governance as the constitution of a firm which specifies the duties and rights 
of firm-related parties.6 However, it was only in the 1990s after a number of unexpected 
insolvencies such as Metallgesellschaft in Germany and cases of fraud such as Barings 
Bank in the UK that the importance of corporate governance was realized. 
 
                                                 
2  These approaches will be discussed later in this introduction. 
3  OECD (1999): http://www.oecd.org/daf/governance/Q&As.htm. 
4  Holmström / Kaplan (2003), pp. 10-11. 
5  Holmström / Kaplan (2003), pp. 12-15. 
6  Theisen (1989), pp. 132-134. 
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Two main developments within the past few years led to an intense discussion on 
corporate governance. The first development is the internationalization of capital 
markets; the second is the series of unexpected insolvencies mentioned above.  
 
The internationalization of capital markets has given the topic of corporate governance 
considerable importance, particularly in countries where originally capital markets had 
not been the primary source of corporate finance. The internationalization of capital 
markets can be seen as a result of the globalization of countries, product markets, and 
companies. Internationally operating companies have started raising capital in foreign 
countries. At the same time investors have discovered new investment opportunities in 
foreign capital markets. The opening up of the markets confronted investors with 
unfamiliar management systems and firms with new expectations concerning capital 
market communication. Especially institutional investors such as pension funds have 
started putting pressure by benchmarking firms along their quality of corporate 
governance.7 This is mainly due to the information deficit of investors and the 
insufficient communication by firms on their corporate governance systems. 
Consequently, there is the risk that investment decisions are made upon incomplete 
information and that shares lose value.8 Hence, there is significant pressure by the 
capital markets on firms to make their corporate governance systems more transparent. 
Reducing the information gap between firms and investors can therefore decrease the 
perceived investment risk and make firms more attractive as investment opportunities. 
 
The second relevant development motivating the current discussion on corporate 
governance is a series of sudden and unexpected insolvencies of large companies often 
combined with fraudulent financial reporting and auditing. Most of these insolvencies 
are caused by inefficiencies of management, deficits of internal control mechanisms, 
and inaccurate auditing. The sudden insolvency of Enron, the US energy company, has 
led to worldwide distrust. Enron manipulated its financial statements by taking 
advantage of the elbow-rooms of US-GAAP concerning the valuation of derivatives.9 
Also in Germany there have been several cases of spectacular insolvencies in the past 
                                                 
7   Nussbaum (2002), p. 172: The US pension fund California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS), for example, regularly publishes a list of firms with poor performance and quality of 
corporate governance.  As CalPERS has been investing in several European equities in the past years, 
many European firms are interested in becoming or staying competitive regarding their corporate 
governance standards. 
8  Saitz  / Wolbert  (2002), p. 322. 
9  Lüdenbach / Hoffmann (2002), p. 1173. 
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years. Philipp Holzmann, which had been making losses due to mismanagement and 
economic slowdown in the construction industry, manipulated its financial statements 
so as to record profits. In 2002 it went bankrupt. Comroad is another case of fraudulent 
reporting. Over several years Comroad recorded sales with a non-existing subsidiary 
company in Asia, which auditors did not detect. The relevance of corporate governance 
is enormous as it can establish control and risk management mechanisms. Further 
solutions to the problems described above certainly lie in a higher quality of financial 
reporting standards and in a more intense cooperation of auditors with the respective 
internal control bodies of firms. 
 
As a reaction to the above-mentioned problems the legislations of the USA and of many 
European countries have started reforming their corporate laws and enacting more 
binding regulations in order to regain the confidence of existing investors and to attract 
new investors. In the USA the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced to intensify liability 
by managers. In Germany, for example, the government has drafted new regulations on 
risk management and has formed a commission to develop the German Corporate 
Governance Code, a list of criteria for good corporate governance. This code, which has 
only advisory character, particularly addresses listed corporations. Application of the 
code is aimed to serve as a positive signal to the capital market.  
 
The recent developments discussed above may suggest that the objective of corporate 
governance is to protect only shareholders. However, there are many other stakeholders 
such as employees or customers, who are also interested in good corporate governance. 
The goals of corporate governance depend on what is understood under “corporate 
governance”. There are various approaches to what corporate governance refers to.10 
The Shareholder Approach11 focuses on the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and managers as well as on listed corporations. It is based on the premises of a 
separation of ownership and control (i.e. those who own the company are distinct from 
those who manage the company) and of opportunism by managers, which makes it 
necessary for shareholders to protect themselves against managerial fraud. This 
approach considers corporate governance as the sum of mechanisms which reduce 
conflicts of interest and minimize information asymmetries between shareholders and 
managers so that monitoring managers becomes unnecessary or easier for shareholders. 
                                                 
10  For an overview of these approaches see Nippa (2002), pp. 12-18. 
11  Blair (1995), p. 236.  
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Such mechanisms may comprise incentive-based compensation, the employment of 
control bodies, and the disclosure of corporate policy. Sometimes the definition 
according to the Shareholder Approach is extended by the creditors of a firm. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), for example, understand that “corporate governance deals with the 
ways in which suppliers of finance assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment”12. Some authors13 criticize the negative image that the Shareholder 
Approach has about managers and emphasize that managers have non-monetary 
incentives such as reputation or interesting tasks to achieve the firm’s goals. This so-
called Stewardship Approach assumes that managers voluntarily act in shareholders’ 
interests, therefore making control and incentive mechanisms irrelevant. The 
Stakeholder Approach, on the other hand, states that a firm should consider the interests 
of all of its stakeholders, including its shareholders, employees, customers, creditors, 
and suppliers.14 The Stakeholder Approach points out that for a firm to be successful it 
will need to satisfy all stakeholders in the long-term. Representatives of the Shareholder 
Approach, however, argue that it is too complex to account for all the different, possibly 
conflicting, interests and that pursuing shareholders’ interests would in the long run 
benefit all the other stakeholders too.15 Although such an argument can be easily 
criticized, the Shareholder Approach appears to be the prevailing approach in the 
corporate governance literature. Also, the Stakeholder Approach has so far failed to 
prove its economic advantage over the Shareholder Approach.16 The Political Approach 
represents the idea that the distribution of rights among various interest groups of the 
firm mainly depends on their political power rather than on the internal corporate 
structure. This approach particularly analyzes the legislation and its efficiency in 
promoting the goals of various interest groups.17 Corporate governance in a broader 
sense may deal with all kinds of firms, institutions, and organizations as well as with all 
stakeholders.18 This approach can be described as referring to economic or 
organizational governance rather than corporate governance.19 The different 
understandings of corporate governance are reflected in country-specific corporate 
governance systems. Whereas, for instance, the USA and the UK are understood as to 
                                                 
12  Shleifer / Vishny (1997), p. 737; similar Dietl (1998), p. 4. 
13  See, e.g. Donaldson / Davis (1994), Ghoshal / Moran (1996), or Kürsten (2002). 
14  Witt (2000), p. 159; Donaldson / Preston (1995), p. 68; Monks / Minow (1996). 
15  Hungenberg (1998), p. 10; Nippa (2002), p. 12; Kuhner (2004), p. 254. 
16  Nippa (2002), p. 17. 
17  For a comparison of international legal systems see, e.g. La Porta et al. (1999) or Grossman / Adams 
(1993). 
18  Turnbull (1997), p. 181. 
19  Nippa (2002), p. 10. 
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follow the Shareholder Approach, Japan and Germany are often described as 
stakeholder-oriented.20 The reasons for pursuing the one or the other approach lie in the 
role of the capital market as a source of finance as well as in the political power of the 
respective stakeholders.21 Germany, which is the country of reference in this thesis, has, 
however, experienced an increase in the importance of the capital market within the past 
few years so that the present discussion on corporate governance is strongly associated 
with the capital market and its requirements. Several empirical studies prove the rising 
shareholder value-orientation of German corporations.22 Moreover, the German 
legislation has recently reformed its corporate law in order to offer more protection to 
shareholders.23 Hence, a general trend toward capital market orientation can be 
observed for German corporations.  
 
The literature on corporate governance takes a theoretical as well as an empirical 
perspective. As far as the theoretical literature is concerned, theories of the firm and the 
economics of information deal with corporate governance issues. Theories of the firm 
include the property-rights approach, the agency theory, and the transaction cost 
economics. Whereas the property-rights approach analyzes the effects of different 
ownership structures, the agency theory designs optimal contracts between shareholders 
and managers. The transaction cost economics develops transaction-specific governance 
structures. The economics of information focuses on the reaction of the capital market 
to firm-related data. In addition, there is vast literature on concrete mechanisms and 
instruments of corporate governance, such as decision-making processes or monetary 
incentives, which generate ideas on how to implement corporate governance.  
 
First empirical works on corporate governance give evidence of the importance of the 
legal framework for corporate control. These studies either make cross-country 
comparisons of legal regulations24 or analyze individual aspects of corporate 
governance for a single jurisdiction25. A number of studies test empirically whether 
better legal regulations result in any economic benefits. La Porta et al. (2002)26, for 
                                                 
20  Witt (2000), p. 160. 
21  On the origins of the stakeholder approach in Germany see Kuhner (2004), p. 247. 
22  See, e.g. Achleitner / Bassen (2002) or Pellens / Tomaszewski / Weber (2000). 
23  Beelitz (2002), p. 584; von Rosen (2002), pp. 593-596. 
24  See, e.g. La Porta et al. (1999). 
25  See, e.g. Lehmann / Weigand (2000), who investigate the relationship between ownership 
concentration and profitability. 
26  La Porta et al. (2002). 
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example, find that better shareholder protection is associated with a higher valuation of 
corporate assets. Lombardo and Pagano (2000)27 give empirical evidence that judicial 
efficiency influences the return on equity of firms, as measured by the dividend yield 
and the earnings-price ratio, significantly. Recent studies measure the quality of firm-
level corporate governance within a single jurisdiction and investigate its relationship 
with firm value. Though based on different methodologies and different understandings 
of corporate governance, many of these studies find a positive relationship between 
firm-level corporate governance and various performance measures. Klapper and Love 
(2003)28 confirm that good corporate governance results in better operating performance 
and higher market valuation for a number of emerging markets. Black et al. (2003)29 
make a cross-sectional analysis for Korean firms and construct a firm-level corporate 
governance index which appears to be positively correlated with Tobin’s q, the market-
book ratio, and the market value, respectively. Gompers et al. (2003)30 attempt a similar 
research for US firms and focus on shareholder rights with regard to takeover defenses. 
They find that stronger shareholder rights result in higher profits, sales growth, and 
valuation of firms. Drobetz et al. (2003)31 construct a corporate governance index for 
German corporations and find a positive correlation between their overall corporate 
governance index and stock returns.  
 
This thesis is a contribution to the empirical research on corporate governance. 
Following the recent trend in corporate governance literature, the main research 
question of this thesis is whether good corporate governance enhances shareholder 
value. After Drobetz et al. (2003) this is the second empirical study investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance and shareholder value for German 
corporations. As the main performance measure analyzed here is shareholder value, a 
Shareholder Approach to corporate governance is taken. In addition, in view of the 
considerable trend toward shareholder value orientation of German corporations, as 
described above, a Shareholder Approach to corporate governance should not pose a 
contradiction for this study. Corporate governance is in the following understood as the 
mechanisms by which shareholders motivate and ensure that managers generate a 
competitive return on their invested capital. 
                                                 
27  Lombardo / Pagano (2000). 
28  Klapper / Love (2003). 
29  Black et al. (2003). 
30  Gompers et al. (2003). 
31  Drobetz et al. (2004). 
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The underlying research methodology is similar to recent studies32. In a first step 
criteria for good corporate governance are determined while taking German specifities 
into account. While other studies put special emphasis on shareholder rights, auditing 
issues, and ownership structure, this study analyzes the quality of managing and control 
bodies, risk management, compensation, and voluntary disclosure. For these criteria the 
main idea is to focus on voluntary corporate governance practice by firms. Data on the 
quality of firm-level corporate governance is collected through personal interviews with 
the German DAX, MDAX, and TecDAX companies and through an analysis of their 
annual reports on the business year 2002. These survey data then serve to measure the 
quality of corporate governance. In a second step values for the quality of corporate 
governance are regressed against proxies for shareholder value in a cross-sectional 
analysis. In contrast to similar studies33 a significant impact of corporate governance on 
shareholder value cannot be confirmed per se. The main difference of this study to 
previous studies lies in the differentiation between the internal corporate governance 
system (ICGS) and disclosure, while investigating both aspects of corporate governance 
simultaneously for a single sample. In fact, significant results are obtained only if the 
internal and external dimensions of corporate governance are not mixed into one overall 
corporate governance measure. This separation is consistent with the economics of 
information, which emphasizes the aim of disclosure to reduce information asymmetry 
between shareholders and managers. ICGS, however, intends to influence managers’ 
decisions and behavior. These different purposes are reflected in the results: ICGS has a 
positive influence on shareholder value measured by Tobin’s q. Disclosure, on the other 
hand, does not affect Tobin’s q, but reduces the cost of equity capital measured by beta 
according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter II prepares the following 
chapters by presenting the various stakeholders of a company and the discussion on the 
Stakeholder and Shareholder Approach. In this chapter an understanding of corporate 
governance will be developed for the underlying study. Microeconomic theories 
explaining the necessity of corporate governance will be discussed in chapter III. Then, 
different control mechanisms will be explained and set in a theoretical as well as in a 
cultural context in chapter IV. On the basis of the literature criteria for good corporate 
governance are derived in chapter V. The empirical part of the thesis in chapter VI 
                                                 
32  See, e.g. Black et al. (2003), Gompers et al. (2003), Drobetz et al. (2004), or Klapper / Love (2003). 
33  See, e.g. Black et al. (2003), Gompers et al. (2003), Drobetz et al. (2004), or Klapper / Love (2003). 
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begins with the development of hypotheses and continues with the results of the statistic 
analyses. This chapter illustrates the methodology of the empirical study, offers a 
descriptive analysis of corporate governance characteristics of German corporations, 
and tests the underlying hypotheses. The final chapter VII concludes. 
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II Different Understandings of Corporate Governance 
 
This chapter focuses on the two main approaches to corporate governance: The 
Stakeholder and the Shareholder Approach. In the introduction (chapter I) various other 
approaches have been mentioned. These approaches will not be discussed in the 
following. First, the stakeholders of a company are presented in order to indicate its 
relationships and dependencies. Second, the Stakeholder and the Shareholder Approach 
are analyzed and an understanding of corporate governance for this study is developed. 
 
2.1 The Stakeholders of a Corporation 
 
The identification of the necessary elements of a good corporate governance system 
requires a thorough understanding of the various stakeholders of a corporation and their 
demands.34 The relationship between a corporation and its stakeholders can be generally 
illustrated as in the following Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
34  Witt (2003), p. 6. 
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Figure 1: The relationship between the firm and its stakeholders35
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Shareholders 
 
Shareholders provide equity funds36 to the corporation in exchange for “shares” or 
“stocks” which entitle them to share in the net profits of the company in case it 
generates profits and after all other financial obligations such as salaries, interests, 
accounts payable to suppliers, etc. are settled. This means that shareholders have no 
right to, i.e. a guarantee for, fixed payments. Because of being paid last, shareholders 
are often referred to as “residual” claimants.37 If the company makes profits, the 
shareholders may get dividends or the profits may be reinvested in new projects which 
increases the value of the firm’s share and generate capital gains for the shareholders.38 
As shareholders have only a residual claim39 in contrast to other stakeholders, it is often 
concluded that they have the greatest interest or incentive to ensure the profitability of 
the company. This is the main reason why shareholders, for example in Germany, are 
granted voting rights by the legislation for the election of supervisory board members, 
who again determine the constitution of management. The privilege of shareholders’ 
interests is formally reflected by their institutionalization within the company as the 
general assembly. Moreover, as shareholders elect the supervisory board to hire 
managers and to monitor them, the supervisory board, at least in Germany, is partly a 
representative body of the shareholders. 
Lenders 
 
Lenders are suppliers of debt capital and are thus also very important for the financing 
of the company’s economic activities. Debt capital in the form of bank loans or bonds 
entitles its holders to repayment of the principal plus a certain rate of interest. 
Particularly in the case of loans the company is often required to secure the loan with 
some form of collateral such as the company’s assets. Obligations to lenders have to be 
settled irrespective of the profitability of the company, i.e. even if the company makes 
losses in a certain business year.40 Repayment of debt capital has the highest priority 
because lenders bear a different risk than shareholders and claim extra security. The risk 
                                                 
36  Shareholders are owners of the equity capital of the company, not the owners of the company itself 
which is understood as a nexus of contracts, see Fama (1980), p. 290 and Alkhafaji (1989), p. 110. 
37  Blair (1995), p. 20. 
38  Blair (1995), pp. 20-21. 
39  Witt (2003), p. 7; Blair (1995), p. 21. 
40  Indebted firms need to be highly liquid in order to serve their financial obligations to their lenders. In 
addition, their creditworthiness decreases with an increasing debt-to-equity ratio. For a detailed 
discussion on the benefits and costs of equity and debt capital see Süchting (1995), pp. 26-32. 
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born by lenders is that they can only be damaged by the losses of the company but 
cannot benefit from its profits as shareholders can do.41 This risk is most relevant in 
times of a bad economic situation when indebted firms tend to invest in risky projects42, 
which, if successful, only benefit shareholders but only damage lenders otherwise.43 
Lenders’ contractual relationship with the firm is, however, legally protected against 
insolvency. Moreover, their supply of corporate information is guaranteed by 
mandatory disclosure obligations of the firm. As they have no voting rights and thus no 
influence on the quality of management, lenders may sometimes be interested in being 
represented in the firm’s control bodies.44  
Employees 
 
Employees as human capital represent an important input factor for the company. Their 
main interests are the security of the payment of their wages or salaries, increases in 
their wages or salaries, good work conditions, enough motivation, etc. Even if their 
contractual relationship with the company is protected by labor law there is no 
guarantee for the employees that they have a secure work place and income.45 
Consequently, employees are another group of stakeholders whose interests depend on 
the survival and profitability of the firm. 
Suppliers 
 
Suppliers of raw material or products are highly relevant for the quality of the firm’s 
goods and services. The suppliers’ main interests are the firm’s liquidity and 
particularly the on-time payment of their accounts receivable. As they also bear the risk 
of non-payment due to insolvency, their contractual relation is protected by law. On a 
long-term basis, however, suppliers will have no particular interest in the survival of the 
company as long as there are enough competition and other potential customers. This 
argument could actually be applied to all other stakeholders since they can choose with 
which company they enter into business. Still, in the case of suppliers or customers 
there is often more flexibility and less financial engagement compared to shareholders 
or lenders. 
                                                 
41  Witt (2003), pp. 8-9. 
42   Risky projects are here understood as projects with a high probability of loss.  
43  Jensen / Meckling (1976), pp. 334. 
44  This is common corporate governance practice in some countries such as Germany or France. 
45  Witt (2003), pp. 7-8. 
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Customers 
 
Customers are necessary for the success and profitability of the corporation as well. 
They are primarily interested in a good quality of the firm’s products and services as 
well as in low prices and innovations.46 Because customers can be negatively affected 
by the use of products, they are legally protected by consumer laws. As with suppliers 
they are flexible in changing the firm if there is enough competition which offers 
similar or even qualitatively better products. 
State 
 
Corporations pay corporate income taxes to the state and represent an important income 
factor for governments. Although the state need not necessarily pursue to maximize its 
tax income from corporations, it is nonetheless interested in financially sound 
companies, which fulfill their tax obligations.47 As a consequence, the state is indirectly 
interested in profitable companies. Tax laws set the legal framework for the relationship 
between the state and corporations. 
 
2.2 The Stakeholder versus Shareholder Approach 
 
As has been indicated above, legal regulations play an important role in ensuring that 
various stakeholders’ rights and claims get accepted. The legal framework, however, is 
still not enough a guarantee so that “private” mechanisms and instruments are often 
needed. Stakeholders will therefore want to participate in such mechanisms in order to 
have additional protection. The possible conflicting interests of stakeholders have been 
mentioned above. In this context, the difficulty of managers to respect each 
stakeholder’s interests and the concentration on the most important stakeholder(s) is not 
to be neglected. From a theoretical perspective, the coalition theory48 suggests that the 
corporation is a co-operation of different interest groups, which adds value to the firm. 
Such a view of the firm would favor the so-called Stakeholder Approach, which advises 
firms to account for all stakeholders’ interests. In practice, the dominance of capital 
markets and the power of institutional investors in influencing corporate strategy 
                                                 
46  Hungenberg (1998), p. 3. 
47  Witt (2003), p. 10. 
48  The most important representatives of the coalition theory are Barnard (1962), Cyert / March (1963), 
and March / Simon (1993).  
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suggests that shareholders would be the “more” important group of stakeholders. The 
approach focusing on shareholders’ interests corresponds to the Shareholder Approach. 
The Shareholder Approach is additionally legitimated by the property rights approach, 
which derives shareholders’ rights to determine the company’s goals from their property 
rights, i.e. their ownership of the company’s equity funds.49 The most important reason 
for the priority of shareholders’ interests is that they have only a claim on the insecure 
residual profits. The Shareholder Approach is often argued to be very operational as the 
shareholder value can be measured simply and implemented within the corporate 
strategy.50 Such a concept as the shareholder value can hardly be developed for 
stakeholders as it is difficult, if not impossible, to objectively measure the costs and 
benefits of each stakeholder group.51 The remaining question is what the consequences 
of a Shareholder Approach are for the other stakeholders, particularly whether they 
experience any disadvantages or not. Supporters of the Shareholder Approach argue that 
maximizing shareholder value requires the company to be competitive and successful in 
the procurement and consumer markets.52 As a result, an increase in shareholder value 
is interpreted positively for most of the stakeholders. In addition, stakeholders’ rights 
are protected by law, which the company has to follow. A possible negative side-effect 
of the shareholder orientation is the so-called myopia, i.e. the short-term maximization 
of shareholder value at the cost of long-term profitability potentials. Myopia of 
managers results in high increases of share prices but wrong investment decisions and 
sometimes also in criminal manipulations of financial statements.53  
 
A compromise which is often suggested by the literature is to maximize shareholder 
value by considering other stakeholders’ interests as restrictions. The strategic 
management literature has developed several concepts for combining stakeholders’ 
interests so as to define guidelines for managers. One of the most important concepts, 
which have experienced much acceptance in practice, is the Balanced Scorecard by 
Kaplan and Norton.54 The Balanced Scorecard is the solution to the often criticized 
problem of neglecting non-financial key performance and success factors such as 
                                                 
49  Hungenberg (1998), p. 5. 
50  Hungenberg (1998), p. 8. 
51  Particularly, the individual stakeholder preferences are assumed to be conflicting and subject to 
change over time. 
52  Blair (1995), p. 12. 
53  Strenger (2002), p. 125.  
54  Kaplan / Norton (1996). Another concept is that by the consulting firm Boston Consulting Group 
which developed the concept of DAVE including the Customers and Employees Perspective apart 
from the Financial Perspective; see Fischer / von der Decken (2002). 
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customer loyalty or know-how. Kaplan and Norton particularly criticize the deficits of 
traditional accounting measures in evaluating competitiveness and profitability. In fact, 
they favor a combination of past performance measures with those indicating potential 
future performance.55 The central idea that financial as well as non-financial factors add 
value to the company is reflected in the four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard:  
 
• Financial Perspective 
• Internal Business Process Perspective 
• Customer Perspective 
• Learning and Growth Perspective 
 
While it is important to succeed financially towards the shareholders, it also necessary 
to optimize business processes and products as well as to be able to react to needs for 
change and innovation.56 Managers who implement a management system on the basis 
of such a scorecard are supposed to take all interests of stakeholders into 
consideration.57
 
The underlying thesis takes a Shareholder Approach to corporate governance. The main 
reasons for this are first that the business practice indicates the increasing importance of 
capital markets and of shareholders as suppliers of finance. Even in countries such as 
Germany, where the Stakeholder Approach has been assumed to prevail, enormous 
changes toward capital market orientation can be observed. As the underlying study 
refers to German corporations the Shareholder Approach is consistent with recent 
developments in Germany. Second, taking a Stakeholder Approach causes problems in 
defining a consistent corporate goal and in modelling all stakeholders’ interests. Third, 
as all stakeholders other than shareholders are more protected legally, shareholders can 
be regarded as the primary group concerned with good corporate governance. 
                                                 
55  Kaplan / Norton (1996), p. 8.  
56  Kaplan / Norton (1996), p. 9. 
57  Speckbacher / Bischof (2000), p. 796; Pellens / Tomaszewski / Weber (2000), p. 1831. 
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III Theories of the Firm 
 
Chapter II illustrated the various stakeholders of a company and emphasized the 
problem of efficiently coordinating their interests. When taking a Shareholder Approach 
the main challenge of corporate governance is to coordinate the interests between 
owners and managers. Microeconomic theories explain the existence of the firm as a 
social institution and the problems related to its external relationships and internal 
structure. In a corporate governance context microeconomic theories deliver ideas on 
instruments and mechanisms to solve the coordination problem. The theories to be 
discussed here are modern theories of the firm including the property rights approach, 
agency theory, and transaction cost economics. These theories have common premises 
concerning the behavior of human beings and the relationship structure between 
individuals characterizing the so-called modern corporation. Modern theories of the 
firm came up after the neoclassical approach of the firm, which had an unrealistic 
understanding of why firms exist. The aim of this chapter is to present the theoretical 
foundations of corporate governance by focusing on the property rights approach, 
agency theory, and transaction cost economics. These three approaches emphasize the 
importance of corporate governance and suggest concepts on how to implement an 
effective corporate governance system. This chapter is structured as follows: First, the 
neoclassical view of the firm will be briefly discussed in order to stress the diverging 
premises between the neoclassical and modern theories of the firm. Second, the three 
approaches mentioned above will be explained while filling the theoretical concepts 
with examples from corporate governance practice. 
 
3.1 The Neoclassical Theory of the Firm 
 
The origins of modern theories of the firm go back to the neoclassical model58, which 
had a different understanding of the firm than today. The neoclassical theory is a 
technological approach to the existence of firms and mainly analyzes the efficient 
allocation of scarce resources. The framework of analysis is a market with supply and 
demand executing exchange transactions at equilibrium prices. Prices hereby serve as a 
mechanism to coordinate supply and demand sides represented by firms or consumers, 
respectively. Moreover, prices determine both sides’ economic activities and thus lead 
                                                 
58  The neoclassical theory is, among others, represented by Walras (1926/1954) or Marshall (1961). 
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factors of production to an efficient resource allocation, comparable to an “invisible 
hand”. An extra centralized authority for coordination is not needed.59 The neoclassical 
theory is therefore often said to be “actually a theory of markets in which firms are 
important actors”60.  
 
Beside the efficient resource allocation there are further assumptions shaping the 
neoclassical model of the firm. Owners of the firm are individuals who are supposed to 
act in self-interest, i.e. they try to maximize their own utilities. The interests of other 
stakeholders in the firm are subordinate to the utility-maximizing goal of the owners.61 
The concepts of private property and private enterprise, which refer to the combination 
of ownership and control, are further features of the neoclassical model. Private 
property means that there is no differentiation between active and passive property.62 
Active property relates to tangible assets such as land or building that gives the holder 
of these assets the right to control them directly. Passive property such as shares or 
bonds, on the other hand, represents the possession of interest in the company without 
implying the power to control any activity concerning the asset itself. In terms of 
today’s corporation holders of active property would be managers whereas holders of 
passive property would be shareholders. Referring back to the neoclassical concept of 
private property both active and passive property belongs to one and the same person or 
people. Consequently, the neoclassical enterprise is a private enterprise where an 
individual or a few people are so-called owner-managers. No hierarchy or authority 
exists in this type of firm because owners of the firm are at same time managers of the 
firm. 
 
With respect to the nature of today’s corporations the premises of the neoclassical 
model appear to be inadequate in describing existing problems and thus in delivering 
solutions to these problems. The idea of the self-interested, profit-maximizing 
entrepreneur ignores the indispensable relationships with other stakeholders, which are 
crucial for the survival of the firm. Creditors, for example, are not supposed to 
participate in decision-making processes. However, in case of insolvency, creditors and 
other stakeholders are concerned so that monitoring would be necessary.63 Even if 
                                                 
59  Erlei et al. (1999), p. 45. 
60  Jensen / Meckling (1976), p. 306. 
61  Seger (1997), pp. 11-12. 
62  Berle / Means (1991), pp. 303-306. 
63  Seger (1997), p. 12. 
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ownership and management lie in the hands of the same person or group of people, 
there might be conflicting interests with other stakeholders of the firm. The concepts of 
private property and private enterprise exclude a possible division of labor between 
owners and managers, which is found in many corporations today, and therefore fails to 
explain the problems occurring in such corporations. Furthermore, the premises with 
respect to the characteristics of the market also need to be analyzed for their plausibility. 
The market premises are perfect competition in the market and perfect market 
transparency. Competition in the product market is the most important regulating and 
disciplining mechanism. Only in the case of perfect competition equilibrium an efficient 
resource allocation is feasible. The question that arises in this context is if perfect 
competition is the best alternative for achieving efficient resource allocation. In certain 
cases a few large companies might be able to operate more efficiently than several small 
companies.64 The premise of perfect market transparency denotes that the market 
contains all relevant information and that information is distributed symmetrically 
among market participants. This assumption implies that there are no information costs 
as well as no uncertainty when two parties enter into a contract, which is too simplified 
to be applicable to the real-life situation.65 In summary, most assumptions of the 
neoclassical approach appear to be too abstract so that new theories with new premises 
needed to be developed. 
 
3.2 Modern Theories of the Firm 
 
Coase’s work The Nature of the firm66 represents the beginning of modern approaches 
to the firm. The revolutionary aspect of this paper is that the neoclassical model is 
questioned regarding its applicability to firms. The main question was why firms exist 
at all if markets allow a decentralized coordination of individual economic activities. 
The phenomenon observed in reality, however, is that firms allocate resources by an 
internal, centralized authority, the management, without calling on the market. The 
answer lies in the cost related to using the market to find contractual parties and to 
execute transactions. In some situations these costs are greater than firms’ internal costs. 
This is a plausible explanation for the existence of firms. Without calling these costs 
                                                 
64  Erlei et al. (1999), p. 48; Berle / Means (1991), p. 308. 
65  Erlei et al. (1999), pp. 48-51. 
66  Coase (1937). 
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“transaction costs” at that time, Coase opened way to the development of the transaction 
cost economics.67  
 
From the 1960s onwards, there was an intense discussion on how real conditions can be 
modeled in theories. Alchian and Demsetz68 were the first to characterize firms not by 
the existence of an authority but by a network of contractual relationships. The 
contractual view of the firm describes the firm as a nexus of contracts between 
individuals. This gives ownership a completely new notion. In fact, ownership becomes 
less important in the contractual concept of the firm with regards to control and decision 
rights. Every contractual partner of the firm is a stakeholder and has an interest in 
controlling over the firm’s decisions.69 Therefore, it is not only the managers or owners 
who have “authority” but also suppliers, creditors, or customers. The contractual 
structure of the firm leads to a coordination problem, on the one hand and to a 
motivation problem, on the other hand.70
 
The coordination problem arises because contracts are made among individuals with 
conflicting interests. The central question is how a common objective function for the 
firm can be defined so that all stakeholders are satisfied. Jensen and Meckling71 
compare this situation to a market where a complex equilibrium process takes place. 
Moreover, it is impossible to include all eventualities in contracts in order to protect 
oneself against potential fraud by the other party. This incompleteness of contracts is 
mainly due to information costs associated with specifying the terms of contract. 
Consequently, there is a risk of opportunistic behavior by parties to a contract once it is 
completed, particularly when parties have different amounts of information. Additional 
institutional arrangements72 are needed then to motivate the better informed party to act 
in the interest of the less informed party. This motivation problem is thoroughly 
discussed in section 3.2.2. 
 
The concept of the separation of ownership and control is fundamental to all modern 
theories of the firm. A high number of shareholders makes it difficult for each 
                                                 
67  Jensen / Meckling (1976), p. 310; Erlei et al. (1999), p. 42. 
68  Alchian / Demsetz (1972). 
69  Fama (1980), p. 290. 
70  Göbel (2002), pp. 55-59. 
71  Jensen / Meckling (1976), p. 311. 
72  Hart (1995), pp. 4-5. 
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shareholder to participate in the management of the company. Consequently, a division 
of labor takes place by which control or management rights are transferred to a group of 
managers distinct from the shareholders. The dispersion of ownership leads a loss of 
control by the shareholders over the firm’s assets. Instead, management has free play in 
the allocation of provided resources and can act in its own favor. In this model of the 
firm owners have no role other than bearing unlimited risk. However, there are obvious 
advantages of a separation of ownership and control over a combination. The separation 
of ownership and control can be analyzed along the decision process within a firm. The 
decision process is composed of the following four stages73: 
 
1) Initiation is the development of alternatives for resource allocation and ideas for the 
specification of contracts. 
2) Ratification refers to the selection among various alternatives developed in the 
previous stage. 
3) Implementation is the execution of decisions made in stage 2. 
4) Monitoring refers to the supervision of the performance of executing people and the 
specification of rewards. 
 
While stages 1) and 3) are described as decision management, steps 2) and 4) represent 
decision control. With respect to the separation of ownership and control within 
corporations, decision management and decision control are distributed to managers and 
shareholders, respectively. By delegating decision management rights to managers with 
specific knowledge and experience, shareholders reduce their costs of gathering relevant 
information to initiate and implement decisions. Moreover, it would be difficult to 
coordinate a decision process of shareholders if all of them or at least many of them 
wanted to participate. The same coordination problem among shareholders arises when 
management tasks are delegated and managers are needed to be monitored. The 
efficiency losses associated with the participation of all shareholders in controlling the 
management makes a further delegation of this task to another party reasonable.74 The 
benefits of a specialization in decision management and decision control are assumed to 
outweigh the costs arising from potential opportunistic behavior of delegates.75
                                                 
73  Fama / Jensen (1983), pp. 303-304.  
74  Control costs due to a delegation of management control may be distributed among the shareholders. 
The more dispersed the ownership structure of a firm, the lower are the monitoring costs born per 
shareholder. 
75  These costs are referred to as agency costs and will be discussed in section 3.2.2.1. 
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In contrast to the neoclassical view of the firm, modern theories attempt to account for 
the problems of today’s corporations, often characterized by a separation of ownership 
and control. By assuming conflicting interests and information asymmetry among 
individuals these new theories take a more realistic approach. They emphasize the 
coordination and motivation problems and deliver ideas on how to solve them. The 
basic objects of analysis are contracts among individuals. The contractual view of the 
firm also points out the importance of other stakeholders than shareholders. Yet the 
main relationship analyzed by modern theories of the firm is that between shareholders 
and managers. These theories state that mechanisms76 are needed to protect 
shareholders’ interests and prevent opportunism by management.77 Such instruments 
and institutions of corporate governance are analyzed by modern theories of the firm, 
including the property rights approach (see section 3.2.1), agency theory (see section 
3.2.2), and transaction cost economics (see section 3.2.3). 
 
3.2.1 The Property Rights Approach 
 
3.2.1.1 Premises 
 
It is important to note that the view of the firm as a nexus of contracts is crucial for the 
property rights approach as for the other modern theories of the firm. The property 
rights approach generally deals with costs and benefits that arise from entering into 
contracts which organize the allocation and transfer of (property) rights on all kinds of 
assets.78
 
The property rights theory comprises three main premises. The first two are the same as 
in the neoclassical theory. The third premise is representative for all modern theories of 
the firm. 
 
1) Self-interest: Individuals, homogenous groups of individuals, or institutions are 
assumed to be homines oeconomici, i.e. they act in self-interest in every economic 
decision they make. 
                                                 
76  Fama / Jensen (1983), pp. 312-313; Demsetz (1983), p. 386. 
77  It is often argued that other stakeholders have enough legal or regulatory protection. Debt holders, for 
instance, may be secured by formal bankruptcy procedures. See also Hart (1995), pp. 10-11.  
78  The property rights approach generally refers to the exchange of tangible assets such as land or 
machines as well as to intangible assets such as patents or labor services; see Göbel (2002), p. 60. 
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2) Utility maximization: Individual goals are supposed to be achieved when their utility 
to the acting agents is maximized. This is expressed by the utility function. Together 
with the first premise this implies that individuals maximize their utility even if 
opportunistic behavior becomes necessary.79 
3) Bounded rationality: The premise of bounded rationality denotes that the human 
capacity of gathering and processing information is limited. This assumption goes 
hand in hand with the incompleteness of contracts. The central problem is that there 
is incomplete information about the future because individuals cannot foresee all 
possible situations and even if they did, information would not be costless.  
 
The importance of property rights can be illustrated by the following examples of 
incomplete contracts. A contract between an airline company A and a producer of 
aircrafts B, which provides for the delivery and for the maintenance of aircrafts, may 
have missing points. Such a contract may, for example, not cover the circumstance of a 
change in the product characteristics of aircrafts due to a political or regulatory decision, 
although this may trigger delays in production or even price changes. There may be 
more things happening after the contract has been concluded, which cannot be included 
ex ante in the contract. Consequently, the contract will always have gaps that represent 
risks or disadvantages for the one or other party. Another example is a consumer goods 
producer who distributes his products via local drug stores. Whereby the contract 
between producer and distributor may have provisions concerning the types and brands 
of products to be sold, it may not consider their placement within the store or whether or 
not directly competitive products should be sold in the same store. The producer is then 
to some extent dependent on the distributor. If the producer, however, has a majority 
stake in the distributor’s firm or even owned the distributor’s firm, he has more 
bargaining power or is much more flexible in deciding how his products are distributed. 
Ownership serves as a remedy to overcome risks associated with incomplete contracts.80 
In the case of an event unspecified in the contract, it is the owner who decides what 
happens, i.e. has residual control rights.81
                                                 
79  Opportunistic behavior may occur when individuals have conflicting interests and when information 
is distributed asymmetrically among them. If these conditions apply individuals may misuse their 
advantages at the expense of others, i.e. act opportunistically. 
80  Hart (1995), p. 29. 
81  Part of the property rights literature discusses strategic decisions of firms to gain more flexibility and 
power. Stiglitz (1991), for example, refers to centralization and decentralization issues. Hart (1995) or 
Hart and Moore (1990) compare costs and benefits of integration processes by developing a formal 
model. 
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It is important to note that the property rights approach considers ownership as the right 
allowing the owner to use and control the respective asset. Therefore, when an asset is 
owned, the rights associated with that asset are owned.82 Furubotn and Pejovich83 
characterize property rights as specifying the “behavior” of people toward assets. 
Property rights are laid down in contracts and are therefore legally protected. 
Consequently, there may be sanction mechanisms in case these rights are not respected. 
The property rights literature discusses the following four types of rights related to the 
ownership of an asset:84
 
1) the right to use the asset (usus), 
2) the right to change the substance of the asset (abusus), 
3) the right to decide over the output produced by the asset (usus fructus) and 
4) the right to transfer the rights 1), 2) and 3) to another party, for example, by sale.  
 
These rights may be held by one single person who can exclude others from these 
rights. In such a case there will not be any coordination and motivation problems among 
various individuals.85 For specialization reasons these rights may also be allocated 
among a number of individuals on a contractual basis. This causes restrictions on each 
individual’s rights on the asset compared to the one-owner model. The fact whether 
property rights are allocated to one or several individuals is assumed to affect the value 
of the property as well as the “behavior” of the owner(s) toward the property.86 If 
several individuals share in the property rights, the asset becomes a “public” good so 
that the uses of the good as well as the benefits from the good are not exclusive to a 
single person decreasing the value of the good for each person. In addition, the 
consequences related to each person’s action on the good become weaker because 
everyone sharing in the property rights will benefit from profits as well as bear any 
losses in proportion to their shares. This implies that there is no incentive for any 
individual to handle the good efficiently. In fact, there will be opportunistic behavior of 
individuals because possible sanctions are born by the entire group of owners and not 
only by the respective opportunistic person. These external effects, which are due to the 
                                                 
82  Alchian / Demsetz (1973), p. 17. 
83  Furubotn / Pejovich (1972), p. 1139. 
84  Pejovich (1990), pp. 27-28; Alchian / Demsetz (1972), p. 783. 
85  Picot / Dietl / Franck (1999), p. 55. 
86  Kaulmann (1987), pp. 15-17; Göbel (2002), pp. 68-75.  
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free-rider problem87, cause loss in wealth and therefore suggest the one-owner model to 
be more efficient.  
 
3.2.1.2 The Free-rider Problem and the Role of Ownership for Corporate 
Governance 
 
The free-rider problem occurs with the separation of ownership and control in a 
corporation. Shareholders delegate the power to control the firm’s resources to 
managers and have an interest in employing an efficient management. Management 
services benefit all shareholders and therefore represent a common good. No 
shareholder can thus be excluded from the benefits the management produces for the 
firm. If management does not use the firm’s resources efficiently because of 
opportunism or mistakes, shareholders need to improve this management by better 
monitoring.88 The question that arises here is who will monitor the management. If, in a 
diffuse ownership structure, one shareholder makes efforts to improve management, he 
alone will bear all monitoring costs whereby all shareholders will benefit from his 
improvements, i.e. they will free ride on his efforts. In order to solve this free-rider 
problem the shareholders can delegate the monitoring task to a separate body such as 
the supervisory board, which would control managers on their behalf. Then all 
shareholders would have to bear the monitoring costs related to the employment of such 
a supervisory board. The property rights literature further suggests takeovers as a 
mechanism of corporate control.89 Takeovers, however, are not able to solve the free-
rider problem completely and often cause costs. 
 
The free-rider problem, as discussed above, occurs in firms with a diffuse ownership 
structure. The existence of a few large shareholders, i.e. a more concentrated ownership 
structure, can be regarded as another solution to the free-riding problem in monitoring 
management. Although nowadays corporations are only rarely owned by a few people 
and ownership structures are often dispersed, large shareholders such as families or 
institutional investors may play an immense role in shaping and monitoring the firm. 
                                                 
87  The free-rider problem can be found in connection with any „public“ or free good where no individual 
exclusion rights exist. See Demsetz (1967) for a discussion on public goods and the various 
instruments to overcome the free-rider problem. See Grossman / Hart (1980) for a formal model on 
how a takeover threat can improve management and prevent free-riding behavior among shareholders. 
88  Berle / Means (1991), pp. 112-114. 
89  See Manne (1965) or Jensen (1988) for the internal and external effects of takeover bids.  
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There are a number of arguments for and against ownership concentration versus 
dispersion. Demsetz and Lehn90 identify three main determinants of ownership 
structure: value-maximizing size, regulation, and control potential. The value-
maximizing size refers to the fact that large firms, which need and usually have more 
capital resources at their disposal than small firms, are characterized by a diffuse 
ownership structure. The “inverse relationship between firm size and ownership 
concentration”91 is due to the cost of capital associated with the capital demand of firms. 
Large firms often have a dispersed ownership structure because they can distribute their 
cost of capital among a high number of shareholders and thus increase the value of each 
single share. Regulation of industries also reduces the degree of concentration. As in 
regulated industries monitoring is provided by the government or other regulating 
institutions, direct control by a few shareholders, and thus ownership concentration, is 
less necessary. Firms operating in regulated industries will therefore tend to have a 
dispersed ownership structure. Control potential is an argument for ownership 
concentration. Control by a few shareholders is particularly needed in case of instability 
of the firm’s environment. Such uncertainty can be related to product prices or market 
share. In order to minimize management failure in an already risky business 
environment the tendency here will be ownership concentration. 
 
As far as the advantages of concentrated ownership are concerned, a few large 
shareholders are able to replace inefficient managers easily, have the power to negotiate 
informally with the managers, and to supervise them unofficially. With their 
considerable holdings large shareholders can also initiate takeovers. The basic 
assumption here is that managers can increase takeover costs only marginally. Even if 
they are not motivated to takeover the firm themselves, large shareholders can facilitate 
takeovers by outsiders. This, indeed, shows that takeover threats are only effective in a 
concentrated ownership structure where large shareholders are able to bear takeover 
costs.92
 
The ownership structure of a firm is only one of several corporate governance issues. In 
view of the fact that firms cannot choose or easily change their ownership structures, it 
is important to analyze which other instruments or mechanisms exist to overcome the 
                                                 
90  Demsetz / Lehn (1985), pp. 1158-1161. 
91  Demsetz / Lehn (1985), p. 1158. 
92  Shleifer / Vishny (1986), pp. 461-465. 
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problems from a separation of ownership and control. The property rights approach 
emphasizes the role of ownership for human behavior. One main premise is that holders 
of property rights act in self-interest. In the context of the conflicting relationship 
between shareholders and managers, transferring property rights to managers would 
align their interests with those of shareholders and motivate them to act in the latter’s 
interests. Such a transfer of property rights would make managers owners of the firm 
without canceling their specialization in management tasks. In listed corporations, for 
example, managers could be partly compensated with shares so that they bear the same 
risks as shareholders. Therefore, stock-based compensation is another important 
instrument in overcoming conflicts of interest. 
 
The equity capital that shareholders provide to the management represents property 
which relates to certain rights. In view of the risk of opportunism by management it is 
crucial that these rights are protected by sanction mechanisms to be applied in cases of 
managerial fraud. Protection of rights, however, can only be provided by a legal 
framework and not by the firm itself. The key issues associated here are the legal 
protection of shareholders’ rights and management liability. As with the ownership 
structure the degree of legal protection can be assumed to be given so that firms are not 
able to control the protection of shareholders’ rights. 
 
The property rights approach illustrates corporate governance aspects which can only be 
influenced to some extent by firms. The ownership structure of a firm, which 
determines the degree of direct control by shareholders, and the legal framework, which 
offers judicial protection to shareholders against opportunism, can be considered as 
rather fixed factors. The property rights approach may therefore be primarily useful in 
explaining fundamental corporate governance structures based on the firm-specific 
ownership structure and the legal corporate governance system. The property rights 
approach can, however, also be applied to voluntary corporate governance aspects. As 
ownership is a key concept, the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers 
can be reduced by transfer of ownership rights to managers, e.g. in the form of stock-
based compensation. Moreover, the property rights approach recommends the 
employment of a supervisory body given a dispersed ownership structure. Therefore, 
the property rights theory is applicable to control and incentive problems of corporate 
governance. 
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3.2.2  Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory analyzes principal-agent relationships in which a principal delegates a 
certain task to an agent. In the context of corporate governance the delegation of 
management tasks by shareholders to managers can be regarded as a principal-agent 
relationship; but also the relationship between shareholders and the supervisory board or 
between shareholders and auditors represent principal-agent relationships. Before 
discussing agency problems, which arise from such relationships, it is important to note 
that there are two distinct streams of agency theory, which are based on the same 
assumptions and address the same agency problems. The main difference between these 
two approaches is the “style” in which problems are dealt with and solutions are found. 
Positivist agency theory concentrates on identifying situations where agency problems 
occur and particularly researches the owner-manager relationship in large public 
corporations in a descriptive way. Empirical studies hereby serve as an important 
research tool. Normative agency theory, on the other hand, is less-empirical and 
characterized by the formal development of optimal contracts. Moreover, as an abstract 
approach, normative agency theory is applicable to many other principal-agent 
relationships such as lawyer-client or buyer-seller relationships.93 Both approaches have 
their advantages and disadvantages.94 In this respect it might be useful to consider them 
complementarily: While positivist agency theory can identify a number of alternative 
contracts, the normative approach can evaluate these alternatives formally and assess 
their efficiency.95 The following analysis of agency problems, however, is based merely 
on the approach of positivist agency theory because first, the main object of research is 
the relationship between shareholders and managers or supervisory board members in 
listed corporations and second, the quality of corporate governance, which tries to 
optimize this relationship, is tested empirically here. 
 
3.2.2.1 Premises 
 
The phenomenon of a separation of ownership and control in corporations implies a 
specialization of individuals and a transfer of property rights. The relationship between 
shareholders and managers, for example, is characterized by a delegation of decision-
                                                 
93  Eisenhardt (1989), pp. 59-60. 
94  For an assessment of positivist and normative agency theories from the perspective of organization 
theory see Jensen (1983), pp. 334-336. 
95  Eisenhardt (1989), p. 60. 
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making rights by shareholders (principals) to managers (agents). Managers fulfill 
management tasks in return for compensation. Even though shareholders transfer a part 
of their property rights to managers, they remain owners of the resources provided and 
therefore expect managers to maximize profits. Two important questions arise in this 
context: Will managers act in shareholders’ interest? How should the profits generated 
by managers be divided among both parties? Agency theory makes suggestions on how 
to deal with these problems. 
 
Agency theory is based on the following three premises: 
 
1) Conflicting interests: The principal and the agent are assumed to have conflicting 
interests because on the one hand, the principal wants to maximize profits requiring 
a high work effort by the agent and one the other hand, the agent is interested in 
minimizing his work effort and thus his disutility.96 Assuming that individuals’ 
behavior is determined by self-interest, it is doubtful that the agent will act 
according to the interests of the principal.97 Consequently, there is room for 
opportunistic behavior as long as the advantages of such behavior outweigh its 
disadvantages or cost. In order to solve the problem of conflicting interests the 
principal can, for example, offer the agent a contract which compromises both 
interests and influences the agent’s work effort.  
2) Information asymmetry: Information asymmetry refers to the fact that the agent has 
more information than the principal on his real work effort and on other external 
factors influencing the outcome. The principal can therefore hardly monitor the 
agent’s actions; but only observe the outcome. The principal is not able to receive 
any information on the agent’s performance or only against high cost of 
information.98 In case information cost is high, the situation becomes even more 
favorable for the agent as he can give false information to the principal (cheating). 
The agent may use the information deficit of the principal in his own favor. 
Consequently, information asymmetry opens further room for discretionary 
behavior. 
                                                 
96  Homburg (2001), p. 67. 
97  In contrast to the property rights approach agency theory extends the premises of self-interest and 
utility maximization of individuals to the principal-agent relationship. Therefore, these premises are 
identical for both theories with the mere difference that agency theory focuses on a multi-person 
context.  
98  Homburg (2001), p. 68. 
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3) Different risk preferences: Agency theory also supposes different risk preferences of 
the principal and the agent. In order to reduce opportunism by the agent, the 
principal may offer the agent outcome-based (variable) compensation motivating 
him to choose a higher level of work effort and to maximize profits. Profits, 
however, not only depend on the agent’s work effort but also on external factors 
which the agent cannot influence.99 Being compensated on the basis of the outcome 
the agent participates in the risk of the principal. Assuming that the agent is risk 
averse and the principal is risk neutral, the agent would prefer fixed over variable 
compensation while the principal would bear the entire risk. However, fixed 
compensation of the agent leads to a very low work effort. On the other hand, if the 
agent should bear any risk, the principal would have to pay him an extra risk 
premium. The main problem is thus the trade-off between an optimal risk 
allocation100 and motivation of the agent to act in the principal’s interest.101 This 
trade-off leads to so-called agency cost, i.e. the residual loss or disutility102 of the 
principal from an optimal motivation scheme for the agent (second-best solution) 
compared to the situation where the principal can perfectly observe the agent’s work 
effort (first-best solution).103 While maximizing his own profit the principal must 
offer the agent a contract which can get him at least his reservation utility, i.e. the 
utility which he would benefit from if he accepted an alternative contract. In order to 
create an optimal principal-agent relationship it is important to write a contract that 
is able to balance risk allocation and incentive effects. 
 
3.2.2.2 Agency Problems and Possible Solutions 
 
Opportunism by the agent is the main problem discussed in agency theory. It is 
particularly relevant because of conflicting interests in connection with information 
                                                 
99  Levinthal (1988), p. 167. 
100  For a formal development of the optimal incentive scheme by considering risk preferences of the 
agent and the principal see Grossman / Hart (1983), pp. 7-45. 
101  Williamson (1990), p. 68. 
102  Jensen / Meckling (1976), pp. 308-309 differentiate between monitoring and bonding costs apart from 
the residual loss. Whereas monitoring costs are associated with efforts of the principal to reduce 
opportunism by the agent, bonding costs are born by the agent in connection with binding behavior or 
a financial guarantee of him should he break the contract with the principal. Bonding costs, either 
monetary or non-monetary, are in most cases positive as the agent will not be able to guarantee 
making optimal decisions on behalf of the principal at zero cost. 
103  Homburg (2001), pp. 69-70. 
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asymmetry. Information asymmetry104 as well as bounded rationality of individuals, on 
the other hand, lead to incomplete contracting105 as the agent is usually not willing to 
give the information he has and both parties are unable to foresee external factors 
influencing the outcome. In case the agent receives fixed compensation, the principal 
bears the entire risk. Information asymmetry may occur at different stages of the 
principal-agent relationship. The following Table 1 illustrates these stages in lapse of 
time and the respective types of information asymmetry. 
 
Table 1: Stages of the principal-agent relationship106
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 
 
The agent’s 
characteristics 
are given 
 
The 
principal 
offers the 
agent a 
contract 
 
The agent 
decides 
whether to 
sign the 
contract 
 
The agent 
chooses a 
certain level 
of work 
effort107
 
 
Influence of 
external 
factors  
 
Outcome 
and  
compensa-
tion of the 
agent 
Hidden 
characteristics 
  
 
Hidden 
action  
+  
Hidden 
information
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows that information asymmetry can arise at three stages of the principal-
agent relationship. Basically it can be differentiated between information asymmetry ex 
ante and ex post, i.e. before and after contracting. Before contracting (t = 0) the 
principal has only little information on the agent’s true qualifications and his ability to 
fulfill the delegated tasks (hidden characteristics). After contracting (t = 3) the principal 
is not able to monitor the agent’s work effort (hidden action). In addition, the agent 
knows better than the principal to which degree profits can be increased by raising his 
work effort (hidden information). It is important to note that the stages presented in 
Table 1 may overlap. The agent may, for example, choose a certain level of work effort 
before signing the contract. Also, external factors may influence the outcome 
                                                 
104  Information asymmetry per se does not yet represent a problem but the fact that information is not 
costless. 
105  For a discussion of the theory of contracts see, e.g. Hart / Holmström (1987). 
106   is based on Jost (2001), p. 30. Table 1
107  It is assumed here that the agent has entered into contract with the principal. 
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simultaneously with the agent’s work effort. Being aware of the different types of 
information asymmetry the principal has to create mechanisms that enable him to 
minimize the risk of opportunism. In the following agency problems related to the 
different types of information asymmetry are discussed and possible solutions are 
presented. 
Hidden Characteristics 
 
Hidden characteristics refer to the principal’s ignorance about the agent’s qualifications 
for the required tasks before offering a contract. The principal therefore bears the risk of 
employing an incapable agent, which is referred to as the problem of adverse selection. 
If the principal writes a standardized contract suitable for an “ordinary” agent with 
average qualifications, agents with weak qualifications will try to hide their real 
characteristics and imitate better qualified agents. Agents with strong qualifications, 
however, will reject the contract. Consequently, the likelihood that the principal 
employs an unqualified agent might be considerable. 
 
As far as the solutions to the problem of adverse selection108 are concerned, the 
principal can, for example, offer different contracts to the agent which are mainly 
tailored to different types of agents. In these contracts the principal may specify 
different degrees of variable compensation. Agents who are willing to apply a high 
work effort because they suffer only low disutility, for instance, will c.p. choose 
contracts with a high proportion of variable compensation.109 Offering tailored contracts 
may be helpful in motivating potential agents to reveal true information on their 
characteristics (revelation principle)110, particularly on their disutility related to their 
work effort. The effect expected is that agents choose contracts adequate to their 
characteristics111 and thus reduce the principal’s risk of adverse selection. This solution 
is called self selection.  
 
The principal may also try to gather additional information for a better knowledge of the 
agent’s characteristics, which is referred to as screening.112 Screening instruments may 
                                                 
108  For a formal discussion of the problem of adverse selection see, e.g. Demougin / Jost (2001),  
pp. 68-77.  
109  Homburg (2001), p. 71. 
110  For the revelation principle see, e.g. Myerson (1979) or Myerson (1982). 
111  Levinthal (1988), p. 178. 
112  See, e.g. Stiglitz (1975). 
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include interviews with the agent and his former employers, tests and a trial work 
period. Shareholders, for example, can ask former employers of applying managers for 
information on their past performance, their willingness to co-operate, or their 
motivation structure. By doing so, the principal hopes to lower the compensation he 
offers to the agent. The gain from additional information, however, has to be weighed 
against the respective cost of information. 
 
A further solution to the problem of adverse selection is signalling.113 Signalling 
denotes that the agent initiates an exchange of information with the principal by 
revealing private information before entering into contract. It is important to note that 
signalling will take place only if the information given is supposed to have positive 
effects for the agent. An agent with a high work effort, a low disutility, and a high 
degree of risk aversion, for example, may communicate his risk aversion to the principal 
in order to receive compensation with largely fixed components. Such a contract would 
still offer enough motivation because a low incentive would be sufficient to affect a 
high work effort. The agent may, however, give false information in order to receive a 
contract with fixed compensation.114 This cheating by the agent can be removed by 
objective information contained, for example, in certificates or references to be gathered 
by the principal (screening) against cost of information. The extent to which the 
principal will believe the agent largely depends on the agent’s costs related to 
adulterating his private information. Therefore, the information the agent gives will only 
be reliable if it is disadvantageous or costly for him to give false information.115 This 
would be the case if, for example, an unqualified manager faked certificates or if he 
bribed his references to give untrue information, which can be legally sanctioned. As 
such actions would always put him at a disadvantage, the probability that a manager 
will make costly efforts to imitate will be low. 
Hidden Action and Hidden Information 
 
After accepting the contract the agent chooses a certain level of work effort which the 
principal cannot observe (hidden action); instead, he can only observe and verify the 
outcome. The risk of opportunistic behavior by the agent due to hidden action is 
referred to as moral hazard. This leads to the fact that the agent’s compensation can be 
                                                 
113  See, e.g. Spence (1976) or Phlips (1988). 
114  Homburg (2001), p. 71. 
115  Göbel (2002), p. 111. 
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related to the outcome but not to his personal performance or contribution to the 
outcome. This is particularly critical for the agent because there is uncertainty on the 
influence of external factors affecting the outcome, even though the agent has more 
information on the relationship between his work effort and the outcome than the 
principal (hidden information).116 The principal is interested in a revelation of this 
information. A poor performing agent will benefit from the principal’s information 
deficit and make external factors responsible for low profits. Even worse, the agent 
could intentionally reduce his level of work (shirking).117  
 
Here again, screening and signalling can help to overcome the possibility of 
opportunism. As far as screening mechanisms are concerned, shareholders, for example, 
can monitor managers’ work via formal planning and control procedures such as cost 
accounting or auditing. Shareholders can also choose to control managers directly by 
hiring a supervisory board, although such a delegation of monitoring tasks again causes 
agency problems between shareholders as the principal and the supervisory board as the 
agent.118 Signalling, on the other hand, can serve as a complementary action by 
managers. They may want to proof that they performed well or even that they 
performed better than other managers in order to improve their reputation. Signalling in 
this context may include voluntary reporting or the integration of shareholders into 
important decision-making processes. As with ex ante signalling, the reliability of 
voluntary information increases with the costs of false reporting.119
 
Control in its broader sense can be divided into input-based and output-based control 
mechanisms.120 Input-based control mechanisms denote direct control of the agent’s 
behavior or input and therefore relate to screening. The main effect of direct control is 
assumed to be that the agent behaves in the interest of the principal because he fears 
sanctions for the case he does not. Direct control, for example, over information 
systems or a supervisory board can, however, be very costly and time-consuming as the 
principal has to invest in information systems, compensate the supervisory board, and 
solve additional agency problems relating to the delegation of control tasks. Even if the 
                                                 
116  No matter whether the external influences are positive or negative, the overall contract offered to the 
agent has to at least cover his reservation utility.  
117  Göbel (2002), p. 102. 
118  Eisenhardt (1989), pp. 64-65. 
119  Vincenti (2002), p. 58. 
120  Gedenk (1994), p. 37. 
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principal bears the costs of such mechanisms, his ability to control the agent directly 
will be incomplete due to his limited rationality of information processing. In fact, the 
principal may not be able to evaluate the quality of the agent’s work effort with respect 
to the outcome. The probability of opportunism by the agent increases with the deficits 
and costs of input-based control mechanisms.121  
 
Output-based control mechanisms, on the other hand, aim at motivating the agent with 
monetary incentives related to the final outcome, i.e. he shares in the profits generated 
by him. The higher the cost of direct control, the more important becomes the role of 
incentives.122 These affect that the agent’s compensation is no longer fixed but varies 
according to the overall performance to which he contributed among other external 
factors. The idea behind this is that the agent participates in the risk of the principal in 
order to pursue the same interests. If the agent, however, is risk-averse, he will claim a 
risk premium because he prefers fixed income. The trade-off between motivation and 
risk transfer is a central problem with output-based control mechanisms.123 An example 
of incentive-based compensation are stock options offered to managers, who gain from 
an increase in the stock price over the strike price but do not suffer losses from a 
decrease of the stock price under the strike price.124
 
However, there are some practical problems with incentive-based compensation such as 
how to measure the outcome, how to determine the relation of fixed to variable 
compensation, or to which degree the agent’s compensation should be connected with 
the outcome. A further disadvantage of incentive-based compensation is a possible 
myopia of the agent, i.e. that he does not support long-term projects but tries to 
maximize short-term profits in order to increase his personal salary. Another risk is the 
untruthful disclosure of performance measures by the agent for reasons of limited 
verification.125 Nonetheless, the relevance and importance of motivation for influencing 
the agent’s behavior126 should not be underestimated.  
 
                                                 
121  Laux (1990), p. 6. 
122  Laux (1990), pp. 4-6. 
123  Gedenk (1994), p. 38; Göbel (2002), p. 115; Eisenhardt (1989), p. 61. 
124  Kuhner (2004), p. 266. 
125  Schmidt (2001), p. 26. 
126  For a detailed description of what determines managerial behavior see Williamson (1964), p. 30, who 
presents a ranking of various factors of motivation such as salary, security, dominance, and 
professional excellence. 
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Input-based and output-based control mechanisms should be combined for effective 
control.127 Direct control will be more accepted if not only “bad” behavior is sanctioned 
but also “good” behavior is rewarded so that incentives need to be created as well. On 
the other hand, direct control may be useful in tracing wrong decisions and behavior of 
the agent in order to improve incentive schemes.128 The following Table 2 summarizes 
the trade-off of the principal in choosing appropriate control mechanisms. 
 
Table 2: Input-based vs. output-based control mechanisms129
 Input-based mechanisms Output-based mechanisms 
Description  Control of the agent’s 
behavior through, e.g. 
information systems or a 
supervisory board 
 Motivation through 
outcome-based 
compensation, e.g. stock 
options 
Benefits  Direct control 
 Fear of sanctions 
 Alignment of interests  
 Transfer of risk 
Costs  Investment e.g. in 
information systems, 
compensation of the 
supervisory board 
 Risk premium for the 
agent 
 
Remaining  
problems 
 Evaluation of the 
agent’s behavior with 
respect to the outcome 
 Measurement of the 
outcome 
 Relation of fixed to 
variable compensation 
 Risk of myopia 
 Risk of untruthful 
disclosure 
 
 
Agency theory has immediate relevance for corporate governance as it can be applied to 
the analysis of the relationship between shareholders and managers or other agents 
                                                 
127  For the role of trust between the agent and the principal as a complimentary phenomenon see, e.g. 
Göbel (2002), pp. 120-121. Trust increases with the reduction of information asymmetry over time 
due to learning effects. 
128  Laux (1990), p. 7. 
129   is based on Eisenhardt (1985), p. 137. Table 2
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within the corporation. Agency theory hereby particularly suggests the creation of 
negative and positive incentives, e.g. for managers in order to align their actions with 
the interests of shareholders.130  
 
Regarding the relationship between shareholders and managers direct control131 can 
hardly be carried out by the shareholders themselves. The free-rider problem of direct 
monitoring in a diffuse ownership structure has already been discussed in section 
3.2.1.2. In large corporations the task of control is therefore delegated to a separate 
internal body, the supervisory board, which, however, causes further agency problems. 
This board is meant to safeguard the contractual relation between shareholders and 
managers.132 Other stakeholders such as debt holders, suppliers, or employees who have 
an interest in “good” management as well will want be represented in the supervisory 
board too. Consequently, there will be interest conflicts among various groups. Agency 
theory emphasizes that direct control alone will not suffice to influence managers’ 
decisions. In fact, shareholders need to motivate managers with monetary incentives 
related to the outcome. Agency theory, however, does not refer to questions including 
how to measure the outcome and how to relate managers’ variable compensation to firm 
performance. Empirical investigations on different approaches concerning these 
questions may help finding adequate solutions in practice. 
 
3.2.3  Transaction Cost Economics 
 
3.2.3.1 Premises 
 
Transaction cost economics deals with the organization of contractual relations for the 
exchange of goods, services, or rights133 whereby the exchange itself is referred to as a 
transaction. As an interdisciplinary approach transaction cost economics integrates 
aspects of law, economics, and organization theory and compares different institutional 
                                                 
130  It is important to note that agency theory suggests “internal” control mechanisms and not “external”, 
i.e. market-based control mechanisms which will be discussed further in section 4.1.1. 
131  The mutual control of managers as a specific control mechanism is not included here. 
132  Williamson (1985), p. 316. 
133  According to Commons (1934) this includes the contractual transfer or exchange of property rights. In 
this context, transaction cost economics can be seen as a complementary theory to the property rights 
approach as it evaluates the benefits of such transfers or exchanges on the basis of the respective 
transaction costs incurred. 
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models for the governance of given transactions.134 The basic assumption is that 
transactions cause costs which determine whether or not and how transactions take 
place. Transaction costs can be generally defined as costs incurred in the search and 
communication of information necessary ex ante to enter into a transaction and ex post 
to control the transaction.135
 
Transaction cost economics is based on the following premises: 
 
1) Bounded rationality: The first premise is that individuals are characterized by 
bounded rationality, i.e. they are limited in terms of time and knowledge, but above 
all in their capacity to receive, to store, and to process information.136 Consequently, 
it is reasonable that individuals divide work among each other and specialize in 
certain fields. 
2) Complexity and uncertainty: The above-mentioned division of labor requires 
coordination in terms of time and content between individuals. The core problems 
hereby lie in the information asymmetry, on the one hand and in the uncertainty of 
the individuals’ behaviors, on the other hand. Therefore, it is impossible to foresee 
the development of a transaction regarding external effects and possible 
opportunistic behavior of individuals.137 
3) Opportunism: The combination of the first two premises leads to a certain degree of 
freedom in the behavior of individuals which in the case of conflicting interests will 
cause opportunism. This is of high relevance as individuals involved in the 
transaction are assumed to be able to influence each other’s utilities.138 Opportunism 
can particularly take the form of a hold-up problem139 if there are only a small 
number of individuals relevant to the transaction.140 The assumption of self-interest 
or opportunism is common to all branches of the new institutional economics. 
                                                 
134  Williamson (1997), p. 1. 
135  Picot (1982), p. 269; Williamson (1997), pp. 5-6. Due to measurement problems there is no clear 
definition of transaction costs in the literature, although there is a common understanding that 
transaction costs mainly comprise information and communication costs. For the only explicit 
definition see Coase, (1937). 
136  Williamson (1975), p. 21; Göbel (2002), p. 135; Picot (1982), p. 269. 
137  Williamson (1975), p. 23. 
138  Göbel (2002), p. 133. 
139  The hold-up problem refers to the risk that the principal becomes dependent on the agent because of 
the latter’s specialization in the delegated tasks over time. 
140  This is called the small numbers problem in the literature. For details see, for example, Williamson 
(1975), pp. 26-29. 
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4) Transaction costs: The above-described premises lead to the conclusion that 
contracting for a transaction is incomplete. Reducing this incompleteness causes so-
called transaction costs. Transaction costs occur in all phases of a transaction and 
can hardly be expressed in monetary units. Rather it makes sense to indicate them 
by non-monetary factors and evaluate them in ordinal terms.141 Transaction costs 
influence the choice of the institutional environment for transactions. The 
transaction cost economics distinguishes between two basic forms of institutions: 
markets and hierarchies.142 
 
The origins of the transactions cost economics go back to Commons143, who uses the 
term “transaction” to refer not to the exchange itself but to the underlying regulations 
and contracts which should serve to reduce uncertainty. Commons understands a 
corporation to be a system of external (bargaining) and internal (managerial) 
transactions. Coase144 was also influential in developing the new branch of institutional 
economics. His basic question is: why do firms exist at all if there are markets which 
can coordinate economic activities with their price mechanisms? The answer lies in the 
costs associated with market coordination, the so-called transaction costs. Transaction 
costs are supposed to arise when searching information on fair prices and when 
concluding or negotiating contracts. Similar costs occur in firms but they are obviously 
lower because the hierarchical coordination in firms permits to economize on scarce 
capacities. Alchian and Demsetz145 have later rejected Coase’s approach of 
characterizing firms as hierarchies and markets as price mechanisms. Instead, they 
describe firms as well as markets as a nexus of contracts. They explain the existence of 
firms with the higher productivity of team production in firms. Moreover, they analyze 
opportunistic behavior by individuals and indicate the necessity of creating monetary 
incentives as well as establishing monitoring institutions. Williamson, who counts as 
one of the most important representatives of the transaction cost economics, bases his 
analysis on Coase’s model of markets and hierarchies. His starting point are 
organizational failures due to human and environmental factors, which lead to 
transaction costs. Firms are supposed to have an advantage in overcoming human as 
well as environmental failures compared to markets: With their hierarchical structure 
                                                 
141  On a discussion of the measurement of transaction costs see Wallis / North (1988), p. 97. 
142  Picot (1982), pp. 270-271; Williamson (1979), p. 235. 
143  Commons (1934). 
144  Coase (1937). 
145  Alchian / Demsetz (1972). 
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and decision processes they are able to reduce information costs. Ouchi146 presents a 
third alternative of organizations, namely clans. Clans are characterized by group 
solidarity and corporate culture which represent implicit contracting and make explicit 
control mechanisms and hierarchical structures unnecessary. The main stream of 
transaction cost economics is, however, represented by the works of Coase and later 
Williamson. 
 
3.2.3.2 The Governance of Transactions 
 
The basic idea of transaction cost economics is that transactions cause costs, which can 
be reduced by choosing the right governance structure. It is the characteristics of 
transactions which determine the appropriate governance structure, i.e. either markets or 
hierarchies. Non-standardized or occasional transactions, for example, are better not 
executed over the market. Here, a more specialized governance structure may help 
saving costs of negotiation and control. With respect to firm-specific transactions such a 
specialization can be reflected by the existence of a corporate culture, of common 
values, of an institutional framework, or of internal information systems, which can 
simplify transactions within firms by decreasing costs of coordination and information. 
The transaction cost economics suggests that, for instance, a good internal reporting 
system can limit managers’ opportunism and reduce control costs. Hierarchies and 
power play a considerable role here.147 The transaction cost economics emphasizes that 
a change in the governance structure for the underlying transaction means a change in 
the respective transaction costs.148 The choice of governance structures149 again depends 
on institutional costs or behavioral preferences.  
 
Beside institutions and individuals above all the characteristics of transactions 
determine the nature of the optimal governance form and the level of transaction costs. 
The transaction cost economics discusses the following three attributes of transactions. 
 
1) Uncertainty: Uncertainty about future events or situations can be anticipated within 
contractual provisions. However, as the premise of bounded rationality becomes 
                                                 
146  Ouchi (1980). 
147  For the role of hierarchies and power see, e.g. Coase (1937), Williamson (1975), or Alchian / Demsetz 
(1972). 
148  Williamson (1997), p. 7. 
149  For an overview of possible governance models see Williamson (1979), p. 253. 
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effective, a contract aiming at including all eventualities will be impossible. Rather 
contracts have to remain incomplete. Consequently, costs of (re)negotiation, 
adaptation, and control will play an important role.150  
2) Frequency: A high frequency with which similar or the same transactions take place 
can result in economies of scale and learning effects in terms of standardized 
processes or trust. The frequency of transactions is supposed to decrease average 
transaction costs.151 
3) Asset specificity: Asset specificity denotes the degree of specialization versus 
standardization of the good or service underlying the transaction. In the complex 
case of specific assets it is difficult to determine prices as information on such assets 
are hard to obtain without costs. The transaction cost literature mentions two forms 
of asset specificity: transaction specific investments and small numbers problem.152 
Transaction specific investments refer to investments in assets with unique use. The 
small numbers problem expresses the availability of a few relevant parties to a 
transaction. Both situations bear risks and will thus incur high transaction costs. 
Long-term and significant investments would be necessary here in order to achieve 
economies of scale. 
 
Assuming that uncertainty is given for all kinds of transactions, basically the other two 
characteristics of transactions determine whether they are carried out by markets or 
hierarchies. Non-specific transactions, no matter if they are occasional or recurring, are 
suitable for market governance. Specific transactions, on the other hand, are better 
governed by organizations due to their cost-intense investments. In case they are 
recurring, the costs of governance can be reduced by economies of scale. 
 
As far as transaction costs are concerned, it has been mentioned before that it is difficult 
to express them in monetary terms. However, transaction costs can be categorized into 
the following four types of costs which reflect the various stages of a transaction.153
 
• Information costs: Information costs are related to the process of gathering 
information on the parties and conditions of transaction before a contract is 
                                                 
150  Williamson (1975), p. 21. 
151  Picot (1982), p. 272. 
152  Williamson (1979), pp. 239-244; Picot (1982), p. 271. 
153  Picot (1982), p. 270. 
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concluded. Regarding the transactional relationship between shareholders and 
managers (see Figure 2) information costs would refer to ex ante screening by 
shareholders, who search, for example, information on the past performance of 
potential managers with their previous employers 
 
• Negotiation costs:  Once the appropriate party to the transaction has been found, 
the content and conditions of the transaction have to be negotiated. Costs occur 
because of the time invested in negotiations, formulation of contracts and other 
agreements. Shareholders and managers may negotiate compensation issues or 
the length of management contracts. 
 
• Control costs: Control is necessary to safeguard that both parties fulfill their 
mutual tasks and agreements. Costs arise with time-consuming monitoring. 
Shareholders have to compensate the supervisory board for monitoring as well 
as auditors for auditing. 
 
• Adjustment costs: Contracts often have to be altered or adapted to changing 
situations. The negotiation of contractual clauses again leads to costs in terms of 
time and effort. Managers, for example, have to renegotiate their compensation 
package when their tasks extend due to a product or market expansion of the 
firm. 
 
Figure 2: The transactional relationship between shareholders and managers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shareholders Managers 
Compensation 
Management services
Incompleteness
 
In a classical sense the transaction cost economics can be applied to the production of 
any good. In the context of corporate governance the main transaction taking place is 
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that between shareholders who leave capital for firm value maximizing investments and 
managers who according to contractual agreements have to fulfil this task. Whereas 
managers offer their human capital for management services, shareholders pay them an 
adequate compensation (see Figure 2). The most important instrument governing this 
transaction is therefore a contract154, although the overall legal and social environment 
will matter as well. As far as the characteristics are concerned, uncertainty, frequency, 
and asset specificity play a role. These characteristics can be directly applied to the 
owner-manager relationship as follows: Uncertainty exists because of incomplete 
contracting and room for opportunism by management, frequency is given as the task of 
maximizing firm value has to be fulfilled with every investment decision, and asset 
specificity need not to be regarded as problematic since there exists a labour market for 
managers with similar qualifications and work experience. 
 
In connection with the contractual incompleteness shareholders have to bear transaction 
costs in the form of control and information costs. Control costs arise with the 
employment of a monitoring institution, the supervisory board. The supervisory board 
can be described as a governance structure to safeguard primarily the interests of the 
shareholders and secondarily those of other stakeholders. In this context the question of 
how the supervisory board should be composed or which stakeholders should be 
represented is of high relevance. Because markets are imperfect in monitoring 
management and can not protect against corporate failures, various interest groups 
require direct access to internal control bodies for information reasons. However, 
representation of all stakeholders in the supervisory board may be difficult due to 
conflicting interests and problems of coordination (see section 3.2.1.2). Instead, it may 
be reasonable for other stakeholders than the owners to improve their relation to the 
firm in general which is a compatible goal with the maximization of firm value.155
 
Information costs are associated with regular reporting of the management to the 
shareholders (disclosure). Beside board representation disclosure is an important control 
instrument for shareholders as well as other stakeholders. Spoken in agency theoretical 
terms disclosure is a signalling mechanism by the management in order to gain 
confidence of the stakeholders which they reward. The role of reporting for reducing 
                                                 
154  In view of the premises of transaction cost economics such a contract is assumed to be incomplete 
(see ). Figure 2
155  Williamson (1985), p. 298. 
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information asymmetry and thus transaction costs is considerable. Pratt / Behr156 show 
that investment in reporting systems pays off because disclosure costs are lower than ex 
post transaction costs. 
 
The supervisory board as well as disclosure are two corporate governance instruments 
discussed in transaction cost economics literature.157
 
3.2.4  Summary 
 
The above-discussed modern theories of the firm explain the existence of firms and 
emphasize the necessity of corporate governance mechanisms and instruments. The 
following Table 3 summarizes their main premises, issues, and mentions their relevance 
for corporate governance. 
 
Whereas all approaches have similar premises, they focus on different problems 
concerning the relationship between shareholders and managers. The property rights 
approach investigates the role of ownership for corporate control. It particularly 
addresses the free-rider problem in monitoring management due to ownership 
dispersion. Apart from the takeover mechanisms, legal protection of shareholders’ 
rights, and monitoring by large shareholders, the property rights approach suggests 
incentive-based compensation in order to align shareholders’ and managers’ interests. 
The agency theory is similar in that respect because it aims at finding an optimal 
contract regarding conflicting interests. However, agency theory also emphasizes the 
necessity of monitoring because of information asymmetry which opens room for 
discretionary behavior by the agent. Transaction cost economics differentiates between 
two types of governance structure: markets and hierarchies. It advises to choose the one 
or other governance structure according to the characteristics of transactions. With 
respect to corporate governance transaction cost economics suggests monitoring but 
also emphasizes the role of disclosure in order to reduce transaction costs in the form of 
information costs. 
                                                 
156  Pratt / Behr (1987). 
157  Williamson (1985), pp. 298-319. 
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Table 3: A comparison of modern theories of the firm158
  
Property Rights 
Approach 
 
Agency Theory Transaction Cost Economics 
Premises 
 
 
 Self interest 
 Utility maximization 
 Bounded rationality 
 
 Self interest 
 Opportunism 
 Bounded 
rationality 
 Complexity and 
uncertainty 
 Opportunism 
 Transaction 
costs 
Problems 
discussed 
 
 
 Free-rider problem 
with management 
control 
 Ownership 
dispersion 
 Information 
asymmetry 
 Conflicting 
interests 
 Different risk 
preferences 
 Information 
asymmetry  
 Asset 
specificity 
 Incomplete 
contracting 
Solutions 
suggested 
 
 
 Take-over market 
 Monitoring by large 
shareholders 
 Screening 
 Signalling 
 Input-based and 
output-based 
control 
mechanisms 
 Governance 
structure 
 Legal 
framework 
Application 
on 
corporate 
governance
 
 
 
 
 Incentive-based 
compensation 
(particularly stock-
based compensation) 
 Ownership structure 
 Management 
liability 
 Shareholders’ rights 
 
 Monitoring 
 Incentive-based 
compensation 
 
 Monitoring 
 Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 Own illustration. 
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IV Corporate Governance Systems 
 
This chapter is aimed to give an overview over different corporate governance systems 
in a conceptual way. It is hereby first distinguished among external and internal 
corporate governance mechanisms (section 4.1). In a next step these mechanisms are 
discussed in a cross-cultural context explaining the role and importance of control 
mechanisms (section 4.2). The focus of section 4.3 is corporate governance in Germany 
as this will be analyzed further in the empirical study. Finally, in sections 4.4 and 4.5 
general ideas for what good corporate governance is will be developed.  
 
4.1 Corporate Control Mechanisms  
 
In order to safeguard stakeholders’ and, in particular, shareholders’ interests there exist 
a number of instruments and mechanisms which control managers’ behavior and 
decisions. These control mechanisms can be grouped into external and internal 
mechanisms according to whether or not markets function as control intermediaries.  
 
4.1.1  External Control Mechanisms 
 
External control mechanisms are market-based mechanisms and comprise control over 
the equity, product, and manager markets. External control mechanisms are referred to 
as mechanisms initiated by markets. Although legal regulations offer “external”159 
protection by the state and may affect managers’ behavior with legal sanctions, they do 
not classify as external control mechanisms because they can be considered as the given 
or fixed framework for corporate governance. In fact, external control mechanisms are 
characterized by their controlling effect due to market forces without regulatory 
intervention. 
Control over the Equity Market 
 
Control over the equity market, which is also referred to as the market for corporate 
control, is the shareholders’ possibility of sanctioning mismanagement directly with 
                                                 
159  The term “external” is here understood as not being influenced by the firm or the shareholders as 
opposed to internal control mechanisms. Legal regulations are therefore neither internal control 
mechanisms.  
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their investment behavior. In fact, the liquidity feature of the stock market gives 
investors the necessary flexibility to react to bad performance. In case of dissatisfaction 
with the existing management and its performance shareholders can basically either 
make use of their voting rights or sell their shares in the market.160 These two 
possibilities are also referred to as “Voice” and “Exit”.161 While the exercising voting 
rights is an internal control mechanism162, the sale of shares is a market-based or 
external control mechanism. If several investors sell their shares, share prices will 
decrease, cost of equity capital will increase and at the same time the probability that 
another firm will make a takeover bid. In a theoretical context both “Voice” and “Exit” 
represent corporate governance solutions suggested by the property rights approach. 
Whereas “Voice” is the use of voting, i.e. property, rights, “Exit” is the transfer of 
property rights. By completely transferring property rights shareholders give up all 
interests in the firm, which they have as owners.  
 
The threat of a takeover therefore serves to prevent managers from so-called “empire-
building”. Due to a separation of ownership and control managers are assumed to be 
able to misuse corporate resources for their own benefit. More concretely, managers 
would try to expand business activities and increase the firm size, i.e. “build an empire”, 
at the expense of profitability in order to maximize their own compensation.163 As bad 
operative performance is automatically164 reflected in the capital market, the stock price 
of the respective firm will decrease and other firms will be interested in improving 
management by taking over the target firm.165 Once the firm is taken over, the existing 
management will be substituted by a new management. The threat of a hostile takeover 
is supposed to discipline managers from the start in their tendency of “empire-building”. 
Takeover threats, however, represent more cyclical and less continuous instruments of 
control. Theoretically, the takeover market is a disciplining mechanism also discussed 
within the property rights approach.166
 
                                                 
160  Witt (2003), p. 48. 
161  Hirschman (1970).  
162  See section 4.1.2. 
163  See Williamson (1964); Manne (1965).  
164  Under the efficient market premise (see Fama (1991)) all firm-specific information available to the 
capital market flows into the valuation of the firm’s assets and thus into the stock price as the market 
performance indicator. 
165  Blair (1995), pp. 100-101. 
166  See section 3.2.1.2. 
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Hostile takeovers had particularly reached their peak in the 1980s in the USA. Although 
they do not occur as often nowadays, they are still considered as an effective 
mechanism of corporate control in the USA. With the exception of the UK, takeovers 
do not play a significant role in the remaining European countries.167  
 
It has been mentioned above that the capital market reacts to firm-specific information 
immediately in the form of a stronger or weaker demand for shares. Disclosure plays an 
important role in reducing information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. 
Agency theory and the transaction cost economics emphasize the relevance of 
disclosure in order to decrease agency as well as transaction costs. Legal regulations can 
provide for minimum standards concerning the amount and content of mandatory 
disclosure by firms. Not only shareholders but also lenders are interested in firm-
specific information so as to evaluate firms’ creditworthiness and determine their cost of 
capital. Consequently, rating agencies can put pressure on firms to improve their 
competitiveness on the capital market by extending their disclosure policy.168 Managers 
who are expected to publish positive information will have to avoid mismanagement 
and opportunism. Mandatory as well as voluntary disclosures by firms represent 
important control mechanisms over the equity market.  
Control over the Product Markets 
 
In case of perfect competition in product markets, managers cannot afford maximizing 
their own benefits at the expense of profits. Firms which do not operate successfully and 
generate enough profits will be pushed out from the market by competitors.169 
Consequently, opportunism by managers is only possible if competition in product 
markets is imperfect due to subsidies, protectionism, or trusts. In markets where there is 
no pressure for competitiveness managers will misuse available sources for their own 
benefit.170
Control over the Manager Market 
 
The competition among managers can contribute to solve the agency problem of 
opportunism by individual managers, who compete with other internal managers and 
                                                 
167  Witt (2003), p. 49. 
168  Witt (2003), p. 51. 
169  Seger (1997), p. 43. 
170  Witt (2003), p. 50. 
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with external potential managers for their positions. This competition, which causes 
threat of dismissal, decreases additional control or agency costs for shareholders. The 
control mechanism works as follows: Because managers are in a contractual 
relationship with the firm, which can be finished at any time, managers control each 
other in order to check their competitiveness.171 Opportunistic behavior of managers 
will be signaled to shareholders who may decide to sanction those managers by 
dismissing them. Managers who are laid off will finally lose in market value, which will 
weaken their negotiation power for new management contracts. These potential 
consequences threaten managers to pursue their own interests at the expense of the 
shareholders. The effectiveness of this control mechanism is difficult to evaluate since, 
on the one hand, it is hard for shareholders to observe the performance of individual 
managers and on the other hand, substituting existing managers incurs further costs.172  
 
The control mechanism of the manager market is highly effective in the USA. There 
exists empirical evidence of a high management fluctuation in times of poor market 
performance.173 This can be explained by the fact that the market for managers is more 
active than, for example, in European countries174 and that management compensation 
is highly transparent to the capital market.175 In Europe and in Asia manager loyalty 
plays an important role and the market for managers is more severely regulated.176
 
4.1.2  Internal Control Mechanisms 
 
Internal control mechanisms refer to management-disciplining instruments that are not 
market-based and can be organized individually by the firms themselves. Whereas firms 
can not really influence external control mechanisms, they can create and develop their 
own internal control mechanisms. Consequently, firms which are listed at the same 
stock exchange and operate in the same business markets may have diverging internal 
corporate governance systems. 
 
                                                 
171  Fama (1980), p. 293. 
172  Seger (1997), p. 42. 
173  See, e.g. Gilson (1989). 
174  In Germany, for example, managers often benefit from a relatively high length of contracts.  
175  Jensen / Murphy (1990), p. 255. 
176  Kaplan (1994a), p. 521. 
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Shareholders can exercise power with their voting rights which arise from stock 
ownership. Voting rights are one form of property rights. Generally, voting rights can 
be used in the shareholders’ assembly in order to elect representative board members.177 
Also, if special investment decisions are to be made, shareholders may be able to have a 
“Voice” with their voting right. Today’s corporation characterized by a dispersed 
ownership structure does not provide for more direct control remedies by shareholders. 
The main problem with direct control are the costs incurred in terms of time and effort. 
This would lead to a free-rider problem, as discussed in section 3.2.1.2, whereby one 
group of shareholders would try to benefit from direct control without bearing the 
respective costs. Voting rights may represent an effective control mechanism when 
there are major shareholders or a number of small shareholders with same interests.  
 
Another way to protect shareholders’ rights and interests is a provision in the firm’s 
articles of incorporation for management liability. According to such internal 
regulations, which can extend legal provisions, shareholders can sue managers for any 
damages arising from management failures.178 Even if the probability of discovering 
mismanagement may be insignificant, managers could be disciplined if the amount of 
liability is rather high. The effectiveness of such provisions is unclear as it is very 
difficult to prove management failures.179 In a theoretical sense, management liability is 
suggested as a corporate governance mechanism by the property rights approach. 
 
The most classical internal control mechanism is indirect control via an elected 
supervisory board, which consists of objective persons and represents shareholders’ 
and, in case of co-determination, also employees’ interests. The supervisory board’s 
task is to monitor the management regularly. In view of the large number of 
shareholders it makes sense to have a supervisory board which has more direct contact 
to the management and is able to monitor day-to-day business better than each single 
shareholder. This delegation of control, however, represents a principal-agent 
relationship itself and causes agency problems due to the risk of opportunistic behavior 
by board members. Shareholders, thus, have to create incentives as well as sanctions for 
supervisory board members in order to ensure that they fulfill their task well. Agency 
                                                 
177  Seger (1997), p. 37. 
178  Such provisions for liability may not only concern managers but also supervisory board members as 
the delegation of control to a supervisory board also leads to agency problems. 
179  Witt (2003), p. 52. 
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problems with respect to supervisory board members are important corporate 
governance problems which can be solved with similar instruments as used for 
managers. 
 
Furthermore, shareholders can align managers’ interests with their own interests by 
creating monetary incentives which relate to appropriate performance measures. Agency 
theory as well as the property rights approach view incentive-based compensation as an 
important instrument in overcoming conflicting interests between shareholders and 
managers. Incentive-based compensation may reward short-term performance in the 
form of, for example, yearly bonus payments as well as long-term performance with 
stocks, stock options or convertible bonds. It is important that the variable part of 
manager compensation is not exclusively short-term-oriented. Managers are intended to 
be motivated to maximize short-term profits as well as to make right long-term strategic 
decisions.180 Consequently, it is necessary that managers are compensated according to 
their present decisions and behavior which may realize profits in the long-run. This is 
also referred to as “deferred compensation”, whereby managers are compensated in the 
future for present decisions.181 Firms introducing long-term incentives have to choose 
efficient incentive instruments, on the one hand, and determine appropriate performance 
measures, on the other hand.182 Incentive instruments are mainly stock-based so that 
managers pursue the same interests as shareholders. The amount of variable 
compensation can be related to internal value-based performance measures such as 
Economic Value Added (EVA) or Cash Value Added (CVA). External performance 
measures such as the stock price performance over a specified period of time may also 
be taken into consideration. In this context it is important that the respective 
performance measures are objective and are related to the overall market performance, 
i.e. to that of a stock index or to the performance of the respective business sector 
measured by an industry index. 
 
Finally, firms can provide for further contractual regulations which limit managers in 
their possibility of opportunism. Such provisions may concern managers’ behavior in 
the auditing process or how interest conflicts are dealt with.  
                                                 
180  Short-term compensation is criticized for causing myopia by managers, i.e. the maximization of short-
term profits with the goal of maximizing their personal wealth at the expense of long-term success. 
181  Becker (1990), p. 47. 
182  The problems in the selection of incentive instruments will be discussed further in section 5.1.2.1. 
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4.2  International Corporate Governance Systems 
 
This section is aimed to compare selected corporate governance systems according to 
their understanding of corporate governance, the role of the capital market as a source 
of financial funds, how management and control are organized within the corporation, 
and shareholders’ rights. Although there exists a number of differences between the 
corporate governance systems of all countries, three main types can be identified and 
assigned to the USA, Europe183, and Japan.  
 
4.2.1 Corporate Governance in the USA 
 
The role of the capital markets is highly significant in the USA which can be explained 
by the long history of the form of corporate finance of US firms. In the 19th century, the 
first railroad companies issued shares to the general public in order to raise equity 
capital. Since then, the ownership of shares has become common for private 
investors.184 Today, private households represent the majority of investors in the US and 
reflect the nationwide significance of capital markets. The US corporation is therefore 
often characterized by a diffuse ownership structure. 
 
The US model of corporate governance is organized as follows. The board of directors 
is the main internal institution which comprises management and control functions. The 
board of directors consists of so-called executive and non-executive directors. Whereas 
executive directors are managers of the firm, non-executive directors representing 
shareholders are to monitor the managers in their day-to-day business.185 They therefore 
fulfill the monitoring task as recommended by agency theory and the transaction cost 
economics. The combination of management and control bodies in one single institution 
is referred to as a one-tier system. A separation of these functions, which, for example, 
can be found in a number of European countries, is called two-tier-system. The one-tier 
system has the advantage that non-executive directors receive more information on a 
                                                 
183  For Europe it is distinguished between the UK and Continental Europe. As far as Continental Europe 
is concerned, only common corporate governance aspects will be discussed without presenting 
specificities of individual countries. 
184  Allen / Gale (2000); La Porta et al. (2000), p. 17; Macharzina (1999), p. 132. 
185  Executive and non-executive directors are also referred to as inside and outside directors expressing 
that non-executive directors should not be recruited internally but from outside. Although the 
advantage of objectivity of outside directors is obvious, many firms elect their non-executives from 
inside, which has often been criticized. 
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more regular basis and are able to monitor the management more immediately because 
they do not have separate meetings. An obvious disadvantage, however, is that the non-
executive directors do not have the necessary distance to the management to evaluate it 
objectively. If managers and non-executives work like colleagues, the supervisory 
character of the control body may get lost. This problem of independence may disturb 
the efficiency of monitoring and cause additional agency costs. Within management the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) disposes of the greatest power as he is the most 
important decision-maker and all the other managers report to him. The CEO is elected 
and can be dismissed by the board. All board members are elected by the shareholders. 
For new members the board may make suggestions on candidates.186  
 
The shareholders are the most important interest group of the corporation. This is 
reflected in the fact that they determine the corporate goals significantly which are 
based on the maximization of shareholder value. By their ownership of shares 
shareholders are entitled to vote in the Shareholders’ Assembly and thus to have an 
influence on management decisions. Due to the only small portion of shares and to their 
geographic dispersion187 small shareholders have the difficulty of controlling directly 
through their voting rights (“Voice”). Actually, the only alternative small shareholders 
have in case of dissatisfaction with the management is “Exit”, i.e. sell their shares.188 In 
some cases, shareholders have even sued the management for damages. This is more 
common in the US than in other countries since it is not only rather cheap to take legal 
action against the management but also because it is possible by law that several 
shareholders go to court together. Liability by management is therefore an important 
issue in the US. As a reaction to a number of insolvencies caused by mismanagement, 
the US legislation has recently enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which provides for 
confirmation by oath of the financial statements, more stringent liability of managers for 
untrue information, and reinforcement of financial reporting to the capital market.189
 
                                                 
186  Fukao (1995), p. 13. 
187  Fukao (1995), p. 20 and p. 25 for a comparison of ownership concentration in the USA, UK, Japan, 
and Germany. 
188  Shleifer / Vishny (1997); Witt (2000), p. 159. 
189  FAZ (2003), p. 17. 
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Banks do not play a significant role in corporate control because first, banks loans are 
only a secondary source of corporate finance and second, US laws enforce liability of 
non-executive board members.190
 
The most important control mechanism is the threat of hostile takeovers. For a long time 
the market for corporate control was assumed to control managers efficiently.191 
Because of the high frequency of hostile takeovers during the 1980s a number of 
defense mechanisms such as golden parachutes or poison pills have been developed. 
This led to a reduction of takeovers in the past decade which have become rather 
expensive. Also, individual states have enacted legal regulations against hostile 
takeovers.192
 
The US American corporate governance system is further characterized by a high level 
of transparency concerning firm-specific information. The capital market is very 
demanding in that respect. The Security’s Exchange Commission (SEC) as well as the 
individual stock exchanges provide for extensive regulations on disclosure which go 
beyond the US-GAAP. Particularly, the disclosure on the compensation of managers 
plays an important role in order to ensure an efficient market for managers. Generally, 
voluntary disclosure in the form of regular reports to the press, road shows, and 
analysts’ conferences is very common. 
 
In summary, corporate governance in the USA is largely based on external control 
mechanisms as discussed in section 4.1.1. Apart from monitoring and voting rights of 
shareholders takeovers and disclosure play a very important role in controlling and 
disciplining the management. This is mainly due to the significant influence of the US 
capital markets on firms’ finance. 
 
 
                                                 
190  Witt (2003), p. 63. 
191  Holmström / Kaplan (2003), pp. 10-11. 
192  Witt (2003), p. 63. 
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4.2.2  Corporate Governance in Europe 
 
One single model of corporate governance does not yet exist in Europe. Despite a large 
variety of corporate governance systems two main types can be identified: corporate 
governance in the UK and in Continental Europe. As the USA, European countries have 
started developing codes of corporate governance or conduct as a reaction to the 
demands of the capital market and to a number of unexpected insolvencies. These codes 
are similar in terms of content and nature so that a convergence of the different systems 
is expected at least concerning the goals and values of corporate governance.  
 
The UK model of corporate governance differs from that of Continental Europe not 
only in its focus on shareholders due to the importance of the capital market as a source 
of corporate finance but also in its board structure as a one-tier system comparable to 
the US model. The main difference of the UK model to the US model is the separation 
of the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board. This separation of power ensures 
a greater balance between the influences of executive and non-executive directors.193 
The difference to the Continental European model apart from the one-tier system is that 
representatives of the workforce in the board do not exist. This is because in the UK it is 
believed that such a representation would in no way affect board or management 
decisions. In fact, it is argued that if several stakeholders are represented, boards may 
become too large and work inefficiently. The advantage of a single board is seen in a 
less formal and more open debate on firm-specific topics. The UK tries to reinforce the 
independence of non-executive board members and their power towards the executive 
directors.194 This is above all reflected in the British code of corporate governance, the 
Cadbury Code, which has been developed a few years ago. 
 
The prevailing form of corporate governance in Continental Europe is a two-tier system 
separating the functions of management and control.195 In contrast to the USA or UK, 
shareholders do not play a special role compared to other stakeholders. In fact, it is 
important that the interests of all stakeholders, including employees, lenders and 
customers, are pursued.196 This corporate governance “mentality” is due to the fact that 
                                                 
193  Highbury (2002), p. 154. 
194  Highbury (2002), p. 154. 
195  Exceptions always exist. French firms, for example, can choose between a one-tier and a two-tier 
system. See also Fukao (1995), p. 13. 
196  Beffa (2002), p. 104. 
 54
 
capital markets have not been as important as in the USA or UK for a long time. In 
Continental Europe, banks have long been the primary providers of financial funds to 
firms. Consequently, banks and usually also employees are still represented in the 
boards of most European countries. In some countries, such as Austria or Germany, the 
representation of the workforce, also referred to as co-determination, is even legally 
regulated.197 Corporate control in Continental Europe is more internal and less market-
based so that, for example, hostile takeovers rarely take place and thus do not function 
as a control mechanism. Traditionally, the USA and the UK have been characterized as 
shareholder oriented whereas Continental Europe has been regarded as largely 
stakeholder oriented.   
 
The internationalization of the capital markets has not only changed the capital structure 
of European companies which now finance their business increasingly with equity 
capital. Finance over the capital markets now forces European firms to emphasize 
shareholders’ interests and rights. The so-called shareholder value-orientation comprises 
value-based management, incentive-based compensation, an extensive disclosure 
policy, etc. As a consequence, firms in Continental Europe are more and more 
confronted with similar issues of corporate governance as those in the UK and US. 
 
There exist a number of concepts on how to unify the various models of corporate 
governance in Europe. The two most important approaches are (1) the harmonization of 
the corporate laws of the member states in the European Union and (2) the creation of a 
European Corporation, the so-called Societas Europeae. The harmonization particularly 
relates to the board structure and the co-determination by the other stakeholders. The 
European Union has developed a directive, the so-called 5th directive, which asks its 
member states to adapt new corporate governance aspects in their national corporate 
laws. European firms, for example, should have the right to choose between a one or 
two-tier board system. If firms decide for the one-tier system, non-executive members 
of the board must have a majority vote in order to approve decisions of the board. 
Furthermore, shareholders’ rights have to be widely legally determined and protected. 
As far as co-determination is concerned, the European Union provides for different 
models on how to integrate the “power” of labor into the corporate governance 
                                                 
197  Fukao (1995), p. 14. 
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system.198 Another concept of harmonization of the various models in Europe is the 
creation of a European corporation which is legally independent of the individual 
national laws. The European Commission has been developing propositions for the 
structure and characteristics of such a corporation for more than a decade, which, 
however, have not yet been approved. The European corporation also allows for both 
the one and the two-tier board structure. It is, however, very restrictive with the 
competencies of managers. Moreover, co-determination rights by the workforce are 
rather weak, which is appreciated by the UK but not by Germany. In summary, it is 
expected that the harmonization process will still take some time due to problems of 
acceptance, on the one hand, and complications in a legal implementation of a European 
corporation, on the other hand.199
 
4.2.3  Corporate Governance in Japan 
 
Comparable to Continental European firms, Japanese firms finance their capital need 
less over the capital market than over debt instruments.200 The average debt ratio201 of 
Japanese firms varied between 40% and 60% in the past 40 years and the issue of new 
shares makes up only 10% of corporate finance.202 Japanese firms do not have a 
dispersed ownership structure, a majority of shares are held by institutional investors 
such as banks or insurance companies.203 Nonetheless, shareholders are, at least by law, 
owners of the firm and therefore their interests are to be pursued in primary place.204 In 
practice, not the shareholders but the employees205 are the most important stakeholders 
of the firm. Although employees do not have explicit rights to influence management 
decisions and determine corporate strategy, they have considerable power so that their 
interests are protected before, for example, shareholders’ interests. The main reason for 
this is because employees are expected and supposed to show long-term commitment to 
their firm. This loyalty gives them a special status within the firm: “It is not uncommon, 
for example, to see a firm scale back dividend in order to protect jobs, or for labor and 
management to join forces to oppose a hostile takeover bid.”206  
                                                 
205  The term “employees” refers here to the workers as well as to the managers of the firm. 
206  Itami (2001), p. 93. 
198  Macharzina (1999), pp. 134-136. 
199  Macharzina (1999), pp. 137-138. 
200  For a detailed description of the historical importance of bank loans in Japan see Witt (2003), p. 64.  
201  The debt ratio is understood as the proportion of debt capital to total assets. 
202  Itami (2001), p. 95. 
203  Witt (2003), p. 66. 
204  Itami (2001), p. 92. 
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From an economic point of view, such an emphasis on employees’ interests can be 
justified with the advantages of incentive compatibility and informational efficiency. If 
the managers and employees are treated as the owners of the firm, then there are no 
diverging interests between them and thus no agency problems which have to be 
reduced with incentives (incentive compatibility). On the other hand, because 
employees are interested in the profitability of the firm, they are assumed to be eager to 
acquire new skills and to increase their productivity by an intense communication and 
team building (informational efficiency).207 Risk of mismanagement and the need for 
effective corporate governance still exist, though. 
 
Market-based control mechanisms play a smaller role in Japan than internal control 
mechanisms. Mergers occur rarely because of cross-holding of shares among firms, the 
so-called Keiretsu system, and because a low acceptance of takeovers by employees. In 
fact, consensus is generally more appreciated in Japan.208 Competition in the product 
markets and in the internal manager market of the firm are considered to be more 
effective control mechanisms against potential opportunistic behavior of employees.209 
Employees compete for promotion within the firm and are continuously controlled 
during their internal job rotation.210 Incentive-based compensation as an internal control 
mechanism plays an important role as well. So far, the variable income of Japanese 
employees has been related largely to profits and dividends. In 1997, a change in the 
Japanese Commerce Law took place allowing firms to issue stock options to their 
workforce.211 Consequently, stock options have become more and more common to 
motivate employees on a long-term basis.  
 
As far as the Japanese internal management and monitoring structure is concerned, there 
is a board which consists of a large number of directors. The board is partly composed 
of “managers”, of an executive committee which supports the decision-making process 
of managers, and some representatives of the firm, who neither manage the firm nor 
control the managers explicitly. The Japanese board is therefore not clearly separated 
into members with management and monitoring functions as in the USA. This is due to 
the fact that managers are considered as the employees of the firm and are expected to 
                                                 
207  Itami (2001), pp. 96-97. 
208  Fukao (1995), p. 25; Witt (2003), p. 65. 
209  Itami (2001), p. 99. 
210  Witt (2003), p. 67. 
211  Witt (2003), p. 68. 
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be loyal to the firm so that monitoring it not regarded as necessary. The recruitment of 
outside directors is therefore very uncommon. Internal directors are regarded as the best 
representatives of employees.212 Managing directors are elected by the Shareholders’ 
Assembly for a period of two years.213 The Japanese board is characterized by its 
hierarchical structure. The most important managing director is the President (Shacho), 
comparable to the CEO in the USA. In contrast to the CEO, the Japanese President 
rarely functions at the same time as the chairman of the entire board.214 The chairman is 
represented by another member of the board. 
 
The Japanese board has originally been established by Americans as a one-tier system 
after World War II. Over the years the board has been more and more adapted to the 
Japanese mentality so that today it is difficult to equate the Japanese model to the US or 
Continental European models. 
 
4.3 Corporate Governance in Germany 
 
This section is aimed to present the corporate governance system in Germany which is 
also subject of reference in the following chapters. First, an overview of the common 
ownership structure of German corporations is given. Second, the two-tier board system 
is discussed with particular attention to the duties of managers and supervisory board 
members. Third, recent reformatory efforts by the German legislation and private 
institutions are presented. 
 
4.3.1 Ownership Structure 
 
The ownership structure of corporations affects the importance of internal or external 
control mechanisms. Germany is often characterized as to have a bank-based corporate 
governance system as opposed to market-based systems found in the USA or UK. This 
can be explained by the role of banks as lenders as well as institutional investors. 
Consequently, it is not unusual that banks often not only have significant voting rights 
in the Shareholders’ Assembly but also represent shareholders’ interests in the 
                                                 
212  Itami (2001), p. 94. 
213  Fukao (1995), pp. 13-14. 
214  Witt (2003), pp. 65-66. 
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supervisory board. Beside that, banks are often authorized by private investors who hold 
bearer shares to exercise proxy votes.215  
 
The capital market has so far played a secondary role for the external finance of German 
corporations. This is changing due to an increasing internationalization of capital 
markets. In 2000, 6.2 million people had direct investments in shares.216 Germans 
increasingly prefer buying investment funds which have enormous growth potential. 
Whereas in 1999, 4.8 million people held shares in investment funds, the number 
increased to 8.4 million in the year 2000.217 A comparison of the importance of the 
capital market is given in Table 4 for Germany, France, the UK, Japan, and the USA. 
As shown in Table 4, Germany has the least market capitalization in proportion to its 
GDP (Growth Domestic Product) compared to the other countries. In 1998, 741 firms 
were listed at the German stock exchange. The mostly traded shares contributed to 
already 84% of the overall trade volume. The respective figures for 2001 confirm a 
growth of the capital market. 
 
Table 4: A comparison of international capital markets218
 Germany 
1998         2001 
France 
1998 
UK 
1998 
Japan 
1998 
USA 
1998 
Market capitalization 
in proportion to GDP 
50.9% 58.1% 68.1% 168.2% 65.5% 144.9% 
Number of listed 
companies 
741 749 914 1.957 2.416 7.555 
 
Contribution of the 
mostly traded shares 
(top 5%) to the total 
trade volume 
 
84% 61.6% 81.2% 85.9% 70.9% 65.1% 
  
The entrance of institutional investors such as investment and pension funds is supposed 
to trigger improvements in the German corporate governance system such as a more 
intense shareholder-value orientation as well as more voluntary reporting to the capital 
                                                 
215  Wulfetange (2002), p. 91; Franks / Mayer (1996), p. 283. 
216  Wulfetange (2002), p. 91. 
217  Wulfetange (2002), pp. 91-92. 
218  Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2000): see tables 05-03, 02-2, and 06-04 for the year 1998; Deutsches        
Aktieninstitut (2002): see tables 05-3, 02-3, and 06-4 for the year 2001.   
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market. The demand and pressure of institutional investors for better corporate 
governance is also referred to as Shareholder Activism. The main motivation for 
shareholder activism is that large investors can not easily sell their shares in case of 
dissatisfaction with management (“Exit”) like small investors can do. Sales of a large 
proportion of shares may not only decrease share prices but are often also difficult to 
substitute by alternative investments of large scale.219 Exercising voting rights might not 
be useful if such large investors are still minority shareholders. In this case they might 
try to convince other shareholders to support their ideas with their votes (so-called 
Proxy Contests). Generally, it is better for institutional investors to influence the 
management informally over a ranking or the press.220
 
4.3.2  Management and Internal Control Bodies 
 
From an internal control perspective the German corporate governance system is 
organized as a two-tier system, i.e. management and control functions are separated into 
two different institutions, the managing and the supervisory board or the so-called 
Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat. Figure 3 summarizes the German corporate governance 
model. 
 
                                                 
219  Davis / Thompson (1994), p. 154. 
220  Nussbaum (2002), pp. 174-176. The US pension fund CalPERS, for example, publishes a ranking of 
firms with good corporate governance on a regular basis. 
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Figure 3: The German corporate governance model221
 
Shareholders’ assembly 
Supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) 
Managing board (Vorstand) 
Top, middle, and lower managements
The shareholders’ assembly meets once a 
year and elects supervisory board 
members. 
The supervisory board reports to the 
shareholders’ assembly, appoints and 
monitors the managing board. The 
chairman has a tie-breaking vote. 
The managing board reports to the 
supervisory board and is responsible for 
the firm’s strategic and operative business. 
The chairman of the managing board is 
merely a representative of the 
management. 
Top, middle, and lower managers report to 
the managing board and also fulfil 
management tasks. 
 
The structure of Figure 3 reflects the hierarchy in the German corporate governance 
model. The shareholders’ assembly is the most important institution which appoints the 
supervisory board. For German corporations, i.e. Aktiengesellschaften, with at least 
2,000 employees 50% of the supervisory board members are appointed by the 
shareholders’ assembly and the workforce, respectively.222 Although the shareholders 
are not involved in the day-to-day business of the firm, they can introduce a provision in 
the articles of incorporation for certain management decisions to be approved by the 
shareholders’ assembly.223 Shareholders can influence the firm’s business affairs by 
exercising their voting rights. Apart from such a direct control, shareholders delegate 
monitoring duties to the supervisory board which consists of independent members 
pursuing shareholders’ interests. 
 
The German supervisory board’s main function is therefore to appoint the managing 
board and to evaluate the management’s performance.224 The supervisory board usually 
consists of representatives of shareholders who are elected by the shareholders’ 
                                                 
221  See also Wulfetange (2002), p. 93. 
222  § 1 (1) and § 7 (1) MitbestimmungsG or Co-Determination Law. 
223  Beside such provisions the German Stock Corporation Law (§119(1)) specifies certain issues such as 
the change of the firm’s capital structure which by all means have to be approved by the shareholders’ 
assembly. 
224  Kaplan (1994b), p. 147. 
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assembly.225 In large corporations half of the supervisory members are by law to be 
elected by the employees and labor unions.226 The co-determination by employees can 
be regarded a long tradition in German corporate culture and understanding of corporate 
governance. Its importance is due to the general stakeholder approach of German 
corporations and to the power of labor unions, not found in the Anglo-Saxon world. 
Having seats on the supervisory board employees’ representatives ensure that 
management does not make business decisions at the expense of jobs. In fact, the 
supervisory board assumes that co-determination by employees helps understanding the 
interests and requirements of the workforce.227 The chairman of the supervisory board, 
who is elected by the supervisory board itself228, however, has tie-breaking vote in favor 
of the shareholders so that in case of doubt shareholders’ interests have priority. The 
German co-determination feature affects the efficiency of the entire supervisory board, 
because it leads to an increase in the number of supervisory board members. German 
supervisory boards often reach a size of 20 members, which affects the discussion 
quality as well as reduces the frequency of board meetings.229
 
The entire managing board is appointed by the supervisory board, for a maximum 
period of five years and may be dismissed by the supervisory board for cause.230 The 
managing board consists of insiders who can not be members of the supervisory board 
at the same time.231 The chairman of the managing board, who is also determined by the 
supervisory board232, is rather a representative of the board than superior of the 
remaining board members as is the case in the USA.233 Top, middle and lower 
management report to the managing board which is by law responsible for the 
management of the firm.234  
 
                                                 
225  Members of the supervisory board are appointed for a period of five years at maximum, see § 101 and 
102 AktG. 
226  Fukao (1995), p. 14; Kaplan (1994b), p. 147; see also Wulfetange (2002), p. 90. In corporations with 
more than 500 employees the proportion of employee representatives is one third. 
227  Schmidt (2000), p. 111. 
228 § 107 AktG. 
229  Wulfetange (2002), p. 90. 
230  § 84 (1) and (3) AktG. 
231  The separation of the managing and supervisory boards is legally regulated in §105 AktG. 
232 § 84 (2) AktG. 
233  Kaplan (1994b), p. 147. 
234  § 76 (1) AktG. 
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4.3.3  Reformation of the German Corporate Governance System 
 
As has been mentioned before, one important weakness of the German corporate 
governance system lies in the insufficient flow of information between the management 
and the supervisory board due to the separation of these institutions. Moreover, 
international and institutional investors have been complaining about the low quality of 
financial reporting by German firms to the capital market which is less value and risk-
oriented than, for example, by US American firms. The need for changes in the German 
corporate governance system comes above all from the increasing capital market 
orientation of German firms. As the legislation is an important basis for the corporate 
governance structure, a number of reforms in the German corporate laws have taken 
place within the past few years. This section is aimed to give an overview of these 
reforms. 
Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG) 
 
The Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG) was 
enacted in 1998 and represents the first reaction of the German legislation to a number 
of weaknesses in the German corporate governance system reflected, for example, by 
several unexpected insolvencies. The KonTraG is a law which modifies the existing 
Stock Corporation Law. It particularly emphasizes monitoring of the management by 
the supervisory board and the shareholders’ assembly, reduces differences in 
shareholders’ voting rights, allows for incentive-based compensation of the 
management with stock options, intensifies the co-operation between the supervisory 
board and the auditor, and shrinks ownership by banks.235 Moreover, it requires the 
management explicitly in § 91 (2) AktG (German Securities Law) to arrange for an 
appropriate risk management system which enables to identify firm-specific risks early 
and ensures the survival of the firm.236  
Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz (KapAEG) 
 
Due to the increasing financing of German corporation over the capital market, another 
goal of the legislation was to ensure that firms satisfy the information needs of 
international and institutional investors. The KapAEG, which was also enacted in 1998, 
                                                 
235  von Rosen (2001), p. 3. 
236  Martin  / Bär (2002), p. 39. 
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aims at increasing the attractiveness of German firms as investment targets. It allows 
German firms to publish their group’s financial statements according to international 
accounting standards without additionally doing so according to German accounting 
standards.237 Later in 2001, the Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der 
Stimmrechtsausübung (NaStraG) was introduced in order to reinforce capital market 
orientation of German firms. NaStraG regulates the issue of registered shares instead of 
bearer shares, which allows direct communication with each shareholder. This is an 
important development for the improvement of investor relations by German 
corporations. 
Codes of Best Practice 
 
International and institutional investors were not only interested in a more detailed 
financial reporting but they above all missed transparency concerning the German 
corporate governance and particularly board structure. In 2000, the Frankfurt 
Commission of Corporate Governance Principles (Frankfurter Grundsatzkommission) 
developed a code of best practice which, on the one hand, explains the German two-tier 
model and on the other hand lists a number of principles of good corporate governance 
to be pursued by German firms. These principles have only advisory character and 
require enough independence of supervisory board members, especially the avoidance 
of recruiting former managers to the supervisory board. They also emphasize the 
disclosure of managers’ conflicts of interest as well as their compensation. Another 
aspect dealt with in the code of best practice is the use of the internet as an instrument of 
investor relations for the publication of the annual report and other firm-specific 
information in German and in English.238 In the same year, another commission in 
Berlin (Berliner Initiativkreis) modified the code of best practice by adding new 
principles concerning the duties of the managing board.239 The existence of several 
codes of corporate governance led to confusion among firms so that the German 
government appointed a separate commission (Regierungskommission) to develop a 
code of corporate governance which would “unify” all the different codes.  
 
The German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) which represents a catalogue of 
criteria for good corporate governance was published in February 2002. The GCGC has 
                                                 
237  Martin / Bär (2002), p. 37. 
238  von Rosen (2001), p. 4. 
239  Wulfetange (2002), p. 98. 
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only advisory character. Although its recommendations are not legally binding because 
firms cannot be sanctioned for not pursuing them, the German government assumes that 
the capital market will be efficient enough to reward those firms which adapt the code 
and to sanction others.240 In fact, several empirical studies give evidence that over 90% 
of German listed corporations adhere to the principles of the GCGC.241 Furthermore, 
firms are required by law (§ 161 AktG) to disclose in their annual reports whether they 
adapt the code and if not, they have do publish which recommendations of the GCGC 
they do not follow. This regulation is also referred to as the “comply or explain“-rule.242
  
The GCGC consists of four parts dealing with shareholders’ interests, the board 
structure, the duties of the managing and supervisory boards, and finally with disclosure 
and accounting issues.243 First, the role of the shareholders’ assembly and shareholders’ 
voting rights are explained. Second, the two-tier model is discussed with particular 
emphasis on the co-operation between the managing and supervisory boards and the 
managing board’s duties of supplying information.244 The GCGC indicates that the 
managing board has to establish an appropriate risk management system by law.245 
Also, the creation of monetary incentives for the management and therefore the 
introduction of a variable component in the compensation scheme are suggested.246 
Further, the GCGC advices the supervisory board to build committees specialized in 
selected issues such as risk management, strategy, or auditing in order to improve the 
quality of internal monitoring.247 The last part of the GCGC deals with disclosure. It 
specifies time limits for the annual and quarter-end reports248 and provides for the 
disclosure of stakes in other firms.249 The GCGC contains only very few new 
regulations. However, because of its compactness and its initiation by the German 
government the GCGC is supposed to be accepted more than its predecessors.  
                                                 
240  See Ehrhardt / Nowak (2002), p. 344: Empirical studies give evidence that such recommendations 
initiated by private institutions are able to influence the quality of corporate governance positively. In 
the UK, for example, the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee not only improved corporate 
governance of British firms but also their average performance (see, e.g., Dahya / McConnell / 
Travlos (2002), p. 461) 
241  See, e.g., von Werder (2003b). 
242  Pfitzer / Oser / Wader (2002), p. 1120; Pfitzer / Orth / Wader (2002), p. 753. 
243  von Werder (2002), pp. 803-809. 
244  See GCGC (2003), paragraph 3.4. 
245  See GCGC (2003), paragraph 4.1.4. 
246  See GCGC (2003), paragraph 4.2.3. 
247  See GCGC (2003), paragraph 5.3.1. 
248  See GCGC (2003), paragraph 7.1.2. 
249  See GCGC (2003), paragraph 7.1.4. 
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4.4  International Corporate Governance Standards 
 
While in the past, different corporate governance systems were compared to each other 
as if they competed, it is widely accepted today that the prevailing systems fit the 
cultural and economic circumstances in the respective countries. Consequently, it has 
been understood that it is difficult, for example, for Germany to completely adapt the 
US model of corporate governance. Various countries have rather passed over to pick-
up selected aspects of corporate governance which they believe would enhance the 
quality of their own system. Whereas Germany has recently discovered the importance 
of incentive-based compensation which is common practice in the USA, the USA, on 
the other hand, tries to separate the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board as is 
the case in Germany. In summary, there is a co-existence of various corporate 
governance systems rather than a competition of them.250  
 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to identify general principles of good corporate governance 
in order to ensure a common understanding and quality of corporate governance. On an 
international scale there exist only two efforts to harmonize corporate governance 
among countries. In May 1999, the OECD and the World Bank have developed a 
catalogue of minimum requirements for the corporate governance systems of member 
countries. These criteria are, however, formulated very vaguely and need to be specified 
by the individual states.251 They particularly concern the protection of shareholders’ 
rights as well as an equal supply of information to small as well as large investors.252 It 
is often criticized that the OECD refers mainly to emerging economies and less 
developed countries. Moreover, the specific issues and problems in individual countries 
are very complex so that the OECD principles do not necessarily contribute to solve 
them. Harmonization efforts also exist in the European Union which has enacted a 
directive concerning the board structure, shareholders’ rights, and co-determination by 
employees. 
 
                                                 
250  von Werder (2003a), p. 19. 
251  Wulfetange (2002), p. 98. 
252  von Rosen (2000), p. 1. 
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4.5  Success Factors for Good Corporate Governance 
 
So far, it has been distinguished between internal and external control mechanisms 
which ensure that managers are efficiently monitored and disciplined. External control 
mechanisms are based on control over the capital, manager, and product markets and 
can be regarded as difficult to influence by individual firms. In fact, firms are more able 
to specify their internal control mechanisms and undertake changes. Apart from the 
legally binding regulations concerning voting rights of shareholders or the board 
structure, firms can voluntarily modify their articles of incorporation or management 
contracts and therefore improve their corporate governance system. This voluntary 
aspect of corporate governance is a central element of this thesis because it is assumed 
that firms differ from each other in terms of their voluntary corporate governance 
practice and are able to increase their attractiveness on the capital market by introducing 
appropriate corporate governance instruments. 
 
The previous sections have presented the scope of possible corporate governance 
mechanisms and instruments. If success factors for good corporate governance should 
be specified, the efficiencies of each individual aspect would have to be analyzed. 
Basically, it can be distinguished between external and internal corporate governance 
mechanisms. Also, corporate governance may be considered from a mandatory and a 
voluntary perspective. As has been mentioned before, investors are expected to reward 
voluntary efforts in improving corporate governance. Mandatory corporate governance 
standards are to be fulfilled by all firms. Therefore, voluntary corporate governance 
instruments can be regarded as the success factors of corporate governance. The quality 
of auditing standards, legal regulations, but also market-based control mechanisms, on 
the other hand, cannot be considered as determining the quality of the individual 
corporate governance system because they cannot be directly influenced by the firms. 
  
The success factors for good corporate governance then refer to the aspects of 
managerial contracts, monitoring by the supervisory board, and voluntary disclosure. As 
far as managerial contracts are concerned, firms can specify general qualifications of 
managers such as age, experience, independence, i.e. no conflicts of interest due to 
contractual relationships with competitors, for example. Incentive-based compensation 
is rather a new issue in Germany as opposed to the USA or the UK, although from a 
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theoretical point of view it is an efficient mechanism to influence managerial behavior. 
Also, providing for liability of managers for mismanagement is another criterion for 
good corporate governance with respect to managerial contracts. As regards the 
supervisory board, it is important to guarantee enough independence of board members 
as well as to create monetary incentives and possibilities for sanctions. Risk 
management which is required by KonTraG is an explicit dealing with firm-specific 
risks which improves the quality of monitoring and avoids unexpected financial crises. 
The supervisory board can make use of a risk management system in order to improve 
the quality of control. Disclosure is another success factor. German firms can attract 
more investors if they disclose firm-specific information more frequently and according 
to the expectations of international and institutional investors. The following chapter 
discusses these success factors with particular attention to the German corporate 
governance system. 
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V Criteria for Good Corporate Governance  
 
This chapter serves to develop an understanding of what represents good corporate 
governance. It will particularly consider solutions to deficits in German corporate 
governance system. First, management issues are dealt with (section 5.1). Second, 
characteristics of the supervisory board are discussed (section 5.2). Third, the 
importance of a risk management system as part of an internal control system is shown 
(section 5.3). Fourth, criteria for good disclosure are presented. 
 
5.1  Management  
  
Agency problems and the necessity of controlling managerial behavior have been 
discussed in chapter III. This section presents ideas on how to solve agency problems 
with respect to the management. First, general job qualifications of managers are 
discussed. Second, compensation schemes as instruments of rewarding good behavior 
are presented. Third, an overview of the importance of liability by managers for 
sanctioning bad behavior is given. 
 
5.1.1  Qualifications  
 
It is crucial that firms recruit highly qualified managers in terms of job experience as 
well as personality. Managers can be insiders, i.e. they are promoted to the managing 
board or they can be recruited from the external market for managers. If managers are 
insiders, the firm has the advantage of having prior information on the respective 
managers’ qualifications from their employment history. If managers are recruited 
externally, the problem of hidden characteristics (see section 3.2.2.2) is more relevant. 
Usual requirements such as job experience in the respective business sector or an open 
and loyal personality are difficult to evaluate with regard to the up-coming decisions to 
be made. In fact, there exist only little empirical evidence on a relationship between 
managers’ personal characteristics and their decisions.253
 
                                                 
253  Gedenk (1994), p. 114. For an overview of empirical studies on the relationship between managers’ 
personal characteristics and corporate strategy see Schrader (1995). 
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An important corporate governance issue is the independence of managers. 
Independence refers to conflicts of interest, which managers may have due to their 
association with important business partners of the firm such as customers, suppliers, or 
competitors.254 Such a conflict of interest may affect management decisions which are 
the reason why independence is a necessity. In Germany, no explicit legal rules exist in 
the German Corporation Law on how to deal with interest conflicts of managers. The 
law only states that managers have to be loyal to the interests of the firm.255 However, 
the GCGC suggests the disclosure of insufficient independence to the managing board 
and the chairman of the supervisory board. Furthermore, firms may specify in their 
articles of incorporation that the managers concerned are not allowed to participate in 
critical decision-making processes, that they are excluded from board meetings or even 
that they are dismissed in case of potential damages for the firm.256 From a theoretical 
point of view conflicts of interest represent an agency problem, which can be solved 
particularly by incentive-based compensation as discussed in agency theory. Conflicts 
of interest can be considered as hidden characteristics which shareholders may 
overcome by screening. The firm may gather information on managers’ previous 
relationships with customers, suppliers, or competitors. A more effective method may 
be signaling or disclosure by the managers, which can be motivated by sanctions of 
non-disclosure.  
 
The German Corporation Law requires that managing board members get offered a five-
year contract at maximum.257 It has often been criticized that most companies offer this 
maximum contract which is far longer than management contracts, for example, in the 
USA. The criticism relates to the danger that managers have a job security for several 
years and so have a negative incentive to opportunism. Therefore, it has been discussed 
that firms could put more pressure on managers and discipline them if they shortened 
the length of their contracts.258 The GCGC does not recommend any specific length of 
management contracts. 
 
                                                 
254 Such an association occurs if managers, for example, have seats on the supervisory boards of 
competitors. 
255  Möllers (2003), pp. 416-417. 
256  The supervisory board can dismiss members of the management for cause such as damages to the firm 
due to insider trading, manipulation of accounts or the misuse of corporate resources for their own 
benefit. See Grumann / Gillmann (2003), p. 771.  
257  § 84 (1) AktG. 
258  Ernst&Young / FAZ Institut (2002), p. 19. 
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5.1.2  Compensation 
 
Compensation represents an important tool in influencing management behavior. This is 
theoretically suggested as well as empirically confirmed. This section deals with the 
possible compensation instruments motivating managers to improve corporate 
performance and with severance payments which reimburse managers in case of 
dismissals, for example, after takeovers. 
  
5.1.2.1 Incentives 
 
It is well established in the motivation literature that non-monetary incentives such as 
recognition, an interesting field of work, possibility of promotion, etc. are not to be 
neglected.259 Nonetheless, it is doubtless that monetary incentives are easier to 
control260 and that their effects may be stronger. Monetary incentives will be the focus 
of the following discussions. 
 
Compensation of managers may consist of fixed and variable income. Only the variable 
component has incentive effects and can be divided into short-term and long-term 
incentives. Whereas short-term incentives such as bonus payments in cash are paid out 
on a yearly basis, long-term incentives are related to corporate and management 
performance over several years, i.e. more than one year. Short-term payments are 
determined by the yearly operative performance of the firm measured by sales, 
operative income, or the degree of cost reduction. These are rather objective measures 
which enable comparisons with competitors more easily. With respect to the efficiency 
of a value-based management system it is reasonable to measure management 
performance additionally with internal value-based ratios such as EVA or CFRoI in 
order to motivate managers to enhance shareholder value.  
 
If short-term payments are related to market performance in terms of share price 
movements, managers might try to increase share prices in the short run while 
neglecting long-term value enhancing strategies. As has been mentioned before, this 
problem is also referred to as the myopia of managers. In order to address this risk, 
                                                 
259  Gedenk (1994), pp. 108-109. 
260  Finkelstein / Hambrick (1988), p. 544. 
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long-term incentives need to be introduced.261 Long-term compensation aims at 
ensuring that managers pursue the goal of shareholder value maximization on a long-
term basis. If their compensation was not evaluated by long-term measures managers 
would have no incentive to make decisions in the interest of shareholders. Long- term 
incentives may therefore be related to the firm’s share price, which reflects the 
development of the firm. Additionally they may consider the stock index or an industry 
index as a measure of reference. In order for long-term incentives to be efficient they 
need to refer to the present performance of managers but reward them on the basis of 
future “profits”.262 From the perspective of managers, increasing the market 
performance of the firm may benefit them in the form of a higher reputation and 
therefore a higher value in the manager market.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, long-term incentives reduce agency costs by aligning 
the interests of managers to those of shareholders. Managers try to maximize 
shareholder value because they are compensated in proportion to it.263 Long-term 
incentives also overcome the different risk preferences of managers and shareholders. 
Assuming that managers are more risk averse than shareholders, long-term components 
may transfer risk to managers motivating them to generate shareholder value on a long-
term basis. The problem of an optimal risk allocation, however, remains. Long-term 
variable compensation should be competitive and sufficient enough to retain managers 
(retention), particularly during unprofitable business years due to external factors. Firms 
can also retain their managers by, for example, specifying blocking or service periods 
for exercising stock options in which they have to stay with the firm.264 Fourth, 
compensation opportunities should be limited so as to control the cost of long-term 
incentives born by shareholders and therefore to yet ensure a maximum shareholder 
value.265 This limitation of management compensation is also referred to as an (upper) 
cap and can be applied to long-term incentives as well as yearly bonus payments by 
specification in management contracts. 
 
                                                 
261  The creation of long-term incentives is also recommended by the GCGC. Most German corporations 
have already implemented this suggestion. See PwC (2003), p. 6. 
262  Riegler (2000), pp. 161-164. 
263  Hall (2002), p. 7 talks about managers being turned into owners. 
264  Hess / Lüders (2001), p. 14. Such service periods may last up to 4 years. 
265  O’Byrne / Stern Stewart &Co. (1996), p. 371. 
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As far as the possible instruments of long-term compensation are concerned, firms may, 
for example, issue phantom stocks or stock options. It is important to note that there are 
only little differences between them, even though the issue of stock options is widely 
disseminated. The more important aspect is that an incentive-based compensation 
scheme takes short-term and long-term performance into consideration and fulfils the 
above-mentioned criteria of aligning, retention, and shareholder cost.266 Further possible 
long-term compensation instruments are stocks, convertible bonds, and stock 
appreciation rights. All these instruments have in common that there is a considerable 
upside potential and downside risk. The only differences may lie in their disclosure in 
the financial accounts.267  
 
5.1.2.2 Severance Payments 
 
Severance payments are granted to managers in case they have to leave the company 
after a hostile takeover. The idea behind severance payments, also referred to as golden 
parachutes, is that managers are reimbursed for any damages they incur in connection 
with their dismissal. Such damages may comprise the risk of not finding another job 
immediately, the loss in their market value, or the career opportunities they may have 
had. Severance payments give managers security and to some extent motivation because 
the firm rewards their loyalty. The risk that managers misuse the possibility of receiving 
such payments is not to be neglected. In view of the risk of managerial opportunism, it 
is critical whether severance payments solve agency problems rather than creating them. 
In Germany, the takeover market is very inactive and consequently, golden parachutes 
may not play a major role in management contracts. 
  
5.1.3  Liability 
 
In view of the potential opportunism by managers it is not only important to reward 
good behavior but also to sanction bad management behavior. Shareholders’ power to 
control managers directly is widely limited which makes shareholder protection 
necessary. The legislations of several countries have noticed the importance of liability 
of managers in order to discipline them and to prevent insolvencies. In the USA, for 
                                                 
266  See also Hall (2002), pp. 7-8. 
267  Hess / Lüders (2001), p. 13. In the US, firms prefer issuing stock options to other forms of variable 
compensation due to advantages offered by the US GAAP. 
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example, the government has enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which poses financial 
sanctions on managers as well as auditors for manipulation of accounts and fraudulent 
auditing.268 In Germany, there exist a number of laws concerning the personal liability 
of managers and supervisory board members.269 These regulations, nonetheless, have 
not been able to prevent managers from mismanagement and fraud. Consequently, one 
aim of the GCGC was to make recommendations on how to complement the legal 
provisions on liability by voluntary measures. The GCGC advises German corporations 
to take out a Directors’ & Officers’ (D&O) liability insurance policy which covers 
damages caused by the managers or supervisory board members and born by the firm 
and the shareholders. In order to create threat of liability the GCGC recommends 
providing for the participation of managers and supervisory board members in damages. 
Even if the probability that the insurance policy takes effect is low, the threat of 
monetary liability alone is supposed to deter managers from fraud. There is, however, 
no suggestion in the GCGC on up to which amount managers should participate in 
damages.270 This is an important aspect since the effect of such a provision will largely 
depend on the amount of participation.  
 
5.2  Supervisory Board 
 
It is often neglected that shareholders stand in a principal-agent relationship with the 
supervisory board as with managers.271 In fact, direct monitoring is delegated to the 
supervisory board on behalf of shareholders as management tasks are transferred to 
managers. The relationship between the supervisory board and shareholders may cause 
agency problems as the supervisory board can be assumed to behave in opportunistic 
form. The main reason for this is that the supervisory board has no more incentive per 
se than managers to act according to shareholders’ interests. Due to the incompleteness 
of their contractual relationship shareholders have to apply similar instruments of 
motivation and sanction on the supervisory board as for managers. Shareholders are 
interested in a good quality of monitoring as they are not able to monitor the managing 
board themselves due to the free-rider problem discussed within the property rights 
approach. In the case of the supervisory board it is important how the board is 
                                                 
268  Ballwieser / Dobler (2003), p. 460. 
269  See Ballwieser / Dobler (2003), pp. 460-461 for a list of regulations on management liability. 
270  Lange (2003), p. 1835. 
271  Hermalin / Weisbach (2003), p. 10. 
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structured and how decision-making processes are organized. Taking these additional 
aspects into consideration this section discusses criteria for an efficient supervisory 
board. 
 
5.2.1  Qualifications 
 
In the event of improving board control it is necessary to ask which board attributes 
may affect the success and efficiency of monitoring. A number of empirical studies 
exist which confirm correlations between board characteristics such as board size or 
composition and firm performance.272 Although the German supervisory board is 
different from the US American board, the suggestions made in American literature on 
the characteristics of non-executive or outside directors can be applied for the German 
supervisory board members. The GCGC makes clear specifications of the attributes 
supervisory board members should have. 
 
A general but new requirement concerns the age of members of German supervisory 
boards. Most firms have no age limit for board members so that it is not unusual that 
they reach an age far beyond the retirement age of 65. This “practice” is assumed to 
distort the quality of monitoring and is therefore criticized. Although the mental fitness 
of a person can hardly be evaluated merely by their age, it is widely accepted that there 
should be an age limit. The GCGC advises firms to specify an age limit for supervisory 
board members without suggesting a certain age limit.273 Another element potentially 
affecting the quality of monitoring is the time that board members are able to invest in 
it. In Germany, it is not uncommon for board members to have several further mandates 
in other corporations. This may be critical if the board members take on further 
mandates at the expense of their monitoring quality. The GCGC recommends limiting 
the number of supervisory board mandates to 5, if the respective persons at the same 
time hold management positions.274 In any case, managers need to get the approval of 
their supervisory board for accepting board mandates somewhere else.  
 
Independence and objectivity are other important attributes supervisory board members 
should dispose of. Interest conflicts due to affiliations with significant business partners 
                                                 
272  See Zahra / Pearce (1989), p. 309 for an overview of studies investigating the relationship between 
board attributes and service, strategy and control, which again influence performance. 
273  See GCGC (2003), paragraph 5.4.1. 
274  See GCGC (2003), paragraph 5.4.3. 
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of the corporation should be disclosed to the chairman of the board (signalling). Similar 
to the case of managers it may be required in the articles of incorporation that the 
respective board members concerned are not allowed to participate in relevant decision-
making processes, that they are excluded from board meetings or even that they are 
dismissed in case of potential damages for the firm. 
 
In connection with a number of insolvencies of large corporations due to failures of 
control275 the process of monitoring has become an important corporate governance 
issue. Several new ideas on how to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of 
supervision arose comprising the building board committees276, a more intense co-
operation between the supervisory board and auditor, more involvement of the board in 
strategic issues, and evaluation. Board committees specialize in certain topics such as 
risk management, strategy or investments and enable the board to have more 
information on the management’s activities.277 Also, it is important that the supervisory 
board, and not the management, concludes the auditing contract and determines the 
payment of the auditor. The GCGC also provides for a regulation that firms should 
determine a list of decisions to be by all means approved by the supervisory board. 
Thus, the management can not act without consulting the supervisory board. Moreover, 
it has often been criticized that the performance of the board is not evaluated. The 
method of peer review, which is common in the USA, is picked up by the GCGC. A 
peer review may serve to evaluate the performance of individual board members.  
 
5.2.2  Composition  
 
The composition of the supervisory board reflects potential independence problems as 
well as the power of stakeholders. Independence problems may occur if supervisory 
board members are not recruited from outside but are former managers of one and the 
same firm. In the USA as well as in Germany the importance of “outside” directors is 
widely recognized.278 As far as the representatives of the firm’s stakeholders are 
concerned, the German law provides for co-determination by employees depending on 
firm size. Moreover, banks play an important role in supervisory boards because they 
                                                 
275  See Gaulke (1996) for an overview of supervisory board failures in the past decades. 
276  See GCGC, paragraph 5.3.1. 
277  Donaldson (1996), p. 54. 
278  See, e.g. Economist (2001), p. 77. 
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have always been significant lenders as well as institutional investors.279 The German 
corporate governance system, despite being often understood as a stakeholder oriented 
system gives shareholders more power in case of doubt since the chairman elected by 
the shareholders has a tie-breaking vote.  
 
5.2.3  Compensation 
 
In view of the existing agency problems it is necessary that also the supervisory board is 
compensated with variable performance-based instruments.280 Therefore, the same 
questions on the pay mix and the incentive instruments have to be asked for the 
supervisory board. It is, however, reasonable to reduce the proportion of variable 
income for the supervisory board, since the performance of the firm is mainly due to the 
efforts and the performance of the management. In Germany, the supervisory board 
only gets an insignificant amount of monetary incentives. The issue of stock options is 
even forbidden by the German Stock Corporation Law so that supervisory board 
members usually get convertible bonds281 or merely bonus payments related to profit-
based measures such as dividends. The GCGC emphasizes the creation of short-term as 
well as long-term incentives for the supervisory board.282
 
5.2.4  Liability 
 
The suggestion of the GCGC to take out a Directors’ & Officers’ (D&O) liability 
insurance policy also refers to supervisory board members. Such an insurance policy 
covers damages to the firm and/or the shareholders which are caused by the managers or 
supervisory board members. The GCGC emphasizes the importance of providing for the 
participation of supervisory board members in damages. Such a threat of liability serves 
to force supervisory board members to careful monitoring. As for managers the GCGC 
makes no suggestion on the amount of such a liability for damages. Because managers 
are the primary group responsible for the financial standing of the firm the amount of 
participation for the supervisory board should be lower than for managers. 
 
                                                 
279  See Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (1997), pp. 17-23. 
280  Fallgatter (2003), pp. 704-706. 
281  Wiechers (2003), pp. 595-596. 
282  See GCGC (2003), paragraph 5.4.5. 
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5.3  Risk Management 
 
Business decisions are characterized by uncertainty in terms of outcome and thus 
involve the probability of profits as well as of losses. The term risk can therefore also be 
understood as a chance for profits. In a narrow sense, risk refers to the probability of a 
loss.283 The attention to risk management has increased with the enacting of the 
KonTraG which provides for the establishment of an appropriate risk management 
system by the management in order to minimize substantial risks which could impede 
the financial soundness of the firm.284 Risk management in this context can be 
understood as the system of monitoring or screening to prevent dangers to the survival 
of the firm.285 As such, it becomes a fundamental tool in making investment decisions. 
Risk management thus has to be integrated into the strategy and its operative 
implementation.286 From the perspective of the shareholders, risk management protects 
firm-specific investments, improves decision-making, and capital budgeting.287  
  
5.3.1  Risk Management Process 
 
The risk management process explains how risks are dealt with in a systematic way. It 
basically represents a general model which can be applied to any kind of risks (market 
risks as well as operational risks). The most important steps in risk management are: 
Identification, Analysis, Evaluation, and Control. Additionally, risk reporting should 
take place at all stages of the process. The following Figure 4 illustrates the risk 
management process. 
 
                                                 
283  Lück (1999), p. 144; Burger / Buchhart (2002a), p. 1. 
284  See § 91(2) AktG.  
285  See § 91(2) AktG. 
286  For the use of the Balanced Scorecard as an element of the risk management system see Homburg / 
Haupt / Stephan (2004), pp. 12-18. 
287  Kaen (2000), pp. 251-256. 
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Figure 4: The risk management process 288
 
Identification 
Analysis Evaluation 
Control 
Reporting 
 
One important task of the management is to introduce this process in all business units 
and departments and to increase the acceptance of the system by the employees, i.e. 
create a “risk culture”. The efficiency of a risk management system requires readiness 
by employees to report risks, to observe them and to evaluate them. Another success 
factor for risk management is the documentation of the risk management process in a 
risk handbook available to all employees. Such a handbook can ensure a common 
understanding on the importance of risk management and give clear constructions on 
how employees have to behave to contribute to the success of the system. Also, setting 
risk limits such as a budget limit or production time can increase the acceptance and 
efficiency of risk management, particularly if the exceeding such limits is related to 
sanctions. The risk management process can be considered as a support tool for the 
supervisory board to fulfil its monitoring tasks. The managing board members as well 
as other managers constantly have to report on the operative business so that monitoring 
becomes easier for the supervisory board. Also, the information costs as internal 
transaction costs related to monitoring can be reduced with the establishment of a risk 
management system.  
 
                                                 
288 s based on Gampenrieder / Greiner (2002), p. 284.  Figure 4 i
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5.3.2  Institutions of Risk Management 
 
Risk management is an integrative part of every business activity. The acceptance and 
efficiency of a risk management system can be increased if there are explicit institutions 
or persons within the firm who coordinate the risk management processes across 
business units and subsidiaries. Such institutions could be independent departments or 
the task of risk management could be fulfilled by related departments such as 
management accounting, internal audit, supervisory board committee, etc. These 
institutions would then have to co-operate with the auditor who by law has to evaluate 
the quality of the risk management system.289
 
5.3.3  Quantification of Risks 
 
The final stage in the risk management process (control) is easier to manage if it is 
possible to determine the risk exposure and the necessary actions to cover it. Therefore, 
the quantification of risks plays an important role and firms should try the best they can 
to calculate the potential losses (profits) arising from business decisions. However, not 
all risks are measurable. Whereas, for example, political risks are difficult to evaluate, 
financial risks such as price or interest rate risks are easy to identify and calculate. In 
fact, there exist mathematical approaches for risk evaluation such as the Value-at-Risk. 
The main reason of the difficulty of risk calculation often lies in the lack of availability 
of risk data. Risks such as concerning the entrance of a competitor in the product market 
may be difficult to estimate. Such risks, however, can then be described and categorized 
according to whether their probabilities are rather high or low.290
 
5.4  Disclosure 
 
Disclosure represents the communication of firm-specific information to the capital 
market. It refers to all kinds of communication tools firms may use. Addressees of 
disclosure, however, are not limited to the capital market but include also employees, 
customers, competitors, suppliers, and the press.  
 
                                                 
289  See § 317 (4) HGB, § 91 (2) AktG and the Auditing Standard IDW PS 340. 
290  For example, in a BCG Matrix, Matrix of McKinsey, or the Balanced Chance and Risk Card. See 
Burger / Buchhart (2002b), p. 593. 
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5.4.1 Mandatory Disclosure and the Role of Accounting Standards 
 
Mandatory disclosure refers to the amount and depth of information required by law 
and/or by stock exchanges which largely depend on the legal form, the size, and other 
firm characteristics. Mandatory publication of firm-specific information comprises the 
balance sheet, profit & loss accounts, and an appendix for supplementary information. 
Since the introduction of KonTraG the annual report has to be complemented by a cash 
flow statement and a business unit report.291 The German Commercial Law (§ 292a I, II 
HGB) allows listed corporations to disclose their financial statements according to 
internationally accepted accounting standards such as IAS or US GAAP.292 The amount 
of mandatory disclosure has been extended by a risk and forecast report. The structure 
of this report is not specified. Beside the annual report corporations are required to 
publish quarterly reports and also immediate reports, if necessary.  
 
Voluntary disclosure goes beyond mandatory disclosure and aims to reduce the 
information gap of investors and to attract new investors. Voluntary disclosure is 
particularly needed where mandatory rules do not give any specifications as it is the 
case for the risk and forecast report. The most demanded information by the 
shareholders is value reporting, risk reporting, and reporting on the compensation of 
managers and supervisory board members. In a theoretical context, voluntary disclosure 
can be classified as a signalling instrument, which reduces the asymmetric distribution 
of information and therefore additional information or transaction costs. Good 
disclosure, which meets the information demand of the capital market, is then supposed 
to increase confidence of investors. The risk of false disclosure is not insignificant 
because voluntary information is not audited by an objective third party such as an 
auditor.  
 
5.4.2  Value Reporting 
 
Value reporting is crucial for shareholders because it informs them on the market value 
of their capital provided to the firm. Value reporting usually comprises the following 
three parts: Total Return Reporting, Value Added Reporting, and Strategic Advantage 
                                                 
291  See § 297 I. (2) HGB. On the attitude of German managers towards US-GAAP see Glaum (1998). 
292  Hütten (2000), p. 129. 
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Reporting.293 Total Return Reporting serves to comment on the development of the 
overall market performance of the firm. Therefore, it concentrates on a presentation and 
explanation of the share price development in the respective business year and relates 
this information to historic data of the past three to five years. Ratios such as earnings or 
cash flow per share may additionally be useful in comparing firms with each other.294 
Furthermore, firms can inform shareholders on the development of dividend payments 
and on internal value-based measures such as EVA or CFROI, which, however, do not 
serve for comparison purposes as most firms, calculate these ratios differently. This 
type of reporting refers to Value Added Reporting. Furthermore, firms may also 
comment on their non-financial value drivers such as technological competencies or 
customer satisfaction and analyze their long-term potential of competitiveness in the so-
called Strategic Advantage Reporting. 
 
5.4.3  Risk Disclosure 
 
The KonTraG reformed the mandatory disclosure of German corporations by requiring 
an extension of their annual reports by a risk report which has to address substantial 
risks that firms have identified in the business year and which bear the danger of having 
long-term effects. This can be viewed as a complementary rule to the required 
establishment of a risk management system. In order to increase the transparency 
towards the capital market, firms can voluntarily disclose additional relevant 
information. Therefore, there is enough room for voluntary disclosure. As regards the 
structure and content of the risk report there are no specifications in the law. The 
German Accounting Standard Committee (DRSC) is a private institution and develops 
recommendations for German corporations on their disclosure policy. The German 
Accounting Standard No. 5 deals with risk reporting. It suggests that firms discuss their 
risk management system and its integration into the strategy and value-based 
management system. Firms should further mention whether they have written a risk 
handbook and which instruments they use to hedge risks. The most important aspect is 
the presentation of the most relevant risks which, if possible, should be quantified. An 
analysis of the risk reports of the largest German corporations indicates that the risk 
                                                 
293  Fischer / Wenzel (2002), p. 329; Ruhwedel / Schultze (2002), p. 603. 
294  Pellens / Hillebrandt / Tomaszewski (2000), pp. 190-191. 
 82
 
reports are rather short and risks are rarely quantified.295 The German Accounting 
Standard No. 5 is definitely a good basis for orientation.  
 
5.4.4  Disclosure of Management and Board Compensation 
 
Transparency concerning the compensation of manager and supervisory board members 
is another requirement of the capital market. The GCGC not only provides for the 
introduction of variable market-based components but also the disclosure of individual 
incomes.296 This is particularly interesting if managers receive abnormally high salaries. 
In the USA, this problem has often been criticized and therefore it is understood as good 
corporate governance if firms disclose the compensation of individual managers. 
Particularly, when firms issue stock option plans it is interesting for shareholders to 
understand the respective incentive mechanisms. In Germany, it is rather a taboo to 
disclose individual salaries. In 2002, for example, most German firms have given 
information only on the total amount of income paid to the entire management or 
supervisory board in their annual reports. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
295  See Rücker (2003). 
296  See GCGC (2003), paragraphs 4.2.4 for the management and 5.4.5 for the supervisory board. 
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VI  Empirical Analysis 
 
This chapter focuses first on the formulation of research questions and hypotheses 
(section 6.1) on the basis of the theoretical explanations of the necessity and importance 
of corporate governance in chapter III and criteria for good corporate governance 
presented in chapter V. These hypotheses serve then as the starting point of the 
following empirical analyses presented in section 6.2. 
 
6.1 Development of Hypotheses 
 
6.1.1 Research Questions 
 
The theoretical approaches presented in chapter III emphasize the importance of 
introducing efficient control and incentive mechanisms (corporate governance) in order 
to solve agency problems. The legal system of a country can create an important 
framework for the quality of corporate governance of firms because it can ensure 
minimum standards concerning the protection of shareholders’ rights. Countries, such 
as the USA or the UK, where capital markets play a significant role for corporate 
finance tend to be more shareholder oriented and to have more stringent regulations, for 
instance, on the disclosure practice of firms.297 In Germany and many other Continental 
European countries equity capital has been only recently gaining importance. Therefore, 
the legal systems of these countries have to adapt to the new circumstance that 
shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders, now demand more protection. 
Apart from legal provisions investors expect voluntary commitment of firms to 
shareholder value orientation and good corporate governance because adherence to the 
law alone is not assumed to ensure profitability and the creation of shareholder value. It 
is well established that investors base their investment decisions on firms’ market 
performance and the degree of their commitment to pursue shareholders’ interests.298 In 
a narrower sense corporate governance mechanisms aim at accomplishing shareholders’ 
interests. Consequently, it is interesting to ask whether firms can contribute to 
shareholder value enhancement by having a “good” corporate governance system. In 
other words, it would be interesting to know whether a higher quality of corporate 
                                                 
297  Whether the quantity of legal regulations influences the quality of corporate governance has to be 
considered critically.  
298  See, e.g. Beelitz (2002), p. 578. 
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governance effectively improves the agency relationship between shareholders and 
managers so that managers increase shareholder value. Furthermore, it is would 
important to analyze which aspects of corporate governance are more or less relevant in 
reducing agency costs and in creating shareholder value.  
 
The main research questions in this thesis are therefore the following: 
 
1) Do firms with better corporate governance c.p. generate higher value for 
shareholders than firms with worse corporate governance? 
 
2) Which aspects of corporate governance are more or less important in a possible 
influence of corporate governance on shareholder value? 
 
In order to address these research questions it is necessary first to analyze the factors 
determining shareholder value (see section 6.1.2) and second, to explain the reasons for 
a potential influence of corporate governance on shareholder value (see section 6.1.3).  
 
6.1.2  Success Factors for Shareholder Value Maximization 
 
The internationalization of capital markets and the increasing involvement of 
institutional investors in corporate finance have given shareholder value a considerable 
importance as a performance measure. In fact, investment decisions are made upon the 
market performance of firms. Firms raising equity funds over the capital market are 
expected to maximize shareholder value, i.e. the market value of their equity capital.299 
Shareholder value is generated if the return on equity capital, consisting of an increase 
in the share price and dividends, is larger than the cost of equity capital, which is 
understood as the opportunity cost from alternative investments. As it is difficult for 
firms to control their operative business according to their external market performance, 
they need to identify the expected return by shareholders300 and to consider it in their 
business decisions. 
 
                                                 
299  Coenenberg / Salfeld (2003), pp. 18, 37 
300  Coenenberg / Salfeld (2003), p. 36. The usual method of calculating the cost of equity capital is the 
CAPM, which accounts for the amount and cost of risk born by shareholders. 
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The integration and implementation of the shareholder value concept into a firm’s 
strategic and operative business, its control systems as well as compensation schemes 
are referred to as value-based management. Value-based management is characterized 
by the substitution of profit-based measures by value-based measures, which take the 
cost of equity capital into consideration. A firm changing from a profit-based to a value-
based measurement system may use the EVA® or the CFRoI instead of the Return on 
Investment (RoI) or the Return on Sales (RoS). Furthermore, compensation of managers 
is increasingly related to value-based performance measured by such value-based ratios. 
These are important aspects of internal efforts of maximizing shareholder value in 
contrast to maximizing profitability which does not account for an adequate return for 
shareholders. The above-mentioned measures are internal ratios that can be 
implemented in a firm’s planning and internal reporting system. Firms controlling 
internally with such value-based measures are then understood as shareholder value-
oriented firms. 
 
Shareholder value represents the ultimate market-based performance measure of firms 
to which several factors contribute. For decision-making purposes by the management 
the rather general concept of shareholder value maximization needs to be broken down 
to so-called value drivers which the firm can control in its operative business.301 
Rappaport302 specifies seven value drivers including capital expenditure, sales growth, 
and cash tax rate. Other value drivers are discussed by Kaplan / Norton303 in their 
concept of the balanced scorecard. The balanced scorecard advises managers to control 
their business according to financial as well as non-financial aspects. Non-financial 
value-drivers are difficult to measure and may comprise customer satisfaction and 
employee satisfaction. Consequently, it is imaginable that intangible assets or 
competencies of firms contribute to the maximization of the shareholder value. The 
success factors for shareholder value have certainly not yet been researched to an end 
and the role of subjective judgements on what enhances value is not to be neglected 
either.304 Firms’ success in generating shareholder value will to a large extent depend on 
their individual organizational, cultural, and business characteristics. Consequently, 
generalizations are hard to make.  
                                                 
301  Sinha / Morison (1999), p. 8. 
302  Rappaport (1998), p. 39. 
303  Kaplan / Norton (1996). 
304  Sinha / Morison (1999), p. 8. 
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6.1.3  The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
Value 
 
Listed corporations, which are expected to be shareholder-oriented, need to adapt their 
management and control systems as well as their overall corporate policy to the 
expectations of the capital market. As corporate governance can generally be 
understood as the management and control systems of firms, the concept of maximizing 
shareholder value has to be taken into account in the organization of corporate 
governance.  
 
Whether corporate governance is a success factor for shareholder value is difficult to 
maintain per se. Microeconomic theories discussed in chapter III support the 
implementation of a good corporate governance system in order to optimize 
management contracts and internal supervision. Nonetheless, whether good corporate 
governance is value-enhancing is an open question which can only be answered by 
empirical evidence. The following arguments speak for a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and shareholder value. 
 
First, corporate governance provides for internal control mechanisms which influence 
managerial behavior and decisions by threat of sanctions. In a firm with dispersed 
ownership structure, monitoring tasks are delegated to a separate body such as the 
supervisory board due to difficulty of direct control.305 This delegation causes 
monitoring costs (agency costs) which, however, do not outweigh the costs arising from 
moral hazard by managers. Effective monitoring may achieve that managers behave in 
the interest of shareholders, because they fear sanctions in case of opportunism, and 
make value-maximizing business decisions which, c. p. , generate higher cash returns 
than without being monitored. The supervisory board may, for example, use an internal 
reporting system or a risk management system to ensure effective control. 
 
Second, similarly to control mechanisms, compensation schemes influence managerial 
behavior and decisions with monetary incentives. They do not sanction “bad” behavior 
but, in contrast, reward “good” behavior. Motivational theories emphasize that 
                                                 
305 Compare section 3.2.1.2 discussing the free-rider problem. 
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incentives are even more important than sanctions in controlling human behavior.306 In 
the context of shareholder value, it is crucial that managers’ compensation is to a large 
extent related to internal value-based measures as well as to the firm’s market 
performance. Moreover, it is important that the proportion of variable compensation 
contains long-term incentives, thus avoiding only short-term profit-maximizing efforts 
by managers. Here again, managers are assumed to make value-enhancing decisions 
because of being motivated to increase their personal income. Corporate governance can 
specify the proportion of variable compensation and determine the measures to which it 
is related. In view of the necessity of aligning the interests of shareholders and the 
supervisory board (see section 5.2.3), similar monetary incentives can be used for the 
supervisory board in order to ensure that managers are controlled effectively and make 
value-maximizing decisions. 
 
Third, the information gap between shareholders and managers, which causes 
information costs, can be reduced if the firm decides to voluntarily give firm-specific 
information, which refers to signalling in agency theory. As investment decisions are to 
a large extent made upon available information firms will be motivated to be able to 
publish positive information or even more positive information than their competitors. 
For shareholders information serves to reduce the risk of making wrong investment 
decisions. The lower this risk the lower is an additional risk premium which 
shareholders require. Such a risk premium is again an important determinant of the cost 
of capital paid to shareholders and thus, of the shareholder value.  
 
In summary, control mechanisms, monetary incentive schemes, and disclosure policy 
can be considered as value-enhancing corporate governance instruments. Whereas 
control mechanisms and compensation schemes represent internal aspects of corporate 
governance, disclosure refers to an external corporate governance instrument. The 
internal aspects aim at influencing managers’ decisions and behavior. Disclosure, on the 
other hand, addresses the problem of minimizing information asymmetries. Such a 
differentiation between the internal and external dimensions of corporate governance 
may make sense with respect to their different ways of affecting shareholder value.  
 
                                                 
306  See, e.g. Ellig (1982). 
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6.1.4  Previous Empirical Research 
 
Previous empirical work on corporate governance gives evidence of the importance and 
relevance of the legal framework within which corporate control can take place. These 
studies either make cross-country comparisons of the scope and intensity of legal 
provisions307 or analyze individual aspects of corporate governance within a single 
jurisdiction.308 The recent trend in corporate governance research, however, is the 
attempt to measure the quality of corporate governance on a firm-level and to analyze 
its effects on firm-specific capital market performance.309 The empirical study 
underlying this thesis follows this trend by analyzing the relationship between the 
quality of firm-specific corporate governance and shareholder value. Capital market 
performance hereby serves as an indicator whether a good quality of corporate 
governance is rewarded by shareholders.  
 
The internationalization of capital markets has made corporate governance an 
international topic. First studies on corporate governance attempt to compare various 
international corporate governance systems discussing their efficiency regarding 
corporate control. These studies identify three main types of systems to be found in the 
USA, in Germany, and in Japan, respectively. An important finding in these studies is 
that different countries have different understandings of how corporate governance 
should be arranged, which is reflected in their legal framework. Following studies 
concentrate on analyzing cross-country differences regarding selected aspects such as 
ownership structure.310 A number of studies test empirically whether better legal 
regulations result in any economic benefits. La Porta et al.311 find that better shareholder 
protection is associated with a higher valuation of corporate assets. Lombardo and 
Pagano312, on the other hand, give empirical evidence that judicial efficiency has a 
significant influence on the return on equity of firms measured by the dividend yield 
and the earnings-price ratio. Apart from these international studies there is a number of 
national research investigating country-specific issues. For Germany, for example, 
                                                 
307  See, e.g. La Porta et al. (1999). 
308  See, e.g. Lehmann / Weigand (2000). 
309  See, e.g. Drobetz et al. (2004). 
310  See, e.g. La Porta et al. (1999). 
311  La Porta et al. (2002). 
312  Lombardo / Pagano (2000). 
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Lehmann and Weigand313 find a negative relationship between ownership concentration 
and profitability, but a positive impact of bank ownership on performance. Boehmer314 
discovers a negative influence of bank control over voting rights on shareholder value 
measured by the market value of equity capital. 
 
Recent studies measure the quality of firm-level corporate governance within a single 
jurisdiction and investigate its relationship with firm value. Though based on different 
methodologies and different understandings of corporate governance, these studies 
interestingly all find a positive relationship between firm-level corporate governance 
and a number of performance measures. Klapper and Love315 confirm that good 
corporate governance results in better operating performance and higher market 
valuation for a number of emerging markets. Black et al.316 make a cross-sectional 
analysis for Korean firms and construct a firm-level corporate governance index which 
appears to be positively correlated with Tobin’s q, the market-book ratio, and the 
market value, respectively. Gompers et al.317 attempt a similar research for US firms 
whereby their focus is more on shareholders’ rights with regard to takeover defenses. 
They find that stronger firm-specific shareholders’ rights result in higher profits, sales 
growth, and valuation of firms.  
 
The current study is comparable to Drobetz et al.318 who construct a corporate 
governance index for German corporations. Drobetz at al. find a positive correlation 
between their overall corporate governance index and sales increase, stock returns, and 
the market value measured by Tobin’s q, respectively. As in many other studies Drobetz 
et al. mix various dimensions of corporate governance into one single corporate 
governance measure and do not differentiate between the internal and external 
dimensions of corporate governance.  
 
The necessity of such a differentiation can be concluded from the disclosure literature, 
which investigates the economic benefits of mandatory disclosure standards and 
voluntary disclosure policy. Research on disclosure concentrates on one aspect of 
                                                 
313  Lehmann / Weigand (2000). 
314  Boehmer (2000). 
315  Klapper / Love (2003). 
316  Black et al. (2003). 
317  Gompers et al. (2003). 
318  Drobetz et al. (2004). 
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corporate governance among others. Findings of disclosure studies indicate that 
disclosure of firm-specific information causes reactions by the capital market. In fact, 
firm-related information serves to facilitate investment decisions and to control 
shareholders’ expectations. Whereas the internal corporate governance mechanisms 
influence the actual quality of corporate governance, disclosure shapes the perception of 
this quality by the capital market. The effects of the two dimensions are thus expected 
to be different. Disclosure focuses on information asymmetry between the firm and the 
capital market. In order for a market to be efficient information asymmetry among 
market participants should not be excessive. Otherwise market transactions might not 
take place.319 Empirical studies on voluntary disclosure320 find effects of disclosure on 
market liquidity and the cost of equity capital. Botosan321, for example, constructs a 
disclosure score322 which she regresses on proxies for the cost of equity capital. The 
result is negative but insignificant. The disclosure literature shows that disclosure has a 
different purpose than the internal corporate governance system, i.e. reducing 
information asymmetry in the market, and thus probably a different effect on 
shareholder value.  
 
6.1.5  Hypotheses 
 
The main research question whether the quality of corporate governance of a firm323 
influences its shareholder value is investigated by testing hypotheses on this 
relationship. Consistent with recent studies a hypothesis concerning the quality of the 
overall corporate governance system is formulated. The basic characteristic of the 
underlying research, however, is the assumption that the effects of the internal and 
external dimensions of corporate governance have diverging effects on shareholder 
value. This assumption will be broken down to further hypotheses in sections 6.1.5.2 
and 6.1.5.3. 
 
                                                 
319   Akerlof (1970). 
320   See, e.g. Diamond / Verrecchia (1991); Baiman / Verrecchia (1996); Botosan (1997). 
321   Botosan (1997). 
322   A high score relates to high disclosure quality. 
323  For the underlying study it is crucial that corporate governance refers to voluntary corporate    
governance efforts of firms. Therefore, legal regulations as well as market mechanisms such as 
takeovers are not included. 
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6.1.5.1  The Overall Corporate Governance System 
 
Recent studies have analyzed the quality of the overall corporate governance system. 
Each study has its own definition of corporate governance and thus a different 
composition of its corporate governance measure. The quality of the overall corporate 
governance system of a firm is here understood as to comprise the criteria for good 
corporate governance discussed in chapter V, i.e. Management, Supervisory board, Risk 
management, and Disclosure.324
 
Even though it can be expected that various individual aspects corporate governance 
have more or less strong effects, it is interesting to analyze whether weaknesses in some 
parts of the corporate governance system are compensated by the strengths of other 
parts. Therefore, it is investigated whether the average quality of corporate governance 
is correlated with shareholder value. In this respect the following analysis is consistent 
with similar studies. The reasons for a positive impact of corporate governance on 
shareholder value have already been discussed in section 6.1.3. Shareholder value can 
be measured in different ways. Tobin’s q is a common proxy used by the above-
mentioned similar studies for the calculation of the firm or shareholder value325 (these 
terms are used synonymously here). Tobin’s q is calculated as the relation between the 
market value of total assets and the replacement cost of assets. Other proxies for 
shareholder value such as market capitalization or the total shareholder return will be 
used complementarily to check the robustness of the results. Hypothesis 1 is formulated 
as follows: 
 
H1: The quality of the overall corporate governance system has a positive impact on 
shareholder value. 
 
 
                                                 
324  Other studies sometimes include legal aspects or auditing in their measure of corporate governance, 
which are here considered to be factors which firms cannot influence. Therefore they do not represent 
the basis of the understanding of corporate governance here. 
325  In proper sense, firm value comprises shareholder value and the market value of debt capital. Thus, 
proxies for the firm value at the same time provide measures for shareholder value. 
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6.1.5.2  The Internal Corporate Governance System 
 
Measuring the quality of corporate governance on the basis of several or too many 
aspects bears the risk that a clear relationship between corporate governance and 
shareholder value cannot be established because individual aspects may have diverging 
effects. The understanding of corporate governance as specified here comprises the 
quality of the internal corporate governance system (ICGS) and that of disclosure. The 
possible diverging effects have been mentioned before. ICGS covers the mechanisms of 
control and incentives, which aim at monitoring managers’ efforts and at aligning their 
interests with those of shareholders. ICGS, therefore, affects managerial behavior 
directly, reduces the risk of opportunism and ensures that management decisions 
support the goal of shareholder value maximization. It can be assumed that if managers 
are monitored effectively and motivated by monetary incentives that they create value 
for shareholders. The following hypothesis 2 expresses this assumption.  
 
H2: The quality of the internal corporate governance system (ICGS) has a positive 
impact on shareholder value. 
 
Shareholder value is again measured by Tobin’s q. By comparing the results with those 
achieved for hypothesis 1, it will be possible to evaluate the effect of ICGS alone and 
together with disclosure. 
 
6.1.5.3  Disclosure 
 
The disclosure literature indicates that disclosure concentrates on the reduction of 
information asymmetry, risk and cost of equity capital. Disclosure therefore primarily 
levels at increasing investors’ confidence in the firm326, transparency about the firm’s 
strategic and financial standing, and ultimately at reducing shareholders’ perceived 
investment risk. Firms will therefore want to be able to publish more positive 
information than their competitors and thus try to operate more profitably. As disclosure 
has the primary goal of reducing information asymmetry, it will influence shareholder 
value only indirectly by decreasing the cost of equity capital. In fact, a decrease in the 
investment risk is supposed to be reflected in lower risk premiums or cost of equity 
                                                 
326  Klijnsmit (2001), p. 87. 
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capital for firms. As the cost of equity capital is a determinant of shareholder value, 
disclosure should affect shareholder value, although the influence cannot be expected to 
be considerable in view of the “long” causal chain. 
 
Hypothesis 3a aims at testing a “direct” influence of disclosure on shareholder value. 
 
H3a: The higher the quality of disclosure the higher is shareholder value. 
 
In order to account for the “indirect” relationship between disclosure and shareholder 
value over the cost of equity capital, as suggested by the disclosure literature, 
hypothesis 3b is developed. As far as the measurement of the cost of equity capital is 
concerned, beta according to the CAPM is used. Beta measures the amount of risk of a 
firm’s shares as perceived by the capital market. Therefore, it is appropriate as a proxy 
for the cost of equity capital, which comprises the amount and price of investment risk. 
The empirical literature also uses dividend yields as proxies for the cost of equity 
capital.327 Dividend yields will be applied as well to check the robustness of results. 
 
H3b: The higher the quality of disclosure the lower is the cost of equity capital measured 
by beta. 
 
6.2  Empirical Research 
 
This section is aimed to present the methodology and results of an empirical study 
including survey-based data collection and statistical analyses with capital market data. 
First, the methodology is discussed by explaining sample selection and data collection. 
Second, a descriptive analysis of the corporate governance characteristics of German 
corporations follows. Third, the hypotheses specified in section 6.1 are tested by means 
of regression analyses. Finally, a discussion of the results of hypotheses concludes the 
section. 
 
                                                 
327  Botosan (1997). 
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6.2.1  Sample Selection 
 
The underlying study is made for German listed corporations. This is consistent with the 
fact that the topic of corporate governance is mainly concerned with listed corporations 
characterized by a diffuse ownership structure. The basic population chosen for the 
underlying research consists of firms represented in the German DAX (blue chip index), 
MDAX (mid-cap index) and TecDAX (growth index) indices on April 30, 2003. With 
this basic population of 110 firms this study covers the largest German corporations. 
Moreover, these firms are primarily concerned by the new regulations and 
recommendations on how to improve the quality of corporate governance.328 
Consequently, these companies are highly motivated to deal with the topic of corporate 
governance.  
 
The selected stock indices comprise various business sectors including the banking and 
insurance sectors. In contrast to similar studies for Germany, it is assumed here that 
there is a difference between firms in more and in less regulated sectors regarding the 
quality of corporate governance. Therefore, banks, insurance companies, and other 
financial services firms, which are subject to different requirements and regulations, 
particularly concerning risk management and disclosure policies, were taken out of the 
basic population of 110 companies in order to obtain a homogenous sample. For this 
reason the size of the final relevant population was reduced to 87 companies.  
 
6.2.2  Data Collection 
 
In the hypotheses it has been differentiated between ICGS and disclosure as their effects 
on shareholder value might diverge. This differentiation is reflected in the methods of 
data collection. As ICGS is understood as the internal and thus for shareholders 
invisible practice of corporate governance, data on ICGS is not publicly available and is 
therefore collected via interviews. The quality of disclosure, on the other hand, can be 
evaluated on the basis of the content and amount of information published by firms. 
Data on disclosure is therefore gathered from the annual reports and the websites of the 
respective firms. 
 
                                                 
328  The GCGC and the German Accounting Standard No. 5, for example, explicitly address listed 
corporations. 
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6.2.2.1 Data on the Quality of the Internal Corporate Governance System 
 
Data on the quality of ICGS has been collected through structured interviews which 
were based on a previously developed questionnaire. The main task of the questionnaire 
to be developed for the underlying study was to cover as many corporate governance 
aspects as possible, which, on the one hand, are supposed to be of high importance and 
relevance for investors and on the other hand, represent voluntary practice, i.e. go 
beyond the requirements of legislation. Both goals are congruent as investors are 
assumed to compare firms along voluntary corporate governance and disclosure 
practices for investment decisions.329 The overall legal framework may at the most 
serve to decide whether or not to enter a capital market in a certain country. Within a 
single jurisdiction the difference in the quality of corporate governance is based on 
voluntary commitment. 
 
The main sources for the construction of the questionnaire were recommendations of the 
GCGC330, the German Corporate Governance Scorecard by the Deutsche Vereinigung 
für Finanzanalyse und Asset Management (DVFA - German Society of Investment 
Analysis and Asset Management)331, the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS) German Market Principles332 as well as the Deutscher 
Rechnungslegungsstandard Nr. 5 (DRS Nr. 5 - German Accounting Standard No.5)333. 
In addition, interviews conducted by Ernst&Young and the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ) Institut (2002)334 with leaders in German corporations and business 
scientists gave interesting ideas on corporate governance aspects which are not yet 
regulated but expected from the capital market.  
 
As far as the structure of the questions is concerned, most of the questions are 
formulated as “yes or no” questions investigating the existence or non-existence of 
specified corporate governance aspects. The majority of items were thus constructed as 
binary variables in order to avoid a subjective estimation of the interviewed person, 
which would have been the case with ordinary variables. The structure of the 
                                                 
329  Bain / Band (1996), p. 14. 
330  GCGC (2003). 
331  DVFA (2000). 
332  CalPERS (2004). 
333  German Accounting Standard No. 5 (2003). 
334  Ernst &Young and FAZ Institut (2002). 
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questionnaire is based on the criteria for good corporate governance as discussed in 
chapter V. As has been mentioned before, the subject of disclosure, however, is not 
included in the questionnaire. Table 5 shows the different parts of the questionnaire and 
the topics dealt with within each part. Each part of the questionnaire contains a different 
number of questions so that later the parts contribute with different amounts of points to 
the corporate governance score. This automatically reflects their relative importance. 
When constructing the questionnaire the number of questions asked within each part 
varied according to the number of issues and problems to be analyzed. It can be 
assumed that parts covering more problems are more relevant and should therefore be 
treated as more important in terms of points. The questionnaire comprises 47 variables 
which are further broken into items. 
 
Table 5: Structure of the questionnaire on ICGS 
 
• Management contracts 
• External supervisory board mandates 
• Independence 
• Liability 
I. Management and Control 
Managing board 
 
 
 
Supervisory board 
 
• Board members’ contracts 
• Additional supervisory board mandates
• Composition of the board 
• Independence 
• Liability 
• Supply of information 
• Board meetings 
II. Risk Management • Risk strategy 
• Risk management process 
• Institutions of risk management 
• Internal risk reporting 
III. Compensation 
(supervisory board, managing board, top, 
middle and lower management) 
• Composition of compensation 
• Yearly bonus payments 
• Long-term incentives 
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Similar empirical studies investigating the quality of corporate governance are based on 
questionnaires which are sent out to firms for response by mail.335 These studies have 
specified a large basic population so that the response rate is on average rather low.336 In 
order to increase the response rate, on the one hand, and the quality of data, on the other 
hand, the underlying study is to a large extent based on personal interviews. The 
response rate is supposed to increase because firms are contacted personally and are 
asked to talk about their individual experiences and problems in implementing an 
appropriate corporate governance system.  
 
As important as a high response rate is the data quality.337 The literature on the 
methodology of empirical research338 often points out the risk of misunderstanding 
questions leading to either missing or to wrong answers. Personal interviews have the 
advantage that the interviewer has a chance to explain the questions, if necessary and 
that the interviewed person has the opportunity to ask immediately if questions are 
incomprehensible. Moreover, the interviewer can also ask after the reasons for given 
answers and get more information in this way. Such additional information can be 
helpful in explaining descriptive statistical analysis of results. The problem of influence 
by the interviewer can be regarded as a disadvantage of personal interviews. For the 
underlying study, this aspect is not considered as a problem since possible answers are 
mainly formulated in binary form and do not require subjective estimations. 
 
For this study managing board members, top managers, risk managers, and employees 
of investor relations and management accounting departments were contacted for 
personal interviews. Out of the 87 firms in the target population, i.e. without banks and 
insurance companies, 45 agreed to participate in the study. This corresponds to a 
response rate of 52%. This response rate is particularly satisfying because the sample 
contains almost all DAX firms and thus the largest German corporations participated. 
As shown in Table 6, the response rate within the DAX index is over 80%. 
 
                                                 
335  For example, Drobetz et al. (2004) as well as Gompers et al. (2003) conduct surveys by mail. 
336  For German corporations Drobetz et al. (2004) achieve a response rate of 36 % (91 firms).  
337  For the advantages of personal interviews see also Pellens / Tomaszewski / Weber (2000). 
338  See, e.g. Hermann / Homburg (2000), pp. 26-28. 
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Table 6: Response rates 
 
No. of companies participated 
 
Response rate 
 
DAX 19 out of 23 82.61% 
MDAX 16 out of 40 40% 
TecDAX 10 out of 24 41.67% 
Total 45 out of 87 51.72% 
 
 
The following Figure 5 demonstrates the variety of business sectors represented in the 
sample of 45 firms. Firms from the chemicals, software, and machinery industries are 
most occurring. The telecommunication and transportation & logistics industries are the 
least represented sectors in the sample. Nonetheless, firms from all possible business 
sectors participated in the study so that an industry-wide comparison of the quality of 
corporate governance is possible. 
 
Figure 5: Sectors represented in the final sample 
 
Construction
 9%
Pharma 7%Tele-
communication 2%
Technology 7%
Automobile 7%
Chemicals
13% Machinery 
18%
Software 17%
NCG&S 9%
Utilities
7%
Transportation&
Logistics
 4%
 
As has been mentioned before, one goal of the underlying study was to collect data 
mainly via personal interviews in order to increase data quality and decrease the amount 
of missing values. Table 7 shows the number and percentage of firms with which 
personal or telephone interviews were conducted and those firms which responded by 
mail or fax. Almost half of the firms (48.89%) agreed to give personal interviews. With 
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17.78% of the firms telephone interviews339 were conducted. Only one third of the firms 
preferred to answer the questions via mail or fax. In these cases telephone interviews 
usually followed in order to clarify answers. 
 
Table 7: Conduct of interviews 
 No. of companies % 
Personal interviews 22 48.89% 
Telephone interviews 8 17.78% 
Response by mail or fax 15 33.33% 
 
 
6.2.2.2 Data on the Quality of Disclosure 
 
Data on the quality of disclosure is collected from the annual reports of the firms in the 
sample on the business year 2002. Although firm-specific information is also disclosed 
via other media such as analysts’ conferences or the press, the annual report can be 
considered as representative of a firm’s general disclosure quality.340 Moreover, with 
respect to the reaction of the capital market it can be assumed that all shareholders have 
received the information given in the annual report.341  
 
A checklist of selected criteria for “good” disclosure served as a guideline for the 
analysis of the annual reports. These criteria are mainly based on issues discussed in the 
disclosure and value-based management literature, which have been presented in section 
5.4. Particularly recommendations in the GCGC and the German Accounting Standard 
No. 5 were integrated into the checklist. The checklist, therefore, does not contain 
criteria that are already regulated legally but rather investigates the quality of voluntary 
disclosure. The basic idea is that there must be differences in the disclosure policies of 
companies which the capital market takes into consideration for investment decisions. 
The disclosure checklist consists of the five aspects shown in Table 8. The checklist 
                                                 
339  Telephone interviews are considered to be as good as personal interviews with respect to ensuring 
data quality. 
340  Labhart (1999), p. 96. 
341  Coenenberg (1998), p. 554. 
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covers 5 parts which are at the same time regarded as variables or questions and is 
broken down into 39 items in total, which are formulated as binary variables.342
 
Table 8: Structure of the disclosure checklist 
I. Value Reporting • Total return reporting 
• Value added reporting 
• Dividend policy 
• Shareholder value ratios 
• Intangible assets 
II. Risk Reporting • Risk management system 
• Quantification of risks 
• Categorization of risks 
III. Disclosure of Compensation Policy • Composition of compensation 
• Incentive programs 
• Trading by managers and directors 
IV. Forecast Report • Strategic advantage reporting 
• Competition analysis 
V. Other Investor Relations Measures • General assembly 
• Information via the internet 
 
In case of necessary information unavailable in the annual reports, the websites of the 
firms were reviewed or investor relations departments were asked for clarification. 
 
6.2.3  Descriptive Analyses 
 
This section is aimed to give a descriptive overview of the answers in each individual 
part of the questionnaire and the checklist without analyzing any statistical effects, i.e. 
without testing the hypotheses. The results of the descriptive analyses demonstrate the 
main characteristics of the present corporate governance systems of German 
corporations and indicate their potential for improvement or change. This section is 
organized according to the structure of the questionnaire on ICGS and the disclosure 
checklist. The following descriptive analyses will not cover all questions asked but 
rather concentrate on selected issues. 
 
                                                 
342  For the individual questions of the checklist see appendix 2. 
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6.2.3.1  Management 
 
Questions on the quality of management aim at analyzing whether management 
contracts offer managers security in connection with their employment, i.e. whether 
contracts contain time or monetary constraints for the firm to dismiss managers in case 
of opportunistic behavior. Such constraints may, for example, relate to the length of 
contracts or to severance payments in case of an early cancellation of the contract by the 
firm. 
 
Firms in the relevant sample were asked on the average length of management contracts 
in order to check whether German corporations tend to reduce the common length of 
management contracts of five years. Over three quarters of the interviewed companies 
(see Figure 6), however, still offer a five-year contract to their management. The 
suggestion in the corporate governance literature to reduce the length of management 
contracts to less than five years as it is in the US is not yet accepted by most German 
companies. 
 
Figure 6: The average length of management contracts 
76%
11%
11% 3%
5 years 4 years 3 years 2 years
 
It has been mentioned in section 5.1.2.2 that severance payments are often criticized for 
giving managers too much job security and less incentive to make efforts. The 
underlying study shows that severance payments are of less importance in Germany 
than it is the case, for example, in the USA or UK, where the manager market is more 
active. Only 6.7% of the companies in the sample provide for so-called “golden 
parachutes” in case of an early termination of management contracts, for example, due 
to take-overs.  
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An age limit for supervisory board members is regarded as an important criterion in the 
GCGC. For managers there are no general specifications in the literature. It can be 
argued, however, that if the age of supervisory board members is assumed to influence 
the quality of monitoring that the same can be expected for managers. The study shows 
that 71.8% of the companies have specified an age limit for their managers of 65 years 
or less. Only 2.6% have limited their managers’ age at over 65 years. The remaining 
25.6% have no internal regulation regarding the age of managers.  
 
Another important characteristic of managers is their objectivity or independence. 
Interest conflicts due to affiliations with the firm’s business partners may limit their 
objectivity and open room for discretionary behavior. In order to deal with this problem 
firms can require their managers to disclose potential conflicts of interest. Such an 
internal requirement may also be related to sanctions in case of non-compliance. There 
may be various other ways to deal with conflicts of interest. The underlying research 
shows that the most important tool of dealing with conflicts of interest is their 
mandatory disclosure by the respective managers towards the chairman of the 
supervisory board as well as towards the managing board. As indicated in Figure 7, 
95% of the firms asked have introduced such a rule. Companies demand only rarely the 
exclusion of the respective managers from meetings and discussions (20%) or even 
withdraw their mandates (5%).  
 
Figure 7: Dealing with managers’ conflicts of interest 
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The GCGC suggests German corporations to take out an insurance policy covering 
financial or material damages caused by management faults. This so-called Directors’ 
and Officers’ Liability (D&O) insurance can be provided for managers as well as 
members of the supervisory board. Although the GCGC has no legal but only advisory 
character, most companies in the sample (over 90%) follow the recommendation of 
taking out a D&O liability insurance policy. The GCGC, however, makes no 
specifications concerning the participation of managers in damages not covered by the 
D&O insurance policy. Consequently, it is up to the individual companies whether or 
not and up to which amount managers should participate in damages born by 
shareholders. 63.4% of the interviewed companies provide for a participation of 
managers in damages. Only 26.7% of these companies give detailed information on the 
amount their managers have to pay in, which varies between 5,000 and 550,000 euro 
per manager. This large range can be explained by the fact that there is no general 
consensus on the appropriate amount of participation. 
 
6.2.3.2 Supervisory Board 
 
Questions on the quality of monitoring by the supervisory board also consider the issues 
of independence and liability. Apart from that, they deal with the composition of the 
board and the supply of information to the board.  
 
Regarding the age limit of supervisory board members only 2.6% of the companies 
asked have specified an age limit of 65 years or less for their supervisory board 
members. 46.2% have limited their board members’ age at over 65 years. The remaining 
51.3% have no age limit. This is rather disappointing result in view of the increasing 
demand for an age limit of supervisory board members as recommended by the GCGC. 
 
The quality of monitoring in German corporations has often been criticized because 
many supervisory board members hold several board mandates in different companies 
and are thus not able to invest enough time for their monitoring tasks in each firm. As a 
reaction to a number of unexpected insolvencies the GCGC suggests to limit the number 
of supervisory board mandates to five if the respective board member holds a 
management position at the same time. The underlying study shows that even 75.6% of 
the companies have no internal regulation on how many supervisory board mandates 
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their board members should have with other companies, irrespective of whether they 
hold management positions or not. Only 19.5% specify that board members should at 
maximum accept five further board positions. 4.9% even allow more than five external 
mandates. 
 
As far as the composition of the supervisory board is concerned, the criticism of the 
dominance of representatives of lending banks in German supervisory boards as well as 
of the internal recruitment of former managers to board positions is no longer 
legitimate. 72.5% of the companies in the sample do not have any representatives of 
debt-financing banks and 95% of the firms have at maximum two bank representatives 
(see Figure 8). Moreover, over 50% of the companies have not recruited any 
supervisory board member from their management. However, a change from a 
management position to a board position still occurs in a number of companies (see 
Figure 9). 
 
Figure 8: Number of banks represented in the supervisory board 
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Figure 9: Number of former managers elected to the supervisory board 
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The GCGC also proposes that the chairman of the supervisory board should not be at 
the same time chairman of the audit committee. 69.2% of the companies do not follow 
this suggestion. Consequently, there is potential for improvement of the objectivity of 
the chairman of the supervisory board in German corporations. 
 
Moreover, it is advised in the GCGC that the chairman of the audit committee should 
not be a former member of the management team. Similar to the penultimate question 
on the number of former managers recruited to the board, the result here is that only in 
one fifth of the companies the chairman of the audit committee was once a manager of 
the same firm. 
 
As far as the dealing with conflicts of interest of supervisory board members is 
concerned, a similar answer structure occurs as for the management: Disclosure of 
interest conflicts towards the chairman is the most important means of dealing with 
interest conflicts. In contrast to the management a retraction of board mandates is taken 
more often into consideration. 
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Figure 10: Dealing with supervisory board members’ conflicts of interest 
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Liability of supervisory board members for damages due to their neglecting of duty is 
considered to be as important as the liability of managers.343 From a theoretical point of 
view the same agency problems exist between shareholders and supervisory board 
members as between shareholders and managers. Therefore, the same sanction 
mechanisms need to be applied to the supervisory board. The D&O liability insurance 
policy can be taken out for managers as well as for supervisory board members. 61% of 
the companies follow the recommendation of the GCGC to arrange for a participation of 
supervisory board members in the reimbursement of damages to the firm or the 
shareholders. The amount to be paid in varies between 2,500 and 75,000 euro per 
supervisory board member, which is on average considerably lower than that for 
managers.  
 
As far the internal reporting system or the supply of information to the supervisory 
board is concerned, 76.7% of the companies have explicitly specified the duty of the 
management to regularly supply business information to the supervisory board. Such 
specifications refer to the form, content, and frequency of information supply. The 
supervisory board not only receives information from the management but also from its 
committees which are specialized in certain topics or tasks. The most occurring board 
committees are the audit committee (93.2%) and the staff committee (84.1%). The latter 
is concerned with management contracts, particularly with compensation issues. Other 
                                                 
343  The GCGC emphasizes that the liability of supervisory board members for lack of monitoring is as 
important as the liability of managers for management faults. 
 107
 
committees, for instance, for strategy or corporate governance are rarely established in 
German corporations. 
 
Furthermore, companies were asked about the importance of different institutions 
within the organization as sources of information for the supervisory board. The 
departments of Management accounting and Internal audit were indicated as less 
important sources due to their indirect communication line with the supervisory board. 
The managing board, the auditor as well as the board committees were ranked as the 
most important sources of information (see Figure 11). This result shows the increasing 
importance of the auditor and the board committees, which is also recommended by the 
GCGC. 
 
Figure 11: The supervisory board’s sources of information  
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6.2.3.3  Risk Management 
 
Questions on the quality of risk management analyze whether firms have established 
explicit rules on how to deal with risks as well as whether they quantify and control 
risks. 
 
The underlying study indicates that almost 80% of the companies dispose of an 
“explicit” risk management system with a risk strategy which is integrated in their 
corporate strategy. Over 90% of the companies have even written a risk management 
handbook stipulating general standards and principles on how to identify, report, and 
hedge risks.  
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The German Accounting Standard No. 5 suggests German corporations to quantify their 
internal risks in terms of a maximum loss344 in favor of more transparency towards the 
capital market. In fact, shareholders are assumed to pursue firms’ businesses in terms of 
their risk exposure. 86.7% of the companies in the sample even categorize qualitative 
risks along incidence rate and potential for damage. This is a very positive result. 57.8% 
of the companies asked even calculate a total risk for the entire company. Many 
companies, however, prefer an aggregation of risks only up to the division level than to 
the company level in favor of a better comparability. 
 
The companies were also asked whether they set risk limits for their business units 
which may have negative consequences, i.e. sanctions, for the respective responsible 
employees in case they exceed the limits. An example of such a risk limit could be a 
maximum amount to be spent within a year on the procurement from a certain supplier. 
Non-adherence to this risk limit may cause non-adherence to the budget plan and 
therefore increase the risk of illiquidity. Only 37.8% of the companies affirmed to set 
risk limits. Almost half of the interviewed companies do not provide for risk limits at 
all. This is an interesting result because the effectiveness of a risk management system 
is closely related to control mechanisms supporting the system. 
 
Risk planning and control are further significant issues. It is necessary that risk 
management is not only integrated in the operative business activities but also in the 
firm’s strategic management tools. It is interesting to note that more than half of the 
companies (56.8%) do not dispose of a strategic tool based on ratios such as a Balanced 
Chance and Risk Card to manage and control their risks. 
 
The institutionalization of risk management within the firm is one of the most important 
ways of making risk management explicit and of increasing employees’ awareness of 
internal risks. Moreover, such institutions specializing in the corporate-specific 
problems of risk management represent a relevant source of information for managers 
as well as the supervisory board. The underlying study shows that in German 
corporations the departments of management accounting (risk controlling) and that of 
internal audit traditionally take on risk management functions (see Figure 12). 
However, this is a negative result in view of the previous result that these institutions 
                                                 
344 A specific method of quantification such as the concept of Value-at-Risk is not suggested.  
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represent only secondary sources of information for the supervisory board which by law 
has to monitor the firm’s risk management system. 
 
Figure 12: Institutions of risk management 
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Another success factor for an effective risk management system is the internal and on-
time reporting of occurring risks by the individual employees. In this context, the study 
shows that 84.1% of the companies motivate their employees to an on-time reporting of 
observed risks. Many firms have indicated that on-time reporting is rewarded in 
monetary terms. 
 
6.2.3.4  Compensation 
 
Questions on the compensation of managers including lower layers of management and 
supervisory board members mainly concentrate on whether long-term incentives related 
to market-based performance measures are offered. Figure 13 gives an overview of the 
percentages of firms paying fixed income, yearly cash bonuses, and long-term 
incentives. 
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Figure 13: Percentage of companies paying fixed income, yearly bonuses, and long- term incentives   
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Figure 13 shows that it is very common for German companies to offer long-term 
compensation schemes to the managing board members and to the top management. 
Over 70% of the companies also offer such incentives to the middle management. 
Room for improvement can be observed for the lower management and the supervisory 
board. Agency theory suggests that supervisory board members should receive 
incentive-based compensation so as to align their interests with those of shareholders. 
This recommendation is not yet implemented in practice. 
 
The effectiveness of short-term as well as long-term variable income is influenced by 
the respective underlying performance measures. These performance measures should 
be closely related to the shareholder value or the market value of equity capital 
measured either externally e.g. by the stock price performance or internally by the 
firm’s value-based ratio. The following Figure 14 presents that yearly bonus payments 
depend largely on performance according to individual agreements (33%) and on the 
performance measured by balance sheet and income statement such as sales or net 
income. Consequently, capital market performance does not play a considerable role for 
short-term incentives. 
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Figure 14: Performance measures for yearly bonus payments 
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Although bonuses represent incentives to improve the overall short-term performance of 
the firm, the capital market often criticizes the enormous amounts of salaries paid to 
managers which are due to bonus payments. In Germany, 73.2% of the companies in the 
sample have therefore set upper-caps for yearly bonus payments. 
 
Figure 15 presents the performance measures determining the amount of long-term 
compensation. With 42% the absolute performance of the share price is the most 
important factor. This result is critical because, on the one hand, it is important that 
managers and supervisory board members are compensated on the basis of objective 
market-based performance measures but, on the other hand, their performance should be 
compared to that of competitor firms. This is not to be neglected because shareholders 
also relate firms’ performance to that of the market or business sector for their 
investment decisions. The absolute share price performance does not fulfill the second 
requirement. Consequently, it would be better if companies related long-term incentives 
to performance relative to a general stock index or to an industry index. 
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Figure 15: Performance measures for long-term incentives 
Shareholder value 
ratio
6%
Performance of 
share price relative 
to industrial index
8%
Performance 
measured by 
balance sheet and 
income statement
16% Individual 
agreements
1%
Absolute 
performance of 
share price
42%
 Performance of 
share price relative 
to stock index
15%
 
The following Table 9 shows that there is a difference in the use of instruments of long-
term compensation according to the stock index. Whereas stock options and virtual 
options are more frequently used by DAX and MDAX companies, convertible bonds 
are favoured by TecDAX companies. The firm size may have relevance here. Besides 
the fact that TecDAX companies were previously listed at the Neuer Markt where share 
prices slumped dramatically within a few years, may explain the rare use of stock-based 
compensation within this stock index. 
 
Table 9: The use of long-term incentives classified according to stock indices 
 DAX MDAX TecDAX Total 
Stock options 44% 30% 26% 100% 
Convertible bonds 0% 25% 75% 100% 
Virtual stocks 55% 36% 9% 100% 
Staff stocks 55% 27% 18% 100% 
Other 33% 33% 33% 100% 
 
As far as the instruments of long-term compensation are concerned, it can be noticed 
that stock options play an important role. Figure 16 presents the percentage of 
companies using stock options for the following hierarchy layers.345 The supervisory 
                                                 
345  The German Securities Law does not permit the issue of stock options to members of the supervisory 
board. 
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board usually does not obtain long-term incentives. Those firms providing for long-term 
incentives compensate supervisory board members with convertible bonds or merely 
shares. 
 
Figure 16: Percentage of companies issuing stock options 
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6.2.3.5 Disclosure 
 
The checklist on disclosure tests the quantity and quality with which firm-specific 
information is disclosed to the capital market. 
 
The results for the quality of disclosure of German corporations are rather 
disappointing. Except for the topic Investor relations the average answers over all firms 
do not even fulfil 50% of the criteria in the underlying checklist for “good” disclosure. 
Figure 17 summarizes the degree of fulfilment for all five topics in the checklist. On 
average 58% of the criteria for Investor relations are fulfilled. In view of the small 
number of criteria within this topic this result must not be over interpreted. The worst 
quality (38%) is observed for the topic Risk disclosure so that German corporations 
have the greatest potential for improvement here.  
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Figure 17: Degree of fulfilment of disclosure criteria 
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There are also sector-specific differences in the overall quality of disclosure. Whereas 
firms in the transportation & logistics and automotive industries dispose of the best 
quality of disclosure, firms in the technology sector, particularly from the TecDAX 
index, are often characterized by a low quality of disclosure. 
 
6.2.4 Regression Analyses 
 
This section presents first the development of a corporate governance score on the basis 
of the answers obtained through personal interviews and the disclosure checklist. It then 
prepares the regression analyses by discussing the selection of adequate proxies and 
summary statistics. Finally, the impacts of the quality of the overall corporate 
governance system, of ICGS, of disclosure, and of individual dimensions of ICGS are 
analyzed. The section concludes with a robustness check regarding a change in the 
calculation of the corporate governance score. 
 
6.2.4.1 Development of a Corporate Governance Score 
 
The idea behind the construction of the questionnaire on ICGS, in particular, was to ask 
as many questions as possible, even if the companies would not agree to answer all 
questions for confidentiality reasons. In fact, some critical questions such as the amount 
of participation of managers and supervisory board members in damages, which are not 
covered by the D&O-insurance policy, were not answered by the majority of firms. 
However, the few answers given leave at least an idea of the range of answers and the 
 115
 
problems or taboos companies are not willing to talk about. Questions with a very low 
response rate, i.e. more than 15 missing values, are taken out before constructing the 
corporate governance score.346 This ensures that the corporate governance score 
contains variables which enable drawing conclusions from the sample to the basic 
population. Moreover, questions which are difficult to translate specifically in any 
criteria for good corporate governance are taken out. For instance, the answer to the 
question on the number of bank representatives in the supervisory board cannot be 
clearly evaluated in terms of whether it is good or bad corporate governance. A firm 
stating to have 2 bank representatives is hardly to be discriminated against a firm with 
one bank representative. Such questions, however, were asked for the purpose of 
descriptive analyses in section 6.2.3. 
 
A second step was to look at the variance of the answers. Some questions were 
answered similarly by almost all firms. For example, almost all firms have written a risk 
handbook. Despite these similarities such variables were not taken out because they can 
still explain any differences between companies with respect to the quality of their 
corporate governance systems. The following Table 10 shows the variables taken for the 
calculation of the corporate governance score. 
 
Table 10: Derivation of variables for the corporate governance score 
 
Total no. of variables in the questionnaire (47) + disclosure checklist (5) 
 
52 
 
No. of variables with very low response rate and difficulty of evaluation 
 
12 
 
Remaining variables for construction of the corporate governance score 
 
40 
 
The corporate governance score is constructed on the basis of a scoring model, i.e. 
every question has a certain amount of items or points which each company can reach. 
Each item is formulated as a binary variable checking for the existence or non-existence 
of specified criteria. If the item is positive, 1 point is given to the respective firm. 
                                                 
346  The statistics literature (see, e.g. Hartung (2002)) emphasizes for regression analyses the use of 30 
cases or answers at minimum for each variable in order to be able to obtain representative results. As 
the size of the underlying sample is 45, the number of missing answers per question must not be 
greater than 15. Also, it would have been possible to take mean values for missing data. As it can be 
assumed that most questions not answered by firms were at the same corporate governance criteria 
which they did not fulfil, using mean values would have distorted the score positively. 
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Ordinary variables were avoided in order to prevent subjective estimation by the 
interviewed person. The firm-level corporate governance score (CGSa) is calculated as 
the equally weighted sum of the points achieved for each question (see (1)), because 
every question is considered to be equally important. However, as each question 
provides for a different amount of items, there is automatically a stronger weighting of 
questions with more items or points than with less points. As this can be viewed 
critically, two other corporate governance scores (CGSb and CGSc) are calculated in 
order to check the robustness of results.347 The first score denoted as CGSa is defined as 
follows: 
 
40
1=
= ∑i
b
CGSa Qbi      (1) 
 
where  stands for the points achieved by company i in question b. The score is based 
on 40 questions or variables which in total comprise 152 items or points. Therefore, 
. CGSa comprises the points achieved for questions on ICGS as well as 
for questions on disclosure. 
biQ
0 CGSa 152≤ ≤
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347  These scores are presented in section 6.2.5 in connection with the robustness analyses. 
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Figure 18 shows the distribution of CGSa, which is skewed to the left. The firms in the 
sample have reached only 52.6% of the points at maximum. Over 80% of the firms have 
obtained a corporate governance score between 40 and 70. Despite the fact that no firm 
achieves more than 80 points, there is still a wide distribution of the score up to the 80-
point level. Selection bias, i.e. the distortion of statistical results due to sample 
selection, does therefore not pose a problem for this study. This is supported by the fact 
that firms with a variety of corporate governance scores or quality are represented in the 
underlying sample. 
 
6.2.4.2 Selection of Proxies 
 
Proxies for Shareholder Value 
 
The following are possible proxies for shareholder value which are frequently used in 
the empirical literature. As Tobin’s q has been used in the hypotheses as a proxy for 
shareholder value, the other proxies will be used as control variables in order to test the 
robustness of the effects of independent variables. For the underlying study data has 
been derived from DataStream. 
Market Value 
 
The market value is calculated as the share price multiplied by the number of issued 
ordinary shares as of the end of 2002 and is expressed in millions of euro. The market 
value represents the value of the equity capital of a company. The share price is an 
important element because it reflects the overall information of the market on the 
company and thus investors’ expectations concerning future returns. Moreover, an 
increase in the share price is part of the total return to shareholders. The market-book 
ratio relating the market value to the book value of equity or the market-sales ratio 
calculating the market value of equity in proportion of the firm’s sales are further 
measures for the firm value.  
 118
 
Total Shareholder Return348  
 
The total shareholder return is calculated as the sum of the increase in share value, i.e. 
share price, and the dividend payment which is assumed to be reinvested to buy 
additional shares: 
 
                                1e b e
b b
p D p p DTSR
p p
+ − += = − ,                              (2) 
 
where ep  denotes the share price at the end of the year, D is the dividend payment in the 
respective period, and bp represents the share price at the beginning of the year. The 
period of reference here is the business year 2002. 
 
Tobin’s q  
 
Tobin’s q is another market-based ratio and relates the market value of a company’s 
assets to their estimated replacement cost. Tobin’s q expresses the capital market’s 
estimation of the value of present assets and future investment opportunities.349 The 
market value of a company’s total assets is calculated as the sum of the market value of 
the equity capital and the book value of the debt capital. The book value of debt capital 
is assumed to be equal to the market value of debt capital. The estimated replacement 
cost is the cost which would have to be born if the company wanted to replace all of its 
assets. A proxy for the estimated replacement cost is the book value of the firm’s total 
assets, which represents their original purchasing cost: 
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where TAMV  is the market value of total assets and TARC  denotes the replacement cost of 
total assets. EMV , DBV , and TABV  stand for the market value of equity capital, the book 
value of debt capital, and the book value of total assets, respectively. 
 
                                                 
348  In DataStream the total shareholder return is denoted as the return index. 
349  Servaes (1989), p.1. 
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Proxy for the Cost of Equity Capital 
Beta  
 
Beta is a risk measure of the CAPM350 referring to the systematic risk of investors 
which they cannot diversify in their portfolio as opposed to the unsystematic risk. For 
this non-diversifiable systematic risk investors demand a risk premium which is 
determined by the covariance between the return of the underlying share and the market 
return. Beta itself is calculated as the ratio of this covariance and the variance of the 
market return.351 For the data in this study we use the total shareholder returns for 
individual shares and the return of the DAX100 as the market return. We calculate beta 
on a three-year basis using monthly data from the years 2000 to 2002. 
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with 
 
ir (t)  = return of share i in t 
mr (t)  = market return, here DAX100 return in t 
t  = time index running from t=1,..,T 
T = 36 months  
i mCov (r ,r )%%  = covariance between share return ir% and market return  mr%
mVar (r )%  = variance of the market return  mr%
 
 
Proxy for Share Liquidity 
Turnover Volume 
 
The turnover volume can serves as an important control variable in this study, 
particularly in connection with the hypotheses 3a and 3b. The turnover volume is a 
                                                 
350  The CAPM has often been criticized for its unrealistic assumptions. For the deficiencies of the CAPM 
see, e.g. Oertmann (1997), pp. 20-21. 
351  For beta and the CAPM see Fama / French (1996). 
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measure for the liquidity of a security in the market where it is traded.352 Liquidity, on 
the other hand, is an indicator for information asymmetry among market participants. 
The higher the information asymmetry the lower is the liquidity of the respective share 
measured by its turnover volume. The turnover volume is calculated as the number of 
shares (in thousands) traded on average per day during the year 2002. 
 
6.2.4.3  Dealing with Missing Values 
 
The problem of missing values is often expected in connection with statistical analyses. 
Missing values are unavailable data on the questions or variables because of a lack of 
answers by the interviewed people, because of invalid answers353, or because of the 
user’s fault of not coding or wrongly coding some data354. The statistics literature 
discusses various methods of dealing with missing values.355 The underlying study and 
its data is analysed with the statistics program SPSS which has individual features for 
missing values.356  
 
Missing values, either specified by SPSS or the user, may be excluded by SPSS from 
analyses. SPSS differentiates two types of deletion of cases with missing values. List-
wise deletion refers to the deletion of cases with missing data from all analyses even if a 
majority of data is available. Pair-wise deletion denotes the exclusion of cases with 
missing data only from the respective calculations when one or both values (i.e. 
dependent and independent variables) are missing. It is also possible to take mean 
values for missing data instead of deleting cases.  
 
The variable concerned by the problem of missing data in the following regression 
analyses is beta. Missing values for beta are due to the fact that beta is calculated on a 
three year basis and 6 firms have not yet been listed on the stock exchange for three 
years so that the required data is unavailable. The method chosen to overcome the 
problem of missing data for the underlying study is pair-wise deletion in order to avoid 
too much loss of data as opposed to list-wise deletion. This means that firms with 
                                                 
352  Brunner (1996), p. 15. 
353  Backhaus et al. (2000), p. 32. 
354  Decker / Wagner / Temme (2000), p. 85. 
355  For the general problem of dealing with missing data in statistics see, e.g. Little / Rubin (1987) or 
Anderson et al. (1983). 
356  Bühl / Zöfel (2003), p. 38; Backhaus et al. (2000), pp. 32-33. 
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missing data have only been neglected in analyses where beta occurs. Mean values are 
not taken because they are assumed to distort results positively or negatively. Using 
mean values for beta would increase the underlying sample for the analyses but not 
necessarily reflect the true values. 
 
The corporate governance score as the independent variable has been calculated before 
regression analyses. Cases with missing data with respect to the answers on the 
corporate governance system have been given the lowest points for the respective 
questions, i.e. 0 points. Missing values in connection with the corporate governance 
questionnaire are mostly due to confidentiality reasons. In the few cases where the 
interviewed person did not know the answers, other departments were asked. Those 
firms which did not give information for confidentiality reasons can be to a large extent 
assumed not to fulfill the respective criteria for good corporate governance. Therefore, 
these firms are sanctioned by not giving them any points for their corporate governance 
score. 
 
6.2.4.4  Summary Statistics 
 
Before testing the hypotheses developed above, correlation statistics are analyzed 
between the corporate governance score and a number of financial data including the 
selected proxies and control variables to be either substituted for the dependent 
variables or to extend the regression equations in to increase the explanation power of 
the models. The following Table 11 shows summary statistics between CGSa, its 
subscores357, and financial data. 
 
Table 11: Pearson correlation coefficients between CGSa, subscores, and financial data 
 
CGSa 
I.  
Manage-
ment 
II.  
Supervisory 
board 
III.  
Risk 
manage-
ment 
IV. 
Compensa-
tion 
V.  
Dis-
closure 
TSR 
 
0.068 
 
-0.133 -0.197 0.166 0.310* -0.122 
Tobin’s q 
 
0.187 
 
0.039 0.267* 0.242* 0.057 -0.130 
                                                 
357  Subscores refer to the topics or parts of the overall corporate governance score. These are 
Management, Supervisory board, Risk management, Compensation, and Disclosure. The subscores 
express the amount of points achieved for the respective parts of the overall score. 
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Market-
book 
ratio 
 
 
-0.098 
 
0.048 
 
0.024 
 
0.097 
 
-0.185 
 
-0.081 
 
Market-
sales 
ratio 
 
 
0.220 
 
0.064 0.180 0.014 0.157 -0.004 
 
Market 
value 
 
 
0.153 
 
-0.033 -0.079 0.313** 0.051 -0.002 
 
Dividend 
yield 
 
 
0.009 
 
-0.095 -0.072 -0.079 0.031 0.040 
 
Turnover 
volume 
 
 
0.140 
 
0.136 -0.039 0.068 0.111 0.019 
 
Beta 
 
-0.089 -0.072 0.123 -0.205 0.082 -0.256 
 
Debt/ 
equity 
ratio 
 
 
-0.413*** 
 
-0.398*** -0.462* 0.194 -0.397*** 0.079 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤  0.10 (two-tail test) 
 
A first correlation analysis between CGSa, its subscores, and some financial ratios gives 
hints on which variables could be taken into consideration for further regression 
analyses. The Pearson correlation coefficients relate to two-tail significance tests at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent levels.  
 
As far as the relationships between the various corporate governance aspects and 
proxies for shareholder value are concerned, these appear to be different in terms of 
direction and strength of correlation. Only the relationship with Tobin’s q is widely 
positive except for the quality of disclosure. These correlations are only partly 
significant. Strong negative and significant relationships can be found between CGSa 
and a majority of subscores and the debt/equity ratio. This is a plausible result 
indicating that the relative importance of shareholders vs. debt holders as corporate 
financiers determines the quality of the corporate governance system. This result is also 
consistent with the theory of the firm that shareholders as residual claimants have a 
considerable interest in corporate control (see chapter III). The largely insignificant 
correlations may be due to the fact that other factors are more powerful in explaining 
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variance of the shareholder value or that the corporate governance score and its 
subscores contain too many different aspects. Another explanation could be that the size 
of the underlying sample is not large enough to deliver significant or representative 
results. However, the size of the sample should not pose a problem because it comprises 
the largest and, thus, the most relevant firms for the recent corporate governance 
discussion. The influence of other factors can be taken into account by employing of 
adequate control variables in OLS regressions.  
 
The importance of control variables which account for firm characteristics and aim at 
deleting distortions of results has been mentioned before. Possible control variables are 
presented in Table 12. These variables will later be employed in regression equations in 
order to check the robustness of results. 
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Table 12: Control variables 
 
Control variables 
 
Proxies for 
 
ln (number of years listed at the German stock 
exchange) 
 
Firm age 
 
 ln (assets) 
 
Firm size 
Number of employees in 2002 
 
Firm size 
 
 
 Proportion of international sales to total sales 
 
Degree of internationalization 
 
 Dummy variable (listing at a foreign stock 
exchange) 
 
Degree of internationalization 
 
Percentage of foreign investors 
 
International ownership structure 
 
Percentage of shares held by banks 
 
Ownership concentration 
 
Percentage of small investors 
 
Dispersion of ownership 
 
Business sector 
 
Business sector 
 
Number of supervisory board members 
 
Size of internal control body 
 
 
Number of managing board members 
 
 
Size of management 
 
Accounting standard (German GAAP, US GAAP 
or IAS) 
 
Accounting standard 
 
These control variables are assumed to influence either the dependent variable as well 
as explanatory variables including CGSa. Firm age, for example, may play a role for the 
quality of corporate governance. “Old” firms may either be listed at the stock exchange 
for a long time because of having a good quality of corporate governance; or they do not 
have a good quality of corporate governance because they assume that investors have 
enough confidence in them. Firm size, on the other hand, may influence the finance and 
ownership structure but also the market capitalization of the firm. A firm’s degree of 
internationalization may, for example, reflect its understanding for foreign investors’ 
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demand on corporate information. International firms may have a good disclosure 
policy. Similarly, the ownership structure may determine the control potential of 
shareholders and the role of disclosure or compensation schemes. Firms whose shares 
are, for instance, largely held by institutional investors are assumed to have a high 
disclosure quality. The business sector may reflect the general corporate governance 
quality of firms in the same industry but also the systematic risk beta. Furthermore, the 
size of the managing and the supervisory board can influence the quality of 
management decisions and monitoring. Finally, the accounting standard used by firms 
may determine the quality of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Before integrating these variables into the regression analyses it is interesting to 
investigate the correlations between these control variables and subscores of corporate 
governance. The following Table 13 summarizes Pearson correlations with two-tail 
significance tests at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
 
Table 13: Pearson correlations between subscores and control variables 
  
 
CGSa 
 
I. 
Management 
 
II. 
Supervisory 
board 
 
 
III. 
Risk 
management 
 
IV. 
Compensation 
 
V. 
Disclosure 
 
ln (number of 
years listed at the 
German stock 
exchange) 
 
0.181 0.084 -0.142 0.377** 0.098 0.306** 
 
 
ln (assets) 
 
0.179 -0.120 -0.208 0.346** 0.151 0.101 
 
Number of 
employees in 
2002 
 
0.016 -0.072 -0.255* 0.113 0.114 0.040 
 
Proportion of 
international 
sales to total 
sales 
 
0.474*** 0.294* 0.134 0.302* 0.415*** 0.092 
 
Dummy variable 
(listing at a 
foreign stock 
exchange) 
 
0.138 -0.132 -0.040 0.301** 0.089 -0.074 
 
Percentage of 
foreign investors 
 
 
0.039 0.024 0.059 0.223 -0.044 -0.121 
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Percentage of 
shares held by 
banks 
 
 
-0.155 
 
-0.645** 
 
-0.471* 
 
0.309 
 
0.149 
 
0.341 
 
Percentage of 
small investors 
 
 
-0.110 -0.016 -0.194 -0.406*** 0.342** 0.137 
 
 
Business sector 
 
-0.085 -0.059 0.041 -0.060 -0.049 -0.028 
 
Number of 
supervisory board 
members 
 
 
0.100 
 
-0.078 
 
-0.220 
 
0.295** 
 
0.108 
 
0.112 
 
Number of 
managing board 
members 
 
 
0.076 
 
0.106 
 
-0.162 
 
0.200 
 
0.026 
 
0.086 
 
Accounting 
standard 
(German GAAP, 
US GAAP, or 
IAS) 
 
0.135 -0.109 -0.072 -0.032 0.273* 0.020 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤  0.10 (two-tail test) 
 
The correlation analyses show that particularly the firms’ degree of internationalization 
as well as their ownership structure influences the quality of their corporate governance 
systems. The qualities of Management, Risk management, and Compensation 
significantly relate with the firm’s proportion of international sales to total sales. 
Moreover, that firms’ shares are held by banks affects the quality of Management and 
Supervisory board negatively. Also, a high percentage of small investors correlates 
significantly with a bad quality of Risk management but positively with the adequacy of 
Compensation. 
 
6.2.4.5  The Impact of the Overall Corporate Governance System 
 
This section presents the testing of hypothesis 1 on the relationship between the overall 
corporate governance system and shareholder value. Hypothesis 1 was formulated as 
follows: 
 
H1: The quality of the overall corporate governance system has a positive impact on 
shareholder value. 
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Recent empirical research provides evidence for a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and firm value.358 It is important to note that these studies often 
take different corporate governance issues into consideration. Gompers et al.359, for 
example, concentrate on takeover defences of US firms while Black et al.360 focus on 
board structure of Korean firms. This indicates that studies on corporate governance are 
highly based on country-specific issues and therefore on different understandings of 
corporate governance. In view of this variety of corporate governance topics, it is 
astonishing that a large majority of studies can prove a significant correlation between 
corporate governance and firm value. In this study the focus is on the corporate 
governance of German corporations. In contrast to similar studies a significant impact 
of the overall corporate governance quality on shareholder value cannot be confirmed 
here. A first correlation analysis has already shown a positive but insignificant 
relationship between the overall corporate governance score and shareholder value 
estimated, for example, by Tobin’s q, the market-book ratio, and the market-sales ratio.  
 
The influence of other economic factors on corporate governance as well as firm value 
has already been discussed in the literature.361 Therefore, employing control variables 
plays an important role in correctly estimating shareholder value. The first step is to 
regress the firm-level corporate governance score CGSa against Tobin’s q, the selected 
shareholder value measure. In single OLS regressions CGSa has a positive but 
insignificant impact (significance at the 0.218 level with an explanatory power of 
18.7%). In a next step control variables are included. The market or shareholder value 
of a firm is mainly influenced by its cost of capital, which again depends to a large 
extent on its capital structure. Therefore, the debt/equity ratio is adequate for controlling 
the effects of the capital structure on Tobin’s q. Furthermore, the correlation analysis in 
Table 11 shows a negative and significant relationship between CGSa and the 
debt/equity ratio. This is a plausible result since firms with more equity capital are 
required to provide for better shareholder protection, i.e. better corporate governance 
mechanisms than otherwise. In this respect it is even more reasonable to include the 
debt/equity ratio into the regression equation conditioning that multicollinearity does 
not occur. As regards the factors potentially influencing the corporate governance score, 
                                                 
358  See, e.g. Drobetz et al. (2004). 
359  Gompers et al. (2003). 
360  Black et al. (2003). 
361  See, e.g. Himmelberg et al. (1999). 
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there is only one variable which actually affects the overall corporate governance 
quality: the firm’s degree of internationalization measured by the proportion of 
international sales to total sales. The more international a firm’s business the more 
international are its stakeholders, including customers, suppliers, and investors. The 
requirements to the quality of corporate governance are expected to be higher for 
internationally operating firms than for others. All the other firm characteristics do not 
correlate significantly with CGSa (see Table 13). Therefore, the following equation is 
estimated: 
 
0 1 2 3' /= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +i i iTobin sq CGSa D E ISi iα α α α ε          (5) 
 
 
Table 14: Regression analyses for CGSa 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
CGSa 
 
D/E 
 
IS 
 
 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
 
1.308 
 
0.030 
 
-0.305 
 
0.109 
 
 
1.594 
 
0.155 
 
-1.771 
 
0.619  
 
 
 
0.120 
 
0.877 
 
0.085 
 
0.540 
 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
5.2% 
 
1.737 
   
 
0.176 
 
Employing control variables (see Table 12 for a list of control variables used in this 
study) decreases the significance of CGSa indicating that other factors play a more 
important role in explaining Tobin’s q than CGSa. The debt/equity ratio contributes 
significantly to the prediction of Tobin’s q. The decrease in significance of CGSa is not 
due to multicollinearity. In fact, VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) values are all below 2. 
Introducing further control variables such as firm size measured by ln (assets), demand 
for shares indicated by turnover volume, or operative performance calculated by sales 
does neither improve the significance level of CGSa nor the overall explanation power 
of the model. If the market value as another measure for shareholder value is substituted 
for Tobin’s q, adjusted R2 increases to 81.5%, yet the corporate governance score 
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remains insignificant. A similar result is obtained regarding the market-sales ratio. 
Centralisation of the dependent and independent variables does not improve results 
either. Consequently, hypothesis 1 must be rejected not because of the direction of the 
relationship between the quality of overall corporate governance but because of the 
insignificance of results. 
 
6.2.4.6  The Impact of the Internal Corporate Governance System 
 
Following the results in the previous section a positive relationship between the overall 
corporate governance system and shareholder value cannot be found as suggested by 
other empirical studies. Consequently, it is reasonable to analyze different aspects of 
corporate governance individually. The main idea of this study is to differentiate 
between ICGS and disclosure. The summary statistics in Table 11 has already shown 
that individual dimensions of corporate governance are correlated at different levels of 
significance with firm-specific financial data. This picture supports the concept of 
differentiating between ICGS and disclosure, which are assumed to affect shareholder 
value in different ways. The ICGS score is measured as the sum of the scores achieved 
for the issues Managing board, Supervisory board, Risk management, and 
Compensation, which deliver data on the quality of a firm’s internal control system, 
management, and incentives schemes. The respective hypothesis 2 is that these factors 
determine the quality of management decisions by controlling managerial behavior and 
therefore positively affect shareholder value, the ultimate relevant performance measure 
for investors. Hypothesis 2 was expressed as follows: 
 
H2: The quality of the internal corporate governance system (ICGS) has a positive 
impact on shareholder value. 
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Figure 19: Scatter plot for ICGSa and Tobin’s q 
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Regressing ICGSa on Tobin’s q in a univariate model shows a positive impact of ICGS 
on shareholder value with the standardized regressor coefficient being 0.267 at a 0.076 
level of significance (see Figure 19). This result does not remain robust, however, if we 
substitute Tobin’s q by the market value. In a next step several control variables are 
employed to check the robustness of the significance of ICGSa. The debt/equity ratio 
proves to be the only effective control variable in explaining residual variance in 
Tobin’s q. When estimating equation (6), there is only a weak explanation power for the 
prediction of Tobin’s q and ICGSa becomes insignificant (see Table 15): 
 
                               0 1 2' /= + ⋅ + ⋅ +i iTobin sq ICGSa D Ei iα α α ε                                  (6) 
 
 
Table 15: Regression analyses for ICGSa (1) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
ICGSa 
 
D/E 
 
 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
1.015 
 
0.142 
 
-0.24 
 
 
1.458 
 
0.839 
 
-1.419 
 
0.152 
 
0.406 
 
0.163 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
11.4% 
 
2.700 
   
 
0.079 
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Table 15 shows that the debt/equity ratio has a stronger effect on Tobin’s q than ICGSa, 
nevertheless, it is an insignificant variable. Because of the insignificant relationship 
between the debt/equity ratio and Tobin’s q, a mediating influence of ICGSa on Tobin’s 
q via the debt/equity ratio cannot be assumed, even though ICGSa has a significant 
negative impact on the debt/equity ratio. This correlation can be interpreted as follows: 
Firms with good corporate governance systems attract more investors resulting in a 
relatively low debt/equity ratio.  
 
A mediating effect is assumed when a third variable explains an indirect relationship 
between the dependent and independent variable.362 In the case above the debt/equity 
ratio could represent a mediator variable between ICGSa and Tobin’s q. In order for the 
debt/equity ratio to qualify as a mediator variable there would have to be a certain 
causal chain between the three variables as shown in Figure 20. A mediating effect has 
to be rejected, however, because the relationship between the debt/equity ratio and 
Tobin’s q is insignificant. As a mediator variable there must be significant relationships 
between ICGSa and the debt/equity ratio and between the debt/equity ratio and Tobin’s 
q, respectively. The relationship between ICGSa and Tobin’s q is allowed to be 
insignificant. 
 
Figure 20: Mediator variable 
 
Mediator 
variable 
(Debt/equity 
ratio)
Independent 
variable 
(ICGSa) 
Dependent 
variable 
(Tobin’s q) 
0 
+/- +/- 
 
                                                 
362  For mediation issues see Baron / Kenny (1986) and Judd / Kenny (1981). 
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A moderator variable, on the hand, determines when or under which circumstances a 
significant relationship exists between the dependent and independent variables.363 The 
moderator effect represents the strength of the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. The relationship between these variables may be higher or lower 
by employing the moderator variable. 
 
Figure 21: Moderator variable 
 
Independent variable 
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Dependent variable 
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Following the results in Table 15 of an insignificant relationship between ICGSa and 
Tobin’s q, it is interesting to analyze if the debt/equity ratio reduces or enhances the 
impact of ICGSa on Tobin’s q, i.e. if the debt/equity ratio functions as a moderator 
variable. In order to test this question the interaction of the two predictor variables is 
measured by their product and included into the equation: 
 
( )0 1 2 3' /= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +i i i iTobin sq ICGSa D E ICGSa D E/ i iα α α α ε
                                                
              (7) 
 
 
363  For regression analysis with moderator variables see, e.g. Champoux / Peters (1987). 
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Table 16: Regression analyses for ICGSa (2) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
ICGSa 
 
D/E 
 
ICGSa* D/E 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
-0.149 
 
0.511 
 
0.568 
 
-0.778 
 
 
-0.188 
 
2.387 
 
1.616 
 
-2.581 
 
 
 
0.852 
 
0.022 
 
0.114 
 
0.014 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
18.2% 
 
4.264 
   
 
0.010 
 
The estimation results improve considerably by employing the moderator variable. 
18.2% of the overall variance is explained with the model and ICGSa is significant at 
the 5% level. ICGS has a positive and a more significant impact on Tobin’s q if the 
debt/equity ratio is taken into account by the moderating effect. The influence of ICGS 
on Tobin’s q is stronger when the debt/equity ratio is lower. The capital structure, thus, 
represents a condition for the effect of corporate governance on shareholder value. 
Other control variables such as firm size, business sector, ownership structure, and the 
degree of internationalization, which are largely used in similar studies, do not 
contribute to prediction of Tobin’s q here. 
 
The regression analyses above confirm hypothesis 2 on a positive relationship between 
ICGS and shareholder value. 
 
6.2.4.7 The Impact of Disclosure 
 
Disclosure, the remaining aspect of corporate governance, is assumed to have an 
“indirect” effect on shareholder value because it reduces the investment risk which 
again decreases the cost of equity capital and should finally influence shareholder value 
positively. The main hypothesis here is that a good disclosure policy characterized by a 
regular communication of firm-specific relevant information to the capital market will 
reduce extra information costs by investors, on the one hand, and will decrease 
investment risk, on the other hand. Due to a decrease of information asymmetry 
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investors will have less information costs which is reflected in a lower cost of equity 
capital of the firm. Finally, a lower cost of equity capital will affect firm or shareholder 
value positively.  
 
There is vast empirical literature investigating the relationship between disclosure and 
the cost of equity capital.364 As it is difficult to measure the cost of equity capital itself, 
most empirical studies use proxies for the cost of equity capital. A direct relationship 
can be seen between disclosure policy and the cost of equity capital. A higher disclosure 
quality will reduce shareholders’ information gap and thus decrease their observed 
investment risk. Investment risk can be measured, for example, by the share price 
volatility which, however, is an absolute measure and does not enable comparisons with 
the general market. The CAPM measures systematic risk of investors with beta, which 
addresses this problem. Beta, calculated according to the CAPM (see equation (4)), is 
used in the following as a measure for the cost of equity capital. 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between disclosure and beta, as suggested by 
hypothesis 3b (The higher the quality of disclosure the lower is the cost of equity capital 
measured by beta), the following equation is developed: 
 
                                0 1= + ⋅ +i DISi iβ α α ε                                                   (8) 
 
Table 17: Regression analyses for disclosure (a) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
DIS 
 
 
 
- 
 
1.088 
 
-0.256 
 
5.767 
 
-1.614 
 
0.000 
 
0.115 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
4.0% 
 
2.603 
   
 
0.115 
 
                                                 
364 See, e.g. Diamond / Verrecchia (1991), Leuz (2003), or Verrecchia (2001). 
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As expected, a single regression analysis between beta and disclosure shows a negative 
relationship with the estimated coefficient being -0.256. The coefficient is, however, 
only significant at the 0.115 level (see Table 17). This result does not support 
hypothesis H3b, although the level of significance is not too bad. In a next step a number 
of control variables such as the turnover volume as a proxy for the liquidity of a firm’s 
shares, ln (assets) as a proxy for firm size, the first year of listing at a German stock 
exchange, and the number of supervisory board members are employed. Including 
control variables into equation (8) increases the adjusted R2 to 10.4%. The influence of 
disclosure as well as its level of significance decrease to 18.2% and 0.264, respectively. 
The result of a negative impact of disclosure on beta remains robust when including 
control variables; the level of significance, however, shrinks.  
 
Regression analysis between the disclosure score and Tobin’s q value delivers a 
negative and insignificant result and therefore rejects hypothesis 3a (The higher the 
quality of disclosure, the higher will be shareholder value). The previous result that 
ICGSa has a positive impact on Tobin’s q when the debt/equity ratio is taken into 
account differs from the disclosure analysis. The debt/equity ratio does not contribute to 
a significant relationship between disclosure and Tobin’s q. In fact, when the 
debt/equity ratio is employed into the equation (8) as a control variable the value for the 
adjusted R2 increases to 6.8%; the impact of disclosure on beta remains negative and 
insignificant. The influence of the debt/equity ratio on beta is negative and insignificant 
(-24.5% at the 0.133 level) so that it cannot be concluded that firms with a high quality 
of disclosure and a low debt/equity ratio have a lower cost of equity capital. In addition, 
if Tobin’s q is substituted for beta, the debt/equity ratio shows a negative and significant 
impact (-30.6% at the 0.042 level). Disclosure, however, has, other than expected, a 
negative and insignificant influence on Tobin’s q (-10.6% at the 0.471 level). 
Consequently, a significant relationship between disclosure and shareholder value 
cannot be found for the underlying sample. This result may be due to the fact that first, 
there are many variables other than disclosure which influence shareholder value but 
cannot be observed and that second, firms with a high quality of disclosure and a low 
cost of equity capital may not necessarily have a lower total cost of capital. 
 
In summary, neither hypothesis 3a nor hypothesis 3b can be confirmed. The 
significance of the result for hypothesis 3b is slightly over the 0.10 level so that at least 
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a weak relationship between the quality of disclosure and the cost of equity capital 
measured by beta can be assumed. 
 
 
6.2.4.8  Evidence on Hypotheses 
 
The results of the previously specified hypotheses are summarized as follows: 
 
Table 18: Evidence on hypotheses for CGSa 
Hypotheses Effect Significance Result 
 
H1: The quality of the overall corporate 
governance system has a positive impact on 
shareholder value. 
 
+ 0.877 H1 rejected 
 
H2: The quality of the internal corporate 
governance system (ICGS) has a positive 
impact on shareholder value. 
 
+ 0.022 H2 confirmed 
 
H3a: The higher the quality of disclosure the 
higher is shareholder value. 
 
- 0.394 H3a rejected 
 
H3b: The higher the quality of disclosure the 
lower is the cost of equity capital measured 
by beta. 
 
- 0.115 H3b rejected 
 
 
Following the findings of corporate governance literature, it was assumed that the 
quality of firm-level corporate governance affects shareholder value positively 
(Hypothesis 1). Hypothesis 1 has to be rejected even after controlling for firm 
characteristics. This result is supported by the discussion in the literature that corporate 
governance is possibly influenced by a variety of economic factors which are difficult to 
identify. Consequently, it is differentiated between ICGS and disclosure. The respective 
hypothesis 2 assumes that ICGS should have a positive impact on shareholder value 
measured by Tobin’s q. OLS regressions confirm a positive and significant relationship, 
which is even improved by employing the capital structure. The evidence of a 
significant impact of ICGS is conditioned by the debt/equity ratio indicating that firms 
with good ICGS dispose of a higher Tobin’s q if their debt/equity ratio is rather low. 
 137
 
The debt/equity ratio functions as a moderating variable in the respective equation. The 
economic interpretation of this result is that investors evaluate firms according to their 
quality of ICGS as well as their debt/equity ratio. Both criteria give investors security 
that their interests will be of importance. ICGS and debt/equity ratio interact with each 
other: Firms with good ICGS will attract more investors than firms with bad ICGS 
resulting in a low debt/equity ratio. On the other hand, firms which are less indebted 
will have an incentive to invest in their ICGS in order to satisfy and maintain existing 
investors. 
 
As far as disclosure is concerned, disclosure deals with the information economic aspect 
of corporate governance and therefore has different goals than control mechanisms or 
incentive schemes. Since the disclosure policy alone does not qualify a firm to have 
good corporate governance, investors are not expected to evaluate firms merely 
according to the quality of their disclosure. In fact, voluntary disclosure practice serves 
to facilitate investment decisions which investors reward with lower risk premiums. 
Consequently, a significant impact of disclosure on shareholder value is not expected 
and hypothesis H3a is rejected. Furthermore, as the literature states that disclosure policy 
is important for reducing the information gap among investors who require a smaller 
risk premium, hypothesis H3b postulates a negative relationship between the firm-level 
disclosure score and the cost of equity capital measured by beta according to the 
CAPM. This hypothesis cannot be confirmed either, although the level of significance is 
not too bad. This shows that closing the information gap with better disclosure of firm-
specific information may still reduce investors’ observed risk, which finally corresponds 
to a lower cost of equity capital. 
 
 
6.2.5 Robustness tests 
 
This section serves to check the robustness of previous results for regression analyses. 
The robustness as investigated here relates to a change in the determination of the 
corporate governance score. As has been mentioned before, it can be assumed that the 
results of the empirical investigation depend considerably on how the independent 
variable, here the quality of corporate governance, is calculated. This section presents 
two alternative calculations of the corporate governance score which focus on the 
relative quality of firms’ corporate governance rather than on their absolute quality as 
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before. The aim is to analyze how the results above change when another measure of 
corporate governance quality applies. 
 
6.2.5.1 First Alternative Calculation of the Corporate Governance Score 
 
The first alternative to the calculation of the corporate governance score is to relate the 
individual points achieved by each firm to the maximum points achievable in the 
questionnaire and the checklist, respectively. By doing so, the firm-specific corporate 
governance quality is evaluated by its distance to the ideal corporate governance 
quality. The maximum points are given the value ‘1’, all points below the maximum 
points are then lower than ‘1’. In a next step, the regression analyses presented above 
are carried out with the new score, which is denoted as CGSb in the following. 
 
The first analysis concerns the relationship between the overall corporate governance 
score and shareholder value as measured by Tobin’s q. 
 
 
0 1' = + ⋅ +iTobin sq CGSbi iα α ε                  (9) 
 
 
Table 19: Regression analyses for CGSb (1) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
CGSb 
 
 
 
+ 
 
0.327 
 
0.265 
 
0.606 
 
1.806 
 
 
 
0.547 
 
0.078 
 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
4.9% 
 
3.260 
   
 
0.078 
 
 
The results for equation (9) show a positive and significant effect of the quality of 
corporate governance on Tobin’s q. In contrast to CGSa CGSb has a much stronger and 
more significant explanatory power. In order to check the robustness other possible 
independent variables are included into the regression equation. The following equation 
(10) employs the debt/equity ratio and the proportion of international sales to total sales.  
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0 1 2 3' /= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +i i iTobin sq CGSb D E ISi iα α α α ε               (10) 
 
 
Table 20: Regression analyses for CGSb (2) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
CGSb 
 
D/E 
 
IS 
 
 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
 
0.875 
 
0.165 
 
-0.255 
 
0.075 
 
 
1.210 
 
0.944 
 
-1.535 
 
0.463 
 
 
 
0.234 
 
0.351 
 
0.133 
 
0.646 
 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
7.4% 
 
2.067 
   
 
0.121 
 
 
Comparable to the results with CGSa equation (10) shows that the effect of corporate 
governance decreases considerably when taking other variables into account. In fact, the 
influence of corporate governance becomes even insignificant. This picture is consistent 
with the results on the basis of CGSa. Therefore, hypothesis 1 can be rejected here as 
well. The next analyses focus on a differentiation between the internal corporate 
governance system and disclosure. As far as the impact of ICGS is concerned, the 
relevance of the capital structure has been discussed before. Consequently, employing 
the debt/equity ration into the regression equation (11) is consistent with previous 
analyses. 
 
0 1 2' /= + ⋅ + ⋅ +i iTobin sq ICGSb D Ei iα α α ε                           (11) 
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Table 21: Regression analyses for ICGSb (1) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
ICGSb 
 
D/E 
 
 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
1.066 
 
0.144 
 
-0.256 
 
 
1.800 
 
0.910 
 
-1.614 
 
0.079 
 
0.368 
 
0.114 
 
 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
7.4% 
 
2.770 
   
 
0.074 
 
 
Again, the results are consistent with ICGSa regarding a weak influence of ICGS on 
Tobin’s q. In a next step, the debt/equity ratio is considered for moderating effects. As 
shown in Table 22, employing the debt/equity ratio as the moderator variable increases 
the overall explanatory power of the equation to 16.9%. Moreover, ICGSb turns out to 
be a significant variable when taking the capital structure into account. Therefore, 
hypothesis 2 can be confirmed. 
 
( )0 1 2 3' /= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +i i i iTobin sq ICGSb D E ICGSb D E/ i iα α α α ε        (12) 
 
Table 22: Regression analyses for ICGSb (2) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
ICGS 
 
D/E 
 
ICGS* D/E 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
0.140 
 
0.474 
 
0.574 
 
-0.827 
 
 
0.206 
 
2.328 
 
1.522 
 
-2.401 
 
 
 
0.836 
 
0.025 
 
0.136 
 
0.021 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
16.9% 
 
3.978 
   
 
0.014 
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Finally, the hypotheses regarding the influence of disclosure are tested. In single OLS 
regressions the quality of disclosure as measured according to the underlying method 
shows an insignificant relationship with Tobin’s q. This is consistent with previous 
results and hypothesis 3a can be rejected. Relating disclosure to beta, however, delivers 
a negative impact which is significant at the 10% level (see Table 23) and hypothesis 3b 
can be confirmed. 
 
0 1= + ⋅ +i iBeta DISb iα α ε          (13) 
 
 
Table 23: Regression analyses for disclosure (b) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
DISb 
 
 
 
- 
 
1.406 
 
-0.278 
 
4.147 
 
-1.759 
 
0.000 
 
0.087 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
5.2% 
 
3.094 
   
 
0.087 
 
 
The alternative calculation of the corporate governance score by relating the firm-
specific points to the maximum achievable points does not disturb the previous results 
considerably. The evidence on the hypotheses is exact the same except for the 
relationship between disclosure and beta which is here more significant, thus 
confirming hypothesis 3b (see Table 24). 
 
Table 24: Evidence on hypotheses for CGSb 
Hypotheses Effect Significance Result 
H1: The quality of the overall corporate 
governance system has a positive impact on 
the shareholder value. 
 
+ 0.351 H1 rejected 
H2: The quality of the internal corporate 
governance system (ICGS) has a positive 
impact on shareholder value. 
 
+ 0.025 H2 confirmed 
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H3a: The higher the quality of disclosure the 
higher is shareholder value. 
 
+ 0.412 H3a rejected 
H3b: The higher the quality of disclosure the 
lower is the cost of equity capital measured 
by beta. 
 
- 0.087 H3b confirmed 
 
 
 
6.2.5.2 Second Alternative Calculation of the Corporate Governance 
Score 
 
A second alternative to the calculation of the corporate governance quality is to relate 
the points achieved by each individual firm to the firm with the highest points, i.e. the 
firm with the best quality standards for the respective corporate governance criteria. 
This score which is referred to as CGSc here differs from CGSb in that it compares 
firms according to best practice and not merely according to the criteria previously 
specified. The following illustrations present regression results on the basis of CGSc. 
The analyses start with testing hypothesis 1 on a positive relationship between the 
overall corporate governance score and Tobin’s q. 
 
 
0 1' = + ⋅ +iTobin sq CGSci iα α ε          (14) 
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Table 25: Regression analyses for CGSc (1) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
CGSc 
 
 
 
+ 
 
0.367 
 
0.248 
 
0.659 
 
1.679 
 
 
 
0.513 
 
0.100 
 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
4.0% 
 
2.818 
   
 
0.100 
 
 
Other than previous results equation (14) shows a positive and significant (10% level) 
relationship between the overall corporate governance score and Tobin’s q. Though the 
influence is not strongly significant, hypothesis 1 cannot yet be rejected under the 
calculation with CGSc. In a next step, control variables are employed (see equation 
(15)). 
 
 
0 1 2 3' /= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +i i iTobin sq CGSc D E ISi iα α α α ε                     (15) 
 
 
Table 26: Regression analyses for CGSc (2) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
CGSc 
 
D/E 
 
IS 
 
 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
 
0.977 
 
0.128 
 
-0.267 
 
0.081 
 
 
1.347 
 
0.707 
 
-1.577 
 
0.493 
 
 
 
0.186 
 
0.484 
 
0.123 
 
0.625 
 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
6.4% 
 
1.918 
   
 
0.144 
 
 
As shown in Table 26, the influence of the overall corporate governance quality 
decreases considerably when employing further variables. The results do not remain 
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significant leading to a rejection of hypothesis 1. Again, the splitting into ICGS and 
disclosure appears to be reasonable. Equation (16) represents the assumed relationship 
between ICGS and Tobin’s q. 
 
 
0 1 2' = + ⋅ + ⋅ +i iTobin sq ICGSc D E/ i iα α α ε          (16) 
 
 
Table 27: Regression analyses for ICGSc (1) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
ICGSc 
 
D/E 
 
 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
1.014 
 
0.154 
 
-0.251 
 
 
1.660 
 
0.967 
 
-1.576 
 
0.104 
 
0.339 
 
0.123 
 
 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
7.7% 
 
2.829 
   
 
0.070 
 
 
As shown in Table 27, the impact of ICGS on Tobin’s q is positive but not significant. 
Again, the debt/equity ratio can be assumed to have a moderating effect. Testing such 
an effect in equation (17) indicates that the influence of ICGS is significant when 
considering the debt/equity ratio as a moderator variable. Moreover, the overall 
explanatory power of the equation increases to 18.2% and hypothesis 2 can be 
confirmed. 
 
 
( )0 1 2 3' /= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +i i i iTobin sq ICGSc D E ICGSc D E/ i iα α α α ε              (17) 
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Table 28: Regression analyses for ICGSc (2) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
ICGSc 
 
D/E 
 
ICGSc* D/E 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
-7.48 E-03 
 
0.504 
 
0.619 
 
-0.864 
 
 
-0.011 
 
2.472 
 
1.652 
 
-2.531 
 
 
 
0.992 
 
0.018 
 
0.106 
 
0.015 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
18.2% 
 
4.265 
   
 
0.010 
 
 
Testing for hypothesis 3a, regression analyses deliver a negative but highly insignificant 
relationship between the quality of disclosure and shareholder value measured by 
Tobin’s q. Therefore, hypothesis 3a has to be rejected. As for hypothesis 3b, the 
following equation is estimated on the basis of CGSc. Similar to the results for CGSa 
the relationship is negative but insignificant. Even though the level of significance is not 
too low, hypothesis 3b cannot be confirmed. 
 
 
0 1= + ⋅ +i iBeta DISc iα α ε           (18) 
 
 
Table 29: Regression analyses for disclosure (c) 
Regressors Hypotheses Standardized 
coefficients 
t-statistics p-value 
 
Constant 
 
DISc 
 
 
 
- 
 
1.364 
 
-0.233 
 
3.604 
 
-1.460 
 
0.001 
 
0.153 
 
Adjusted R2
 
F-test 
 
2.9% 
 
2.131 
   
 
0.153 
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The following Table 30 summarizes the results for the hypotheses on the basis of CGSc. 
Similar to CGSa hypotheses 1, 3a and 3b need to be rejected. 
 
Table 30: Evidence on hypotheses for CGSc 
Hypotheses Effect Significance Result 
H1: The quality of the overall corporate 
governance system has a positive impact 
on shareholder value. 
 
+ 0.484 H1 rejected 
H2: The quality of the internal corporate 
governance system (ICGS) has a positive 
impact on shareholder value. 
 
+ 0.018 H2 confirmed 
H3a: The higher the quality of disclosure 
the higher is shareholder value. 
 
- 0.914 H3a rejected 
H3b: The higher the quality of disclosure 
the lower is the cost of equity capital 
measured by beta. 
 
- 0.153   H3b rejected 
 
 
The robustness check in 6.2.5.1 and 6.2.5.2 has shown that the method of calculation of 
the corporate governance score matters only weakly. In fact, the direction of effects and 
their levels of significance largely remain robust so that the results for the hypotheses 
are widely similar for CGSa, CGSb, and CGSc, respectively. 
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VII  Conclusion 
 
The main goal of this thesis was to create a list of criteria for good corporate governance 
which are tested empirically for the German market. The research questions hereby 
were first whether firms with better corporate governance are able to generate higher 
shareholder value and second which aspects of corporate governance play a more or less 
important role in explaining the relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance and shareholder value. The foundations of this investigation lie in modern 
theories of the firm comprising the property rights approach, agency theory, and the 
transaction cost economics. All of these theoretical approaches can be applied to the 
problem of corporate governance in modern corporations characterized by a dispersed 
ownership structure. They emphasize the necessity of monitoring and incentive schemes 
as well as the role of voluntary disclosure. These aspects establish at the same time the 
basis for the underlying criteria for good corporate governance, which have been 
developed by taking recommendations for German corporations such as in the GCGC 
into consideration. The criteria for good corporate governance refer to the following 
aspects as presented in chapter V: Management, Supervisory board, Risk management, 
and Disclosure. As far as the hypotheses are concerned, it is argued that corporate 
governance influences managerial behavior over control and incentive mechanisms. At 
the same it is crucial for shareholders to receive firm-specific information in order to 
reduce their personal transaction costs. 
 
This study belongs to the stream of empirical research on corporate governance, which 
attempts to measure the quality of firm-level corporate governance for German 
corporations. While the main research questions are related to recent studies, the results 
differ. Investigating the relationship between firm-level corporate governance and 
shareholder value, the assumed positive impact of corporate governance on shareholder 
value cannot be confirmed. Instead, it appears to be necessary to differentiate between 
the internal (ICGS) and external (disclosure) dimensions of corporate governance. In 
fact, ICGS has a positive and significant explanation power of Tobin’s q, the selected 
proxy for shareholder value, as opposed to the overall corporate governance score. 
Disclosure, on the other hand, reduces information asymmetry of investors and thus 
their cost of equity capital measured by beta according to the CAPM. 
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Limitations and possible extensions of this study can be seen in the fact that the 
underlying study is a cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between corporate 
governance and shareholder value. As previous studies have indicated, the importance 
of time-series analyses which would allow investigating the consequences of a change 
in the corporate governance systems of firms is not to be neglected. Therefore, it would 
be useful to observe differences in firm valuation over several management generations. 
 
With this study new results are contributed to the empirical corporate governance 
literature, particularly in Germany. The results indicate that in the short run firms should 
invest in both the internal and external corporate governance dimensions as positive 
effects can be established. These effects should not be overestimated, however, as there 
are potentially further economic factors and interactions of them which may play a 
larger role. Consequently, c. p. it is reasonable for firms to invest in their corporate 
governance systems. On a long-term basis, the impact of corporate governance on 
shareholder value may be stronger. In fact, Germany is rather at the beginning of 
reforming its corporate governance structure and new recommendations and regulations 
are expected to come in the future. 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire on the Quality of ICGS 
 
I. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 
 
Managing board 
 
A) Contractual arrangements   
 
A1) How long is the average length of management contracts? 
 
A2) Is there an age limit for managers? 
 
o Yes 
o  No  
 
 If yes, what is the age limit?  
 
A3) Do management contracts provide for severance payments in the event of an early 
termination of contracts, particularly in case of hostile takeovers? 
 
o Yes 
o  No  
 
 
B) External mandates 
 
B1) Are there any regulations in the articles of incorporation or in management 
contracts on how many supervisory board mandates managers are allowed to hold 
at maximum outside the firm? 
 
o Yes 
o  No  
 
If yes, how many? 
 
 
C) Independence 
 
C1) How does the firm deal with possible conflicts of interest of individual managers? 
 
 o Disclosure toward the supervisory and the managing board  
 o Option for the respective manager to participate in relevant discussions and 
votings  
o Prohibition of the respective manager’s participation in relevant discussions 
and votings  
o Retraction of the mandate 
o Other: 
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D) Liability 
 
D1) Has the firm taken out a D&O-insurance policy for its managers? 
 
o Yes 
o  No 
  
If yes, does the insurance policy provide for a participation of individual managers 
in damages? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
If yes, how is such a participation arranged ? 
 
 
 
 
 Supervisory board 
 
 A) Contractual arrangements 
 
A1) Is there an age limit for supervisory board members? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
If yes, what is the age limit? 
 
 
B) External mandates 
 
B1) Are there any regulations in the articles of incorporation on how many external 
board mandates supervisory board members are allowed to hold at maximum?  
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
If yes, how many? 
 
 
C) Board composition   
 
C1) How many supervisory board members are representatives of banks which play a 
major role in the firm’s debt financing?  
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D)  Independence 
 
D1) How many supervisory board members are former managers of the firm? 
 
 
D2) Is the chairman of the supervisory board at the same time a member of the audit 
committee? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
D3) Is the chairman of the audit committee a former manager of the firm? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
D4) How does the firm deal with possible conflicts of interest of individual 
supervisory board members? 
 
 o Disclosure toward the chairman of the supervisory board  
 o Option for the respective member to participate in relevant discussions and 
votings  
o Prohibition of the respective member’s participation in relevant discussions 
and votings  
o Retraction of the mandate 
o Other: 
 
 
 
E) Liability 
 
E1) Has the firm taken out a D&O-insurance policy for the supervisory board 
members? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
If yes, does the insurance policy provide for a participation of individual members  
in damages? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
If yes, how is such a participation arranged ? 
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F) Supply of information 
 
F1) How often does the managing board supply the supervisory board with 
information on the following issues?  
 
 monthly quarterly half-yearly yearly 
Strategy     
Business planning     
Business development     
Risk management     
 
F2) Are the duties of the managing board to supply information specified in any 
written form with respect to content, form, and frequency?  
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
F3) Are there board committees specialized in certain topics or tasks in order to 
improve the supply of information to the supervisory board as well as to increase 
the efficiency of the work of the supervisory board?  
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
If yes, which committees?  
 
 o Strategy committee 
 o Audit committee 
 o Risk management committee 
 o Corporate governance committee 
 o Personnel committee for managers 
o Other: 
 
 
F4) Please estimate the importance of the following sources of information for the 
supervisory board.  
 
 
            Not important                Very important 
 
Managing board   o o o o o 
Management accounting  o o o o o 
Internal audit    o o o o o 
Auditor     o o o o o 
Board committees   o o o o o 
Other     o o o o o 
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G) Board Meetings 
 
G1) Do the board committees prepare separately for board meetings?  
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
G2) Do representatives of shareholders and representatives of employees prepare 
separately for board meetings? 
 
 o Yes 
o No 
 
G3) Does the supervisory board prepare together with the managing board for its 
meetings? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
G4) Does the supervisory board regularly sit without the managing board? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
G5) Does the supervisory board regularly evaluate its efficiency? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 If yes, how? (e.g. peer review) 
 
 
 
II. RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
 A) Risk Strategy 
 
A1) Has the firm defined a risk strategy as a part of its corporate strategy? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
If yes, are risk policies developed from such an overall risk strategy for operative 
business units? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
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A2) Does the firm has a risk handbook with company-wide guidelines on risk 
management specifying responsibilities, reporting duties, and principles of risk 
management?  
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 
B) Risk Management Process 
 
 Risk Identification and Analysis 
 
B1) Please estimate the importance of the following instruments of risk identification 
within the firm.  
 
           Not important                  Very important 
 
Brainstorming    o o o o o 
Checklists   o o o o o 
Group discussions   o o o o o 
Observation    o o o o o 
Control     o o o o o 
Other     o o o o o 
 
 
B2) Please estimate the importance of the following instruments of risk analysis within 
the firm.  
 
           Not important  Very important 
 
Risk inventory    o o o o o 
Scenario analyses    o o o o o 
Balance sheet simulations  o o o o o 
Risk drivers    o o o o o 
Statistical analyses   o o o o o 
Other     o o o o o 
 
Calculation of risks 
 
B3) Are qualitative risks calculated or “evaluated”? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 
 
 155
 
If yes, 
 
1) how? 
 
2) does such an evaluation include estimations on the probability and potential of 
damage?  
 
 o  Yes 
  o No 
 
B4) Which measures or concepts are used to evaluate quantitative risks? 
 
B5) Are individual or business unit-specific risks aggregated to a total risk of the firm? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
Risk Control 
 
B6) Has the firm specified any risk limits for operative business units?  
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
If yes, are there any sanction mechanisms in the case of non-compliance? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 If yes, what are these sanctions? 
 
B8) Does the firm account for diversification effects in its allocation of risk capital to 
operative business units?  
 
o Yes 
 o No 
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B9) Does the firm allocate risk-specific equity capital to operative business units?  
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
B10) Is there an instrument for risk control which is based on ratios? (e.g. Balanced 
Chance and Risk Card)? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 
If yes, please describe the main characteristics of this instrument. 
 
 
C) Institutionalization of Risk Management 
 
C1) Which of the following departments exist within the firm? 
 
o Risk Accounting – as part of Management Accounting 
o  Internal Audit 
o Risk committee 
o Treasury Department 
o Other 
 
 
D) Internal Risk Reporting 
 
D1) Are employees motivated to an on-time reporting of observed risks? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 If yes, how? 
III. COMPENSATION 
  
 Supervisory board = Sb 
 Managing board = Mb 
 Top management = Tm 
 Middle management = Mm(e.g. Head of department) 
 Lower management = Um (e.g. Product manager) 
 Long-term incentives (> 1 year) 
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A) Composition of Total Compensation 
 
A1) What is the composition of the total compensation? 
 
 Sb Mb Tm Mm Lm 
Fixed income      
Yearly bonus payments       
Long-term incentives      
 
 
B) Variable Component of Compensation 
 
B1) To which measures are yearly bonus payments related? 
 
 
 Sb Mb Tm Mm Lm 
Absolute share price performance       
Share price performance relative to market 
performance  
    
Share price performance relative to industry 
performance  
    
Internal shareholder value-ratio, 
since when? 
 
 
   
Measures based on the balance sheet and/or 
the profit&loss account  
    
Individual arrangements      
Other      
 
 
B2) Are there any upper caps for yearly bonus payments? 
o Yes 
 o No 
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B3) To which measures are long-term incentives related? 
 
 
 Sb Mb Tm Mm Lm 
Absolute share price performance      
Share price performance relative to market 
performance  
    
Share price performance relative to industry 
performance  
    
Internal shareholder value-ratio, 
since when? 
 
 
   
Measures based on the balance sheet and/or 
the profit&loss account  
    
Individual arrangements      
Other      
 
 
B4) Which instruments are used in order to create long-term incentives? 
 
 Sb Mb Tm Mm Lm 
Stock options      
Convertible bonds      
Appreciation rights      
Virtual / Phantom stocks      
Employee stocks      
Other      
 
 
 
B5) If stock options are used, is there a minimum time horizon to be respected before 
exercising them? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
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 If yes, how long is this time horizon? 
 
 o 1 year 
 o 2 years 
 o 3 years 
 o >3 years 
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Appendix 2: Disclosure Checklist 
 
I. VALUE REPORTING 
 
1) Does the firm present its share price performance over several years (at least over 
3 years) and compare it to an industry index? 
 
2) Does the firm report on value-based management or at least on the goal of a long-
term increase of its firm value? 
 
3) a. Does the firm report on an internal value-based measure? 
 b. Is this measure quantified? 
 c. Is the calculation of the measure explained? 
 
4) Are intangible assets explicitly mentioned? 
 
5) Does the firm report on its dividend policy? 
 
6) Is there a calculation of the value added? 
 
7) Does the firm report on at least two share price ratios such as earnings per share or 
price/earnings ratio? 
 
 
II. RISK DISCLOSURE 
 
1) Is there a separate risk report in the annual report? 
 
2) Are there any references in the risk report to other parts of the annual report? 
 
3) Is there a categorization of risks? 
 
4) Does the firm report on basic or fundamental risks? 
 
5) Does the firm report on risks that may endanger the financial standing of the firm 
considerably? 
 
6) Are there any comments on risk concentration? 
 
7) Is the focus of risk disclosure on firm-specific risks? 
 
8) Are individual risks described? 
 
9) Is there any information on damage potential? 
 
10) Does the firm report on risks at the business unit level? 
 
11) a. Is there any information on probabilities? 
 b. If yes, are these probabilities quantified? 
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12) Are risks quantified? (value at risk, cash flow at risk, duration measures, 
sensitivity or scenario analyses) 
 
13) Are the methods used to quantify risks and their premises explained? 
 
14) Is there any information on how the firm deals with risks? 
 
15) Does the firm report on risks remaining after insurance or hedging activities? 
 
16) Is there any information on interdependencies between risks? 
 
17) Is there any information on chances? 
 
18) Does the firm comment on any changes in the firm’s risk exposure compared to 
the year before? 
 
19) Does the firm report on the strategy of its risk management? 
 
20) Does the firm explain how its risk management system is structured in terms of 
organization and process? 
 
21) Is there any information on the existence of a risk handbook? 
 
 
III. DISCLOSURE ON COMPENSATION 
 
1) Are there any quantitative comments on the composition of compensation (fixed 
versus variable)? 
 
2) Does the firm report on the individual compensation of managing and supervisory 
board members? 
 
3) Does the firm report on long-term incentives such as stock options? 
 
4) Does the firm report on buying and selling activities of managing and supervisory 
board members? 
 
 
IV. FORECAST REPORT 
 
1) Does the firm comment on its position and development within the industry? 
 
2) Does the firm report on its expected market share? 
 
3) Is there any information the firm’s long-term market strategy? 
 
4) Does the firm comment on the competition expected for the future? 
 
5) Does the firm report on expected developments of individual business units? 
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V. FURTHER INVESTOR RELATIONS MEASURES 
 
1) Does the firm report on its own corporate governance principles? 
 
2) Does the firm allow shareholders to pursue the shareholders’ assembly and other 
public conferences over the internet? 
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Appendix 3:   Translation of the Questions into the Corporate Governance 
Score 
 
I. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 
 
Managing board 
 
A) Contractual arrangements   
 
A1) How long is the average length of management contracts? 
 
 1 point if less than 5 years, 0 otherwise 
 
A2) Is there an age limit for managers? 
 
o Yes 
o  No  
 
 If yes, what is the age limit?  
 
         2 points if age limit is equal to or less than 65, 1 point if it is over 65 
 
A3) Do management contracts provide for severance payments in the event of an early 
termination of contracts, particularly in case of hostile takeovers? 
 
o Yes 
o  No  
 
1 point for “No” 
  
 
B) External mandates 
 
B1) Are there any regulations in the articles of incorporation or in management 
contracts on how many supervisory board mandates managers are allowed to hold 
at maximum outside the firm? 
 
o Yes 
o  No  
 
If yes, how many? 
  
 2 points if less than “5”, 1 point if “5” or more than “5” 
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C) Independence 
 
C1) How does the firm deal with possible conflicts of interest of individual managers? 
 
 o Disclosure toward the supervisory and the managing board  
 o Option for the respective manager to participate in relevant discussions and 
votings  
o Prohibition of the respective manager’s participation in relevant discussions 
and votings  
o Retraction of the mandate 
o Other: 
 1 point for each positive answer 
 
D) Liability 
 
D1) Has the firm taken out a D&O-insurance policy for its managers? 
 
o Yes 
o  No 
  
If yes, does the insurance policy provide for a participation of individual managers 
in damages? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
If yes, how is such a participation arranged ? 
 
1 point if participation is provided for 
 
 
 
 Supervisory board 
 
 A) Contractual arrangements 
 
A1) Is there an age limit for supervisory board members? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
If yes, what is the age limit? 
 
 2 points if age limit is equal to or less than 65, 1 point if it is over 65 
 
 
 165
 
B) External mandates 
 
B1) Are there any regulations in the articles of incorporation on how many external 
board mandates supervisory board members are allowed to hold at maximum?  
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
If yes, how many? 
 
2 points if less than “5”, 1 point if “5” or more than “5” 
 
 
 
C) Board composition   
 
C1) How many supervisory board members are representatives of banks which play a 
major role in the firm’s debt financing?  
 
Question not considered in the score 
 
D)  Independence 
 
D1) How many supervisory board members are former managers of the firm? 
 
Question not considered in the score 
  
D2) Is the chairman of the supervisory board at the same time a member of the audit 
committee? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
1 point if “No” 
 
 
D3) Is the chairman of the audit committee a former manager of the firm? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 1 point if “No” 
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D4) How does the firm deal with possible conflicts of interest of individual 
supervisory board members? 
 
 o Disclosure toward the chairman of the supervisory board  
 o Option for the respective member to participate in relevant discussions and 
votings  
o Prohibition of the respective member’s participation in relevant discussions 
and votings  
o Retraction of the mandate 
o Other: 
 
 1 point for each positive answer 
 
 
E) Liability 
 
E1) Has the firm taken out a D&O-insurance policy for the supervisory board 
members? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
If yes, does the insurance policy provide for a participation of individual  
members in damages? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
If yes, how is such a participation arranged? 
 
1 point if participation is provided for 
 
 
 
F) Supply of information 
 
F1) How often does the managing board supply the supervisory board with 
information on the following issues?  
 
 monthly quarterly half-yearly yearly 
Strategy     
Business planing     
Business development     
Risk management     
 
Question not considered in the score 
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F2) Are the duties of the managing board to supply information specified in any 
written form with respect to content, form, and frequency?  
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
1 point if “Yes” 
 
F3) Are there board committees specialized in certain topics or tasks in order to 
improve the supply of information to the supervisory board as well as to increase 
the efficiency of the work of the supervisory board?  
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
If yes, which committees?  
 
 o Strategy committee 
 o Audit committee 
 o Risk management committee 
 o Corporate governance committee 
 o Personnel committee for managers 
o Other: 
 
1 point for each positive answer 
 
F4) Please estimate the importance of the following sources of information for the 
supervisory board.  
 
            Not important                Very important 
 
Managing board   o o o o o 
Management accounting  o o o o o 
Internal audit    o o o o o 
Auditor     o o o o o 
Board committees   o o o o o 
Other     o o o o o 
 
 
 2 points for each answer if “very important”, 1 point if one less than “very 
important” 
 
 
G) Board Meetings 
 
G1) Do the board committees prepare separately for board meetings?  
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
1 point if “Yes” 
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G2) Do representatives of shareholders and representatives of employees prepare 
separately for board meetings? 
 
 o Yes 
o No 
 
1 point if “Yes” 
G3) Does the supervisory board prepare together with the managing board for its 
meetings? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
      1 point if “Yes” 
 
G4) Does the supervisory board regularly sit without the managing board? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 1 point if “Yes” 
 
G5) Does the supervisory board regularly evaluate its efficiency? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 If yes, how? (e.g. peer review) 
 
       1 point if “Yes” 
 
II. RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
 A) Risk Strategy 
 
A1) Has the firm defined a risk strategy as a part of its corporate strategy? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
1 point if “Yes” 
 
If yes, are risk policies developed from such an overall risk strategy for operative 
business units? 
Question not considered in the score 
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A2) Does the firm has a risk handbook with company-wide guidelines on risk 
management specifying responsibilities, reporting duties, and principles of risk 
management?  
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
       1 point if “Yes” 
 
 
B) Risk Management Process 
 
 Risk Identification and Analysis 
 
B1) Please estimate the importance of the following instruments of risk identification 
within the firm.  
 
           Not important                  Very important 
 
Brainstorming    o o o o o 
Checklists   o o o o o 
Group discussions   o o o o o 
Observation    o o o o o 
Control     o o o o o 
Other     o o o o o 
 
 Question not considered in the score 
 
B2) Please estimate the importance of the following instruments of risk analysis within 
the firm.  
 
           Not important  Very important 
 
Risk inventory    o o o o o 
Scenario analyses    o o o o o 
Balance sheet simulations  o o o o o 
Risk drivers    o o o o o 
Statistical analyses   o o o o o 
Other     o o o o o 
 
Question not considered in the score 
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Calculation of risks 
 
B3) Are qualitative risks calculated or “evaluated”? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
1 point if “Yes” 
 
If yes, 
 
1) how? 
 
2) does such an evaluation include estimations on the probability and potential of 
damage?  
  
 o  Yes 
  o No 
 
1 point if “Yes” 
 
B4) Which measures or concepts are used to evaluate quantitative risks? 
 
3 points at maximum if “value at risk”, “sensitivity analysis” or “damage 
potential times probability” 
 
B5) Are individual or business unit-specific risks aggregated to a total risk of the firm? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 1 point if “Yes” 
Risk Control 
 
B6) Has the firm specified any risk limits for operative business units?  
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
1 point if “Yes” 
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If yes, are there any sanction mechanisms in the case of non-compliance? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 1 point if “Yes” 
  
 If yes, what are these sanctions? 
 
 Question not considered in the score 
 
B8) Does the firm account for diversification effects in its allocation of risk capital to 
operative business units?  
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 1 point if “Yes” 
 
B9) Does the firm allocate risk-specific equity capital to operative business units?  
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
1 point if “Yes” 
 
B10) Is there an instrument for risk control which is based on ratios? (e.g. Balanced 
Chance and Risk Card)? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
1 point if “Yes” 
 
If yes, please describe the main characteristics of this instrument. 
 
Question not considered in the score 
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C) Institutionalization of Risk Management 
 
C1) Which of the following departments exist within the firm? 
 
o Risk Accounting – as part of Management Accounting 
o  Internal Audit 
o Risk committee 
o Treasury Department 
o Other 
 
1 point for each positive answer 
 
D) Internal Risk Reporting 
 
D1) Are employees motivated to an on-time reporting of observed risks? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
       1 point if “Yes” 
  
 If yes, how? 
 
 Question not considered in the score 
 
III. COMPENSATION 
  
 Supervisory board = Sb 
 Managing board = Mb 
 Top management = Tm 
 Middle management = Mm(e.g. Head of department) 
 Lower management = Um (e.g. Product manager) 
 Long-term incentives (> 1 year) 
 
A) Composition of Total Compensation 
 
A1) What is the composition of the total compensation? 
 
 Sb Mb Tm Mm Lm 
Fixed income      
Yearly bonus payments       
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Long-term incentives      
 
1 point for each positive answer for long-term incentives and for bonus payments, 
respectively (10 points at maximum) 
B) Variable Component of Compensation 
 
B1) To which measures are yearly bonus payments related? 
 
 
 Sb Mb Tm Mm Lm 
Absolute share price performance       
Share price performance relative to market 
performance  
    
Share price performance relative to industry 
performance  
    
Internal shareholder value-ratio, 
since when? 
 
 
   
Measures based on the balance sheet and/or 
the profit&loss account  
    
Individual arrangements      
Other      
 
1 point for each positive answer except for the last three roows (20 points at 
maximum) 
 
B2) Are there any upper caps for yearly bonus payments? 
o Yes 
 o No 
  
 1 point if “Yes” 
 
B3) To which measures are long-term incentives related? 
 
 
 Sb Mb Tm Mm Lm 
Absolute share price performance      
Share price performance relative to market 
performance  
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Share price performance relative to industry 
performance  
    
Internal shareholder value-ratio, 
since when? 
 
 
   
Measures based on the balance sheet and/or 
the profit&loss account  
    
Individual arrangements      
Other      
 
1 point for each positive answer except for the last three roows (20 points at 
maximum) 
 
  
B4) Which instruments are used in order to create long-term incentives? 
 
 Sb Mb Tm Mm Lm 
Stock options      
Convertible bonds      
Appreciation rights      
Virtual / Phantom stocks      
Employee stocks      
Other      
 
 1 point for each positive answer 
 
B5) If stock options are used, is there a minimum time horizon to be respected before 
exercising them? 
 
o Yes 
 o No 
 
 1 point if “Yes” 
 
 If yes, how long is this time horizon? 
 
 o 1 year 
 o 2 years 
 o 3 years 
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 o >3 years 
 
 Question not considered in the score 
 
 
Disclosure Checklist 
 
1 point is given for each positive answer 
 
 
I. VALUE REPORTING 
 
1) Does the firm present its share price performance over several years (at least over 
3 years) and compare it to an industry index? 
 
2) Does the firm report on value-based management or at least on the goal of a long-
term increase of its firm value? 
 
3) a. Does the firm report on an internal value-based measure? 
 b. Is this measure quantified? 
 c. Is the calculation of the measure explained? 
 
4) Are intangible assets explicitly mentioned? 
 
5) Does the firm report on its dividend policy? 
 
6) Is there a calculation of the value added? 
 
7) Does the firm report on at least two share price ratios such as earnings per share or 
price/earnings ratio? 
 
 
II. RISK DISCLOSURE 
 
1) Is there a separate risk report in the annual report? 
 
2) Are there any references in the risk report to other parts of the annual report? 
 
3) Is there a categorization of risks? 
 
4) Does the firm report on basic or fundamental risks? 
 
5) Does the firm report on risks that may endanger the financial standing of the firm 
considerably? 
 
6) Are there any comments on risk concentration? 
 
7) Is the focus of risk disclosure on firm-specific risks? 
 
8) Are individual risks described? 
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9) Is there any information on damage potential? 
 
10) Does the firm report on risks at the business unit level? 
 
11) a. Is there any information on probabilities? 
 b. If yes, are these probabilities quantified? 
 
12) Are risks quantified? (value at risk, cash flow at risk, duration measures, 
sensitivity or scenario analyses) 
 
13) Are the methods used to quantify risks and their premises explained? 
 
14) Is there any information on how the firm deals with risks? 
 
15) Does the firm report on risks remaining after insurance or hedging activities? 
 
16) Is there any information on interdependencies between risks? 
 
17) Is there any information on chances? 
 
18) Does the firm comment on any changes in the firm’s risk exposure compared to 
the year before? 
 
19) Does the firm report on the strategy of its risk management? 
 
20) Does the firm explain how its risk management system is structured in terms of 
organization and process? 
 
21) Is there any information on the existence of a risk handbook? 
 
 
III. DISCLOSURE ON COMPENSATION 
 
1) Are there any quantitative comments on the composition of compensation (fixed 
versus variable)? 
 
2) Does the firm report on the individual compensation of managing and supervisory 
board members? 
 
3) Does the firm report on long-term incentives such as stock options? 
 
4) Does the firm report on buying and selling activities of managing and supervisory 
board members? 
 
 
IV. FORECAST REPORT 
 
1) Does the firm comment on its position and development within the industry? 
 
2) Does the firm report on its expected market share? 
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3) Is there any information the firm’s long-term market strategy? 
 
4) Does the firm comment on the competition expected for the future? 
 
5) Does the firm report on expected developments of individual business units? 
 
 
V. FURTHER INVESTOR RELATIONS MEASURES 
 
1) Does the firm report on its own corporate governance principles? 
 
2) Does the firm allow shareholders to pursue the shareholders’ assembly and other 
public conferences over the internet? 
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